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I first became aware of the state of Franklin nearly a decade ago, while 
pursuing my master’s degree at Western Carolina University in Cullowhee, 
North Carolina. Cryptic passing references often appeared in books, arti-
cles, and lectures, but the Franklin statehood movement remained obscured 
by the maddening complexity and confusion surrounding the event. Very 
few historians actually identified the underlying causes, participants, or 
results of the separatist movement, and it was nearly impossible to locate 
even a precise geographical definition of the boundaries of the “lost” state. 
Perhaps it was this cloud of obscurity that inspired my own fascination with 
the subject, but I gradually became more and more intrigued by the state of 
Franklin and the Franklinites. What was this long forgotten statehood 
movement? Why did it fail? Who were the leaders of the movement? These 
essential questions continued to spark my historical fascination and ulti-
mately propelled this project forward.
By the time I arrived at West Virginia University in the fall of 2000 to 
pursue my doctoral degree, I had committed myself to writing my disserta-
tion on the state of Franklin. As I began to study the history of America’s 
early national period, I became transfixed by the political disquietude and 
socioeconomic turmoil precipitated by the American Revolution. The 
Revolutionary War unleashed a wave of bubbling social tensions previously 
submerged under the weight of British colonial rule and a decade of revolu-
tion. As politically marginalized and economically exploited groups of “new 
Americans” agitated for their share of the fruits of the American Revolu-
tion, postbellum America erupted in spasms of violence and political unrest. 
From Daniel Shay’s rebelling Massachusetts yeoman farmers to trans-
Appalachia’s Whiskey Rebels, expressions of fierce backcountry localism 
and agrarian radicalism threatened to plunge America into its own Revolt 
of the Vendee.
Against this historical backdrop of political chaos and social unrest, the 
backcountry leaders of the Tennessee Valley initiated their effort to estab-
lish America’s fourteenth state. As I gradually sifted through the materials 
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relating to the state of Franklin, written primarily by admirers of both the 
movement and the state’s only governor, John Sevier, I began to believe that 
the Tennessee Valley separatist movement emanated from the same ideo-
logical strains and reflected admirable goals similar to the other expressions 
of postrevolutionary frontier radicalism. I embraced the image of the 
Franklinites as noble adherents to the principles of the American Revolu-
tion and their movement as a grassroots expression of backcountry egali-
tarianism and passion for self-governance. Pennsylvanians had their 
Whiskey Rebels. North and South Carolinians had their Regulators. New 
Englanders had their Shaysites. So it seemed only natural for Tennesseans 
to have their Franklinites.
Of course, the deeper I delved into the primary source materials related 
to the state of Franklin, the less this romantic (and naïve) image of the 
movement and its leaders resembled historical reality. Many scholars who 
have chronicled the statehood movement refer to Franklin as the “lost state,” 
and in many ways this project represents my effort to rediscover it and the 
statehood movement’s far-reaching consequences for the new American 
Republic and Appalachia’s Amerindian and Euroamerican residents.
As with many first historical monographs, this project began as my 
doctoral dissertation and could not have been completed without the sup-
port, encouragement, and compassion of a number of individuals, institu-
tions, and organizations. My fascination with the Appalachian frontier 
began at Western Carolina University, where I had the pleasure of studying 
and working with several wonderful historians. They include Curtis W. 
Wood, H. Tyler Blethen, George Frizzell, and William L. Anderson. My 
time in the Cullowhee Valley remains one of the most magical periods of 
my life. I am also deeply indebted for the tremendous support I received 
from the faculty and my fellow graduate students at West Virginia Univer-
sity. They include Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, Mary Lou Lustig, A. Michal 
McMahon, Steven M. Zdatny, Tim Konhaus, Jennifer Egolf, and Elizabeth 
Oliver-Lee.
In many ways I am the product of these two universities, and this book 
represents not only my own struggle to become a historian, but also the 
struggles of the professors who worked so hard and gave so much to allow 
me the opportunity to participate in life’s amazing historical conversation. 
I want to express my most heartfelt gratitude to Ronald L. Lewis, Ken 
Fones-Wolf, and Peter S. Carmichael for their inspiration and guidance on 
my quest to become a historian, and I am eternally grateful.
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This project would not have been possible without the support of Mar-
shall University and my friends and colleagues in the Department of His-
tory. I also want to thank East Tennessee State University archivist Ned L. 
Irwin for his gracious encouragement of this study and for compiling an 
exhaustive and invaluable bibliography related to the state of Franklin. Ad-
ditionally, I want to express my thanks to the universities, organizations, 
and library/archival staffs that gave so freely of their time and resources to 
make this project possible. These include: West Virginia University (West 
Virginia Collection), Marshall University (Special Collections), East Ten-
nessee State University (Archives of Appalachia), Western Carolina Univer-
sity (Special Collections), University of Tennessee (Special Collections and 
Archives), Tennessee State Library and Archives, University of North Caro-
lina Manuscripts Department at the Wilson Library (Southern Historical 
Collection), North Carolina State Archives, Appalachian State University 
(W. L. Eury Appalachian Collection), East Tennessee Historical Society 
(McClung Historical Collection), and the Tipton-Haynes Historical Site.
I am fortunate to have the love and support of several wonderful fami-
lies. I want to thank the Barksdale, Howell, Tjovaras, and McFerrin fami-
lies for their kindness and encouragement. I also want to thank my “animal 
family” (Clyde, Otis, and Floyd) for their companionship and humor. Fi-
nally, to Kelli, this book is as much yours as it is mine. You have given me 
the confidence to see this project to its conclusion.
Doss Hill, West Virginia
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Yes, give me the land that hath legends and lays
That tell of the memories of long-vanished days.
Yes, give me the land that hath story and song
To tell of the strife of the right with the wrong;
Yes, give me the land with a grave in each spot
And names in the graves that shall not be forgot.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
And the graves of the dead, with the grass overgrown,
May yet form the footstool Of Liberty’s throne.
—Father Abram J. Ryan, 
from Poems: Patriotic, Religious, Miscellaneous
In the winter of 1784, an ambitious coalition of Tennessee Valley leading 
men and their small-holder supporters defiantly declared their indepen-
dence from the state of North Carolina and formed the sovereign state of 
Franklin.1 Over the next four years, the Franklinites crafted a backcountry 
bureaucracy aimed at defending their Tennessee Valley communities and 
their contested trans-Appalachian land claims, advancing their regional 
market economy and landholdings, eradicating the southwestern frontier’s 
Native American inhabitants, and ultimately winning support for Franklin’s 
admission into the union as America’s fourteenth state. The Franklin state-
hood movement unleashed a cataclysmic wave of partisan violence and In-
dian warfare that left hundreds dead and the Tennessee Valley communities 
reeling from the devastation of political discord and backcountry blood-
shed. The Franklin separatist movement resulted in the emergence of a te-
nacious faction of Anti-Franklinites, whose efforts to derail the statehood 
movement led to the polarization of the once unified trans-Appalachian 
Footstool of Libert y’s Th rone
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communities. Despite the diplomatic efforts of the Franklinites, the state-
hood movement failed to garner political support from outside of the region 
and ultimately succumbed to external political pressure and intestine 
factionalism.
From its inception, the Franklin separatist movement evoked passion-
ate responses from inside and outside of the Tennessee Valley, and the par-
tisan tensions that emerged during the state’s chaotic four-year existence 
persisted long after the movement’s collapse and the passing of the partici-
pants in the Franklin affair. During the two hundred years of historical 
scrutiny, two diametrically opposed interpretations of the Franklin state-
hood movement and its leadership developed. After the state’s violent disin-
tegration in 1788, descendents and celebrants of the Franklinites recast the 
historical legacy and meaning of the trans-Appalachian separatist move-
ment. Local historians, romance novelists, ambitious politicians, and re-
gional business leaders defended the image of Franklin as a patriotic 
extension of the American Revolution and the Franklinites as virtuous ad-
herents to the republican principles of self-determination and popular sov-
ereignty. Throughout the twentieth century, historians repeatedly challenged 
this romanticized vision of Franklin’s murky past and identified the often 
sordid maneuverings of the state’s political leadership.
In an address delivered to the Historical Society of Washington Coun-
ty, Tennessee, in the early 1940s, the Honorable E. Munsey Slack described 
the state of Franklin as a “vision that was magnificent, a dream that illumi-
nates history, a hope that stirs ambition and thrills men to this day!”2 Slack’s 
depiction of the Franklin separatist movement built upon the efforts of the 
Franklinites and their supporters to fashion an image that simultaneously 
connected their state to the glory and nobility of the American Revolution 
and distanced it from the economic motivations and internal factionalism 
tainting their statehood movement. In 1932, University of Virginia history 
professor Thomas Perkins Abernethy penned a scathing economic interpre-
tation of the development of the Tennessee frontier, entitled From Frontier 
to Plantation in Tennessee. Against the backdrop of the Great Depression 
and the birth of “New Deal liberalism,” Abernethy emphasized the central 
role land speculators played in the organization of Tennessee, and harshly 
condemned the consequences of their monopolization of land and corrup-
tion of regional politics on the unsuspecting yeoman farmers of the Tennes-
see Valley.3 In his chapter on the state of Franklin, Abernethy argued that 
two powerful cabals of land speculators instigated the separatist movement 
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in order to increase their personal landed wealth. As to the revolutionary 
sprit of the Franklinites, he stated, “There was nothing revolutionary in the 
minds of the men who had started out to establish this State of Franklin.” 
Abernethy castigated previous Franklin defenders who “have heretofore 
treated the Franklin movement as a serious rebellion—the cry of the West 
for freedom.”4 Slack’s laudation and Abernethy’s condemnation reflected 
decades of misunderstanding, mythologizing, and distorting America’s first 
postrevolutionary statehood effort in the trans-Allegheny frontier. These 
two divergent historical versions of Franklin evince the polarizing effect of 
the statehood movement on the residents and chroniclers of the Tennessee 
Valley. This study seeks to find Franklin’s historical middle ground and 
reveal the complex, chaotic, and often tragic historical reality behind the 
backcountry movement to create America’s first trans-Appalachian state.
The disparity between the popular perception and the historiography 
relating to the state of Franklin originated with the bitter political partisan-
ship that fermented within the Tennessee Valley communities during the 
earliest days of the movement. The historical battle waged in print, oration, 
museum displays, and on granite memorials to recount and define the mo-
tivation and legacy of Franklin stands as a testament to the emotions the 
movement and its participants inspired in both its defenders and critics. 
Tennessee’s first historians relied heavily on oral accounts offered by par-
ticipants in the Franklin debacle in their efforts to record the early history 
of the state of Tennessee. In 1823, Tennessee judge John Haywood com-
piled the first historical account of the state of Franklin. During his judicial 
appointment in Tennessee, Haywood began to “collect the facts” for his 
history from the “remarkable men” who carved out East Tennessee. Hay-
wood’s book, The Civil and Political History of Tennessee, is one of the earli-
est and most important works on frontier Tennessee history and laid the 
historical groundwork for every student of Franklin.5 Prominent Tennessee 
Valley historian and Franklinite descendent Dr. J. G. M. Ramsey relied 
heavily on the pioneering work of John Haywood in his own history of the 
Franklin movement. Ramsey’s 1853 The Annals of Tennessee remains the 
definitive work on the early history of the state.6 Dr. Ramsey’s father, F. A. 
Ramsey, supported the Franklin movement, and his participation in the 
Franklin government occasionally led his son to dramatize the state’s past. 
J. G. M. Ramsey concluded his account of the statehood movement with a 
forlorn “Vindication of Franklin.” He assured his readers that “the action of 
the parties [participating in the Franklin affair] need not be ascribed to 
6 Th e Lost State of Franklin
fickleness of purpose or bad faith, much less to disloyalty to their proper 
rules, or insubordination to regular government and law.” Ramsey argued 
that the Franklinites seceded from North Carolina to “preserve quiet and 
order,” and “their course was pacific and conservative . . . nothing destruc-
tive or revolutionary, much less belligerent, was intended or contemplated.” 
Dr. Ramsey believed that “Every review of the conduct of both parties in the 
disaffected [Franklin] counties, from 1784 to 1788, reflects honour upon 
their patriotism, their moderation, their love of order, and their virtue.”7
Haywood’s and Ramsey’s descriptions of the state of Franklin demon-
strate similar historiographical characteristics, with both accounts relying 
upon suspect oral traditions offered by participants in the Franklin affair 
that negatively impacted historical accuracy. Additionally, both early histo-
ries ignored the significance of land speculation, the brutality of white on 
red violence, and the Franklin government’s clandestine relationship with 
the nation of Spain. Despite the factual shortcomings of the accounts of-
fered by Haywood and Ramsey, their scholarship inspired historical fasci-
nation into the obscure backcountry statehood movement and revived 
regional interest in the state of Franklin.
During the decades surrounding the Civil War, the state of Franklin 
largely faded into historical obscurity as American historians struggled to 
come to grips with the tragedy of war and the turmoil of reconstruction. 
In East Tennessee, survivors of the Civil War and localized “bushwhacker 
wars” confronted the horrors of postbellum life in their war-ravaged com-
munities. The region’s identification with radical abolitionism, vocal op-
position to Tennessee’s secession, and wartime unionism muddied the 
Tennessee Valley’s Civil War legacy.8 East Tennessee’s historical reputation 
emerged tarnished from the carnage of the Civil War, and East Tennesse-
ans found it difficult to draw upon the South’s “Lost Cause” mythology to 
ease the pain of military defeat and the wrenching socioeconomic transfor-
mation of Reconstruction. They instead turned to two of the Tennessee 
Valley’s defining moments, the revolutionary Battle of King’s Mountain 
and the legacy of mountain separatism, to repair their region’s historical 
image. The state of Franklin emerged from the Civil War and Reconstruc-
tion transformed.9
In the decades following the Civil War, the historiography and popular 
perception of the state of Franklin diverged. Historical scrutiny of the sepa-
ratist movement intensified, and the simplistic and often romanticized na-
tionalistic interpretations of historians like Haywood and Ramsey yielded 
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to probing revisionism. As scholars deconstructed the events and meaning 
of Franklin, local East Tennesseans continued to reinvent and reinterpret 
the legacy of their “lost” state and its fallen heroes. On occasion the lines of 
historical scholarship and popular memory intersected, but more often, the 
two interpretive paths careened hopelessly in opposite directions.
More than any other Franklinite, the only governor of the state of 
Franklin, John Sevier, became the embodiment of the blossoming regional 
mythology surrounding the state. On January 7, 1873, East Tennessee resi-
dent William A. Henderson delivered a speech before the Board of Trade of 
the City of Knoxville. The lecture, entitled “Nolachucky Jack,” offered at-
tendees an aggrandized account of John Sevier’s life. From his “distinguished 
services at [the revolutionary Battle of ] King’s Mountain” to his governor-
ship of the state of Tennessee, Henderson lavished praise upon Sevier. He 
referred to the Franklin movement as a “little revolution,” and argued that 
the “rebellion of Franklin” owed its very survival to the courage of John Se-
vier. Henderson’s carefully crafted image portrayed Sevier as a friend to the 
Indian, fictively quoting one Cherokee treaty negotiator as saying, “Send us 
Nolachucky Jack; he is a good and great man, and will do us right.” Hender-
son recounted another incident in which a young child and his father waited 
along a dusty roadside for “Nolachucky Jack” to pass. Apparently, Sevier’s 
“legend” overshadowed his actual physical appearance, leaving the child 
disappointed that he “was only a man.” According to Henderson’s lecture, 
Sevier’s heroic stature caused the supernatural death of the North Carolina 
judge responsible for issuing the warrant for the Franklin governor’s arrest 
during the finals days of the statehood movement. Following his signing of 
the warrant for Sevier’s arrest, Judge Spencer found himself “prostrated on a 
bed of sickness.” After overcoming his mysterious illness, “he arose from his 
bed and seated himself under an oak in his yard, when his antagonist sud-
denly without warning, fiercely attacked him.” Despite his “cries of help” 
and the rescue efforts of his family, Judge Spencer succumbed to injuries 
inflicted upon him by a “turkey gobbler.” “The cause of the singular tragedy 
was referred by some to the red flannel worn at the time by the unfortunate 
victim, but many of the common people always stoutly maintained that it 
was because he had had John Sevier arrested!” William Henderson’s exag-
gerated account of John Sevier’s life represented a new phase in the burgeon-
ing legend of John Sevier and the state of Franklin.10
In 1887, Sevier biographer James Roberts Gilmore published the sec-
ond volume of his biography of John Sevier, entitled John Sevier as a 
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Commonwealth-Builder. Gilmore, best known for his Civil War stories and 
poems, advanced the “romantic” historical interpretation of the state of 
Franklin and the life of John Sevier.11 He glowingly depicted Sevier as “the 
rear-guard of the Revolution and the guardian and defender of the newly 
planted civilization beyond the Alleghenies.” Sevier valiantly “built up a 
great commonwealth in the very heart of the Western wilderness.” The 
opposition leaders of the Franklin movement, John Tipton and Joseph 
Martin, are portrayed as Sevier’s ruthless “enemies” who stopped at nothing 
to destroy the Franklin movement and its august leader. Gilmore harshly 
criticized Indian agent and land speculator Joseph Martin, labeling him “a 
treacherous friend” and “self-seeking demagogue.” His descriptions of John 
Tipton are even more venomous, with Gilmore comparing Tipton to the 
biblical Prince of Darkness and Antichrist, “Belial.”12
Gilmore’s biography continued the antebellum historical feud between 
the Franklinites and Anti-Franklinites and created what one historian for-
givingly labeled as the “Democratic” interpretation of the state of Franklin.13 
In Gilmore’s hyperbolized version of Franklin, North Carolina’s “indiffer-
ence” and “parsimonious refusal of all appropriations” for the Tennessee 
Valley communities forced Sevier and the Franklinites to declare their inde-
pendence. According to Gilmore, “North Carolina bade her over-mountain 
citizens look for security and protection, at the very time when they were in 
daily danger from the savage enemy.” He mused, “With their parent state’s 
refusal to protect their families, Can it be wondered at that, when tidings 
crossed the Alleghenies, it aroused a universal feeling of indignant conster-
nation?” Gilmore caustically described the Tennessee Valley’s principal 
Native American inhabitants, the Overhill Cherokee, as “savages” who re-
fused to abide by lawfully concluded land treaties, and applauded the 
peace-seeking Franklinites who conducted assaults against the Native 
American communities only to protect their own families. He denounced a 
remarkable egalitarian frontier constitution, proposed for the state by a 
leading Tennessee Valley Presbyterian minister and defeated by Sevier and 
his fellow Franklinites, as a frame of government drafted by religious “zeal-
ots” and supported by an “intolerant minority.” Gilmore also avoided ac-
knowledging the Sevier family’s role in a series of clandestine backcountry 
talks between Franklin and the nation of Spain, and accused John Tipton 
of “recklessly” instigating the climactic and tragic battle on his farm during 
the final days of the state of Franklin. In Gilmore’s Shakespearean history 
of Franklin, Sevier gallantly led his fellow Tennessee Valley residents into a 
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period of “unbroken prosperity,” in which “Education had been fostered, 
law had been duly administered, and crime had been a thing almost un-
known.” Sevier defended the state of Franklin from “a swarm of warlike 
enemies,” but alas, “The reign of peace and law and fraternal feeling was for 
a time to be interrupted by the machinations of a few reckless and ambitious 
men, who, with no power or influence of their own, were rendered potent for 
evil by the ‘mother-State’” of North Carolina. James Roberts Gilmore cre-
ated East Tennessee’s own version of the “Lost Cause,” and John Sevier’s 
failed statehood movement became the forlorn “Lost State of Franklin.”14
At the turn of the twentieth century, the first gaps emerged between 
the historical studies and the public’s perception of the state of Franklin. As 
“Progressive” historians began to question and reshape our understanding 
of the past, the simplistic and nationalistic interpretations of the nineteenth 
century yielded to piercing historical revisionism. Influenced by the pro-
found socioeconomic and political changes accompanying the opening 
decades of the twentieth century, the scholarship of Progressive historians 
“focused on the social [and economic] forces they believed drove history.”15 
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt published his four-volume history 
of the American frontier, entitled The Winning of the West. His chapter on 
the state of Franklin offered one of the earliest unvarnished critiques of the 
movement and its supporters. Roosevelt described the Franklin movement 
as a “separatist” movement and downplayed its connection to the principles 
of the revolution. He acknowledged the “blunt truthfulness” and “real at-
titude of the Franklin people . . . towards the Indians,” stating that the 
Franklinites “never swerved from their intention of seizing Indian lands . . . 
by force.” He labeled the Franklinites as “freebooter[s]” and “pirates” who 
“lusted for the possessions of the Indian.” Despite Roosevelt’s Native 
American racism, he understood the tragedy that befell the southeastern 
Indian tribes when they found themselves “face to face” with a “masterful 
[race] of people, still in their barbarian prime.” He believed that “the con-
quest and settlement by the whites of the Indian lands was necessary to the 
greatness of the race and to the well-being of civilized mankind. It was as 
ultimately beneficial as it was inevitable.” “As to the morality or immorality” 
of these events, Roosevelt argued that “a conquest may be fraught either 
with evil or with good for mankind.” He acknowledged that “Every such 
submersion or displacement of an inferior race, every such armed settlement 
or conquest by a superior race, means the infliction and suffering of hideous 
woe and misery.” As to history’s judgment of the Franklinites, Roosevelt 
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stated, “All that can be asked is that they shall be judged as other wilderness 
conquerors, as other slayers and quellers of savage peoples are judged.” 
Roosevelt’s Winning of the West represented a watershed moment in the 
historiographical maturation of the state of Franklin and the “New History” 
being offered by Progressive historians.16
Despite the efforts of Progressive historians like Theodore Roosevelt to 
reinterpret the backcountry separatist movement, the mythology surround-
ing John Sevier and the “lost” state of Franklin continued to seep into the 
public’s consciousness.17 On March 11, 1910, Dr. William Edward Fitch 
delivered a speech to the New York Society of the Order of the Founders 
and Patriots of America at the Hotel Manhattan. The talk, entitled “The 
Origin, Rise, and Downfall of the State of Franklin, Under Her First and 
Only Governor, John Sevier,” exemplified the popular perception of Frank-
lin. Dr. Fitch described the Franklinites as “the fearless pioneers of the west, 
who had gone into the wilderness, had suffered incredible hardships, many 
of whom had been murdered by the savages, some had their wives and 
children massacred, and all had suffered in privation and property.” John 
Sevier “stood guard over and protected the women and children of the State 
of Franklin,” and “their absolute devotion to him . . . enabled him to con-
quer his greatly superior savage enemies.” Fitch believed that Sevier “pre-
ferred peace to war” with the Indians, and that he made every effort to see 
that “the two races . . . live[d] together in perpetual amity.”18 Biblical imag-
ery and language permeated Fitch’s lecture. He described the Franklinites’ 
unwavering devotion to independence and Sevier, conjecturing that “Had 
the destroying angel passed through the land, and destroyed the first born 
in every section, the feelings of the hardy frontiersmen would not have been 
more highly incensed.” He closed his lengthy address with a rousing patri-
otic summary of the state of Franklin, describing the state as “the immedi-
ate offspring of the Revolution of the Regulators, culminating in the Battle 
of Alamance in 1771.” In Fitch’s fallacious history of “the little common-
wealth of the State of Franklin,” the Franklinites earned their “indepen-
dence . . . before it was dreamed of elsewhere.” Despite the fact that the state 
did not exist before the American Revolution, Fitch thought it necessary to 
reveal that “the British flag was never unfurled, and no British officer ever 
trod the soil” of Franklin. The Franklinites “paid tribute to no government 
on earth except their own,” and their actions “set to the people of the new 
world the dangerous example of erecting themselves into a state, separate 
and distinct from, and independent of, the authority of the English Crown.” 
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For Fitch, the Franklin separatist movement inspired America’s Declaration 
of Independence and the Revolutionary War.19
The mythologizing and memorializing of the state of Franklin ex-
tended well beyond exalted speeches and lectures. On August 22, 1903, the 
Historical Society of Washington County held a public ceremony in Jones-
boro (now Jonesborough) “to celebrate the founding, or organization, of the 
State of Franklin.”20 Fifteen years later, the Samuel Doak Chapter of the 
Daughters of the American Revolution unveiled a memorial to Franklin in 
the courthouse square of the former state capital of Greeneville. The 
marker commemorated “the courageous little commonwealth that repudi-
ated the sovereignty of North Carolina, and for five years exercised state-
hood in defiance of North Carolina and the Continental Congress.” The 
Dorian marble monument stood 6½ feet in height and 14½ feet in width, 
and included a bronzed “tablet inscribed” with the following:
1785–1788
To Commemorate the Capitol
of the
State of Franklin
and
To Honor
Governor John Sevier
and the Patriotic Pioneers
Who Followed Him in the
War of the Revolution
and Assisted in Establishing
in the Wilderness the
Foundation of
Law and Liberty.
Erected 1918
Through the Efforts of the
Samuel Doak Chapter
of the
Daughters of the American
Revolution
Morristown, Tennessee
Daughters of the American Revolution member Louise Wilson Reynolds 
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penned a companion history of Franklin for the Daughters of the American 
Revolution Magazine. Reynolds recounted the “story of the brave little 
Franklin,” whose history burned with “all the fire and romance which is 
usually attributed to fiction.” She described John Sevier as “handsome, 
magnetic, and graceful in manner and form,” one who dashingly “made his 
appearance on the page of frontier romance as a gallant admired by the 
belles in linsey.” Reynolds believed that the Franklin Monument stood as a 
“deserving and too long neglected tribute to the fearless, liberty-loving pa-
triots, the rugged pioneers of Tennessee.”21
In 1924, amid the speeches, lectures, celebrations, and memorials, Ten-
nessee historian and former justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court Samu-
el Cole Williams published the first book-length treatment of the state of 
Franklin. Williams’s History of the Lost State of Franklin is a sweeping study 
of the Franklin statehood movement.22 Williams understood the historical 
inaccuracies and ongoing public romanticization regarding Franklin, and 
he hoped his history would “extend the research, correct errors, and supple-
ment the work of the earlier [Franklin] writers.” Despite the effort of Judge 
Williams to correct the rampant fallacious mythology and historical inac-
curacies surrounding the state of Franklin, the historical realities of the 
separatist movement remained obscured behind the blinding rays of patrio-
tism and the deafening roar of local adulation.23
Following the 1932 publication of Thomas Perkins Abernethy’s scath-
ing revisionist history of Franklin, professional historians continued to re-
interpret the state’s past. In 1960, Tennessee historians Stanley J. Folmsbee, 
Robert E. Corlew, and Enoch L. Mitchell issued their seminal four-volume 
History of Tennessee. Their study of Tennessee reflected the social turbulence 
of the 1960s and the profound transformation of the historical discipline 
being ushered in by the emerging “New Left” historians. These New Left 
historians exploded the consensus historical interpretations of post–World 
War II America and explored the impact of societal conflict and the colli-
sion of countervailing forces on America’s past. The three Tennessee history 
professors’ treatment of the state of Franklin built upon the work of Pro-
gressive historians like Abernethy and Roosevelt and embraced their “accent 
on economic motives” behind the statehood movement.24 The authors also 
pointed out the link between land speculation and the Franklin separatist 
movement, arguing that “Sevier assumed leadership” of the Franklin gov-
ernment “apparently in the hope that . . . [it] might be used as a means of 
reviving and advancing” a lucrative Tennessee River land deal.25 Fifteen 
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years after the publication of Folmsbee, Corlew, and Mitchell’s book, the 
prolific Tennessee scholar Wilma Dykeman completed her bicentennial 
history of Tennessee. Dykeman’s book, simply titled Tennessee: A History, 
offered another discerning interpretation of the Franklin movement. Dyke-
man criticized the “romanticization [of Franklin] by local writers,” and as-
serted that the state stood as “an example of common public needs and 
desires shaped and used by powerful private interests allied with interna-
tional ambitions.” She believed that “money was a deep though often ob-
scure motive behind the movement for the new state” and the “bloody 
skirmishes between Cherokees and Franklinites.” Dykeman denounced the 
“land-hungry settlers” for initiating the Indian wars, and branded the exe-
cution of two peaceful Overhill Cherokee chiefs by a Franklinite as the 
“low point of Southern frontier history.” As historians like Roosevelt, Aber-
nethy, Folmsbee, Corlew, Mitchell, and Dykeman identified the economic 
motivations and grievous consequences of Tennessee Valley separatism, the 
myths and melodrama of earlier historical efforts largely disappeared from 
scholarly works on Franklin.26
Despite the biting historical revisionism offered by Franklin scholars 
throughout the twentieth century, the romantic historical interpretation of 
Franklin persisted. The pertinacious defense of Franklin’s historical legacy 
by regional historical societies, local writers, the descendents of the Frank-
linites, and East Tennessee’s political and economic leaders kept the my-
thology of Franklin alive.27 Writers like Noel B. Gerson and Paul M. Fink 
continued to applaud Franklin “as a self-made state carved out of the wil-
derness almost overnight by ambitious, energetic frontiersmen who refused 
to be halted or even slowed by obstacles that would have forced the more 
cautious to wait, weigh risks and proceed slowly.” Paul M. Fink, the most 
important twentieth-century collector of documents and artifacts relating 
to Franklin, wrote in a 1957 essay, “Such was the independence and indi-
vidualism that characterized the founders of the State of Franklin, and 
sustained them in their valiant but temporarily fruitless efforts to enjoy self 
government—as a new state or as a separate nation.”28 In his 1968 history 
entitled Franklin: America’s Lost State, Gerson proudly proclaimed that the 
Franklinites’ “relentless drive . . . set in motion the forces that transformed 
an impenetrable wilderness into one of the most advanced and cultivated 
regions in the entire United States.”29
As the state of Franklin entered its third century of historical interpre-
tation and public celebration, its mythology and history continued to be at 
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odds. The Progressive and “New Left” historians left little doubt that the 
Tennessee Valley separatist movement stood in sharp contrast to the 
distorted and often self-serving images being offered by the Franklinites’ 
defenders, descendents, and admirers. The widening divide between pro-
fessional historians and Franklin supporters continued to eerily parallel the 
eighteenth-century political partisanship that ultimately destroyed the 
state. Revisionist historians stepped into the role of the Tiptonites and 
modern Franklin loyalists continue to fill the part of Sevier and the rebel-
lious Franklinites.
In sharp contrast to the previous historical dialectic separating Franklin’s 
historiographical development and the regional evolution of popular percep-
tion, the statehood movement cannot be simply characterized as either a re-
publican aftershock of radical idealism sparked by the American Revolution 
or a sinister plot forced upon the unsuspecting inhabitants of the Tennessee 
Valley by an edacious coterie of backcountry land speculators. The Franklin 
separatist movement emerged within the competitive and anarchic political 
and economic climate that materialized following the American Revolution 
on the rapidly developing trans-Appalachian borderlands. Under the strict 
limitations imposed by the Articles of Confederation on the powers of the 
national government, the United States proved incapable of governing, de-
veloping, or defending its western frontier. Faced with continued territorial 
threats posed by the British and Spanish, firmly ensconced in forts in the 
Northwest and Southwest respectively, and by Native American groups in-
creasingly hostile to western expansion, the American government struggled 
to meet the demands of the nation’s western settlers and to mediate the fierce 
competition for western land, political hegemony, and economic supremacy. 
This postrevolutionary political vacuum that emerged in the transmontane 
backcountry forced several state governments to engage in their own efforts 
at western governance, but geographical distances, political isolation, and 
powerful ideological forces presented enormous challenges to the effective-
ness of these policies.30 Across the new republic, disaffected factions initiated 
backcountry separatist movements aimed at creating new states, promoting 
economic growth, and securing local political autonomy. Throughout the 
final three decades of the eighteenth century, New Hampshirers (Vermont-
ers), Virginians (Kentuckians), and North Carolinians (Franklinites) agi-
tated for separation from their parent states and demanded control over their 
political and economic destiny. At its core, the Franklin separatist movement 
stood as a contest between two partisan ruling factions and their rank and 
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file supporters to determine the economic and political future of the Tennes-
see Valley.31
Following the settlement of the Tennessee Valley, a diverse and com-
petitive commercial economy blossomed within the communities of North 
Carolina’s trans-Appalachian frontier. This specie-poor, land-dependent 
backcountry economy hungrily craved new territory and markets. Despite 
the financial rewards offered by the region’s agrarian economy, mercantile 
interests, and available lands, the postrevolutionary economic malaise, in-
adequacies of regional trade and transportation arteries, marginalization by 
North Carolina’s eastern political leadership, and the U.S. government’s 
pacific Indian policies presented formidable obstacles to the expansion of 
the Tennessee Valley market economy. In the face of these limitations, an 
influential class of commercial farmers, merchants, and land speculators 
emerged within the valley communities and quickly secured control over 
the region’s political economy. This ruling class utilized their regional in-
fluence, their shared wartime and frontier experiences, and their collective 
political and financial interests to secure the allegiance of their Tennessee 
Valley neighbors.32
Despite the existence of internal tensions provoked by fierce competi-
tion for landed wealth, control over the regional marketplace, and domin-
ion over political and judicial positions of local and regional influence, the 
leaders and residents of the Tennessee Valley remained largely united im-
mediately following the revolutionary and backcountry Indian wars. North 
Carolina’s postbellum cession of its western lands (which included the 
Tennessee Valley) to the U.S. government disturbed the tenuous harmony 
among the valley residents and unleashed partisan forces that polarized 
the entire region. The 1784 Cession Act offered the Tennessee Valley’s 
leading men the opportunity to pursue their own political and economic 
agenda unfettered by the policies of their parent state of North Carolina. 
The leadership of the Tennessee Valley quickly seized upon the political 
circumstance and initiated the Franklin statehood movement. Their deci-
sion forced valley residents to choose sides in the escalating separatist de-
bate and opened up a widening gulf between the once unified Tennessee 
Valley inhabitants.
The Franklinites’ efforts to expand their regional commercial economy 
and unrelenting pursuit of western lands inevitably brought them into di-
rect conflict with the Native American groups who claimed much of the 
southwestern frontier. Franklin’s political autonomy allowed the separatist 
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leaders to carry out their long-delayed hawkish diplomatic and military 
campaign against the southeastern Indians that resulted in coerced land 
treaties, the intensification of backcountry savagery, and ill-fated alliances 
with the state of Georgia and the nation of Spain. The savvy political lead-
ership and supporters of Franklin understood the interconnectedness of 
their land-based economy and diplomatic policies to the level of Indian 
warfare, but chose to accept the inherent dangers in exchange for opening 
new lands to white settlement. This tumultuous dynamic occurred across 
the rapidly expanding western frontier, and the state of Franklin simply 
represented another front in the conflict between Euroamerican expansion 
and Native American resistance. Franklin is not exceptional in this respect, 
but the ferocity and duration of the Indian wars in the Tennessee Valley 
made for one of the bloodiest periods in eighteenth-century America.
Over the course of four years, Franklin’s leadership and small-holder 
supporters managed to fashion a functioning state government and court 
system, but failed to attract backing for their separatist movement from 
outside the region. Despite the overwhelming regional support for Franklin 
by the Tennessee Valley’s yeoman farmers and merchants, the movement 
came under attack from the political leadership of eastern North Carolina, 
the U.S. government, and a determined minority faction within the Ten-
nessee Valley. The inability of the Franklinites to amass support for their 
state within the halls of the North Carolina legislature or the U.S. Con-
gress, North Carolina’s divisive strategy for defeating the movement, and 
the hardening of partisan positions within the Tennessee Valley escalated 
the competition for control over the region’s political and economic pros-
pects. The polarization of the Tennessee Valley caused by the state of 
Franklin ultimately resulted in a bloody pitched battle between the two 
warring factions upon the snow-covered fields of Anti-Franklinite leader 
John Tipton’s Washington County farm and the ruination of the Franklin 
separatist movement.
The state of Franklin remains a powerful symbol for many East Ten-
nesseans, and its historical legacy is carefully preserved in the highway 
markers, business names, and stone monuments dotting the rolling hills of 
the Tennessee Valley. To East Tennesseans, Franklin and its charismatic 
governor, John Sevier, have come to represent rugged individualism, re-
gional exceptionalism, and civic dignity. The purpose of this study is not to 
take this away from them, but to reevaluate the extraordinary history of 
their “lost” state. However one chooses to interpret the statehood move-
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ment, Franklin remains a complex and fascinating historical event. From 
their reckless assertion of independence to their undaunted diplomatic 
campaign to garner political and popular support for their movement, the 
Franklinites’ attempt to establish a new state in the Tennessee Valley stands 
as a testament to boundless economic and political ambition. As one 
Franklin historian commented, “Perhaps the most prominent characteris-
tic of the Franklinites was their relentless drive.”33 The state of Franklin’s 
ruinous failure reminds us of the extraordinary and fragile nature of 
America’s independence.
The state of Franklin emerged out of the shared desires of a powerful coali-
tion of landed elite, yeoman farmers, and backcountry merchants to defend, 
expand, and dominate the Tennessee Valley’s rapidly developing political 
economy. From the earliest permanent settlement of eastern Tennessee, a 
diverse, dynamic, and interconnected regional economy developed. Despite 
the potential financial rewards alluringly held out by commercial agricul-
ture, mercantilism, and land sales, the region’s full economic efficacy re-
mained unrealized throughout the 1780s. Lack of support from the North 
Carolina state government for the improvement of the Tennessee Valley’s 
infrastructure presented a formidable obstacle to economic advancement 
for the region’s ruling and laboring classes. The perceived unresponsiveness 
of North Carolina’s eastern political leaders to the demands made by back-
country farmers, stockmen, merchants, and land speculators for state funds 
for internal improvements ultimately served as one of the driving issues 
uniting many of the region’s economic elite and small-holders behind the 
Franklin statehood movement. Both the frontier localism and internal fac-
tionalism that erupted in the Tennessee Valley during the Franklin move-
ment found their origins in the fierce competition for control over the 
region’s political and economic systems.
The state of Franklin began with a journey by a forty-eight-year-old 
Scots-Irish militia captain, planter, and long hunter named William Bean. 
Captain Bean and his wife, Lydia “Liddy” Russell, ascended the Great War 
Path, following the Appalachian Mountains southwest through the Shenan-
doah Valley of Virginia with their four children in tow, and settled in the 
upper Tennessee Valley, near the Watauga River. Bean is widely believed to 
have been the first white man to permanently settle in the Tennessee back-
country. Hundreds of families followed the Beans into the heart of the 
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southwestern frontier to stake their claim to the rich resource-laden lands of 
the future state of Tennessee.1
In 1769, Bean built his mud-chinked log cabin at the mouth of Boone’s 
Creek, a small tributary of the Watauga River he named for his friend and 
hunting companion Daniel Boone.2 After a year spent busily improving 
land, cultivating crops, avoiding Indians, and giving birth to their fifth 
child, Russell, the first white child born to permanent settlers on the Ten-
nessee frontier, the Bean family moved even deeper into the Tennessee in-
terior.3 The Beans finally settled along the banks of the lower Watauga 
River at the junction between two key frontier routes, the Old Catawba 
Road and the Great War Path. Bean constructed a four-room log cabin that 
served as the family’s home and as a small inn for settlers, fur traders, and 
speculators who ventured into the Tennessee wilderness. The modest inn, 
known respectively as Bean’s Crossroads, Bean’s Cabin, or Bean’s Station, 
soon grew to include a tavern and a small blacksmith shop.4
The settlement of Bean’s Station and the rapid blossoming of a small 
community surrounding the homestead typified the early maturation of 
the Tennessee frontier. During a “long hunt,” Captain Bean and Daniel 
Boone had camped above the future site of the Bean’s Station settlement, 
and the weary hunters undoubtedly had made note of the abundance of 
water, land, game, nutrient-rich soils, and economic potential that lay at the 
foot of the Appalachian Mountains. Bean left his Pittsylvania County, 
Virginia, home and substantial landholdings to advance his family’s eco-
nomic fortunes. Despite the remoteness of Bean’s Station, he managed to 
create a thriving and diverse business that served the needs of the newest 
settlers and entrepreneurs traveling the ancient Indian paths into the Great 
Valley of Tennessee. The same desires for land and prosperity that led Bean 
to ignore the threats posed by Indian massacres, harsh winters, and geo-
graphic and cultural isolation lured hundreds of frontier families into the 
southwestern frontier. The defense of these backcountry land claims and 
communities and the expansion of the region’s multifarious economy com-
pelled the descendents of the Tennessee Valley’s first inhabitants to form 
the state of Franklin.5
After William Bean’s pioneering effort in the Watauga Valley, several 
permanent settlements sprang up along the twisting banks of the Watauga, 
Tennessee, and Holston rivers. These upper Tennessee Valley communities 
included Carter’s Valley, Shelby’s Station, Sycamore Shoals, and the Noli-
chucky settlements.6 Most of these early settlements developed similarly to 
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Bean’s Station. Men with economic vision and a desire to benefit from a 
rapidly expanding frontier economy established these communities. John 
Carter, founder of Carter’s Valley on the Holston River, was a Virginia 
merchant and trader who settled in the region sometime in 1772. He and 
his partner, Joseph Parker, watched a small community flourish around the 
backcountry store they erected to capitalize on the lucrative Cherokee fur 
trade and the influx of new frontier families.7 The financial success of 
Carter’s store led to its eventual looting by Cherokee Indians from the 
neighboring Overhill towns who bitterly complained that the store com-
peted with their own fur trade.8 In 1772, fifty-one-year-old Welshman 
Evan Shelby, a “hard-drinking Marylander,” moved his family into the 
Watauga Valley and settled on a 1,946-acre tract of land he called Sapling 
Grove.9 Shelby expanded his settlement, at the present-day site of the city 
of Bristol, Tennessee, by constructing a trading post and a small stockaded 
fort (appropriately named Fort Shelby) to protect his investment. Shelby’s 
Station, also known as “North-of-Holston,” became a critical trading post 
and rendezvous point for settlers venturing into the southwestern frontier.10 
Jacob Brown, an “itinerant trader” from South Carolina, and a small group 
of former North Carolina Regulators leased a tract of land from the Chero-
kee Indians and established the Nolichucky River settlements.11 Brown 
opened a small store, a gunsmith shop, and a blacksmith shop on the north 
bank of the Nolichucky River to cater to Indian fur traders.12 In the spring 
of 1770, James Robertson, an Orange County, North Carolina, farmer and 
participant in North Carolina’s Regulator movement, erected a settlement 
on a piece of land he called Sycamore Shoals.13 Robertson had fled into the 
Watauga Valley to escape the violence surrounding the Regulator move-
ment. The Sycamore Shoals settlement quickly grew to include twenty 
families, most Robertson’s own relatives.14 Capitalism drove the first fron-
tier settlers into the wilds of East Tennessee, and their successful businesses 
became the fiscal engines driving the economic development of the Tennes-
see Valley.15
Following the close of the American Revolution, the backcountry com-
munities that would eventually comprise the future state of Franklin 
experienced tremendous demographic and economic growth. By 1784, 
population increases and the rapid expansion of the regional marketplace 
had transformed the underdeveloped Tennessee Valley frontier settlements. 
Historians Paul H. Bergeron, Stephen V. Ash, and Jeanette Keith described 
the “push-pull” effect responsible for this dramatic population explosion. 
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Either legal or financial difficulties “pushed” early Tennessee Valley frontier 
families out of their communities, or economic possibilities “pulled” them 
into the region.16
In May 1772, the Watauga settlers banded together and fashioned a 
quasi-frontier government they called the Watauga Association.17 As the 
Tennessee Valley settlements continued to expand both economically and 
geographically, the backcountry residents realized the necessity of forming 
a frontier government in order to “manage land affairs and facilitate gover-
nance of the colony.”18 Under constant threat from the original Native 
American land claimants, mounting concern over the inadequacies of the 
local legal and political systems, and the looming revolutionary conflict, on 
July 5, 1776, the Watauga settlers sent a formal petition to the North Caro-
lina General Assembly requesting to be annexed and organized into a fron-
tier militia district or county.19 In April 1777, North Carolina accepted 
their petition, temporarily established the Washington District, and ap-
pointed twenty-one justices of the peace to oversee political and legal mat-
ters within the region. Seven months later, the North Carolina Assembly 
formally recognized the Wataugans by creating Washington County and 
establishing a much-needed Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions. Prior to 
the formation of the state of Franklin in 1784, administrative difficulties 
forced North Carolina to split off from Washington County the new coun-
ties of Sullivan (1779) and Greene (1783).20 The counties of Washington, 
Greene, and Sullivan and the rapidly shrinking swath of Tennessee Valley 
land reserved for the Cherokee Indians eventually comprised the boundar-
ies of Franklin.21
East Tennessee’s frontier economy is best described as a complex mix-
ture of semi-subsistence agriculture, early rural market capitalism, and ex-
pansive land speculation. The development of this mixed economy began 
with early frontier communities like Bean’s Station and the other Watauga 
Valley settlements, but four critical factors collided to determine the future 
course of the Tennessee Valley’s frontier economy: population growth, the 
abundance of natural resources and land, geography, and the tenuous eco-
nomic climate resulting from the American Revolution. The rapid growth 
of East Tennessee’s population dramatically impacted the region’s economy. 
Utilizing the scarce census records available prior to the formation of the 
state of Tennessee in 1796, historians estimate the 1778 population of 
Washington County, at the time encompassing nearly all of the eventual 
state of Franklin, at roughly 2,500 residents.22 This statistic reveals the 
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tremendous regional growth in the six years following the settlement of the 
Watauga River Valley. The confusion presented by the division of Wash-
ington County into Washington, Sullivan, and Greene counties and the 
incomplete nature of early tax lists further complicate efforts to ascertain 
precise population statistics. A July 1, 1791, census conducted by the South-
west Territory’s Governor William Blount established the population of the 
eastern section of the Southwest Territory at 36,043 residents, with ap-
proximately 29,000 of the settlers inhabiting the Tennessee Valley settle-
ments.23 Compiled tax lists for this same period show the population of a 
geographically diminished Washington County to be 5,862 persons.24 De-
spite the ambiguities of these census and tax records, it is clear that the 
Tennessee Valley experienced a sustained period of population growth be-
tween 1772 and 1791. The increased population strained relations with the 
region’s Native Americans and placed tremendous pressure on the Tennes-
see Valley’s court system, economy, and frontier defenses.25
On May 28, 1788, the well-traveled Methodist bishop Francis Asbury 
recounted in his journal the challenges and conditions he found when 
piercing the Smoky Mountains and descending into the Great Valley of the 
Tennessee. Asbury wrote, “After getting our horses shod, we made a move 
for Holstein [Holston], and entered upon the mountains; the first of which 
I called steel, the second stone, and the third iron mountain: they are rough 
and difficult to climb.” He also noted the “heavy rain” and “awful thunder 
and lightning” that plagued his journey into the Appalachian frontier. As-
bury’s journal entry concludes with a description of the “little dirty house 
where the filth might be taken up from the floor with a spade” that served 
as shelter for his traveling party.26 Bishop Asbury’s description of the Ten-
nessee frontier inadvertently offered keen insight into Franklin’s economy. 
The “rough and difficult” mountains made overland communication and 
trade enormously challenging and separated the Tennessee Valley settlers 
from their transmontane state government in Hillsboro, North Carolina.27 
The abundance of rainfall created excellent growing conditions for East 
Tennessee’s backcountry farmers, and the steel, stone, and iron mountains 
Asbury identified reflected the tremendous untapped wealth contained in 
the mineral resources buried deep within the surrounding ranges.28
The Tennessee Valley’s “dual economy” functioned as both a tradi-
tional subsistence-based “household economy” and as a peripheral com-
mercial marketplace.29 Most recent frontier scholars believe that America’s 
preindustrial backcountry economies began as semicommercial and rapidly 
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became “fully integrated in the world capitalist market system.”30 The no-
tion of a pure subsistence “moral economy” in the southern mountains was 
a romanticized “invention of the industrial age.”31 The examination of 
early backcountry settlers in the Shenandoah Valley reveals the existence of 
“nascent commercialism” on Virginia’s western frontier and the develop-
ment of rural market capitalism immediately following the “pioneer phase” 
of settlement.32 Across the southern Appalachian frontier, the presence of 
early land speculation, dense concentrations of wealth and land, slave labor, 
and the commodification of the region’s natural resources provides ample 
evidence that the southwestern frontier fit into a “global capitalist para-
digm.”33 The first settlers of eastern Tennessee embraced frontier market 
capitalism and positioned themselves to capitalize on the robust regional 
marketplace.34
Mercantile sales and hostelry emerged as two of the earliest businesses 
on the Tennessee frontier. Entrepreneurs like William Bean, Evan Shelby, 
John Carter, and Jacob Brown built inns, taverns, and a diverse array of 
shops to serve the needs of the expanding population and market demands. 
Small inns sprang up across the Tennessee Valley, and many of these busi-
nesses became hubs for commerce and the centers of community-building. 
In 1779, backcountry land surveyors laid out Tennessee’s first town, Jones-
boro (now Jonesborough), and sold the rustic town lots at a lottery for sixty 
dollars each. Within a few years, local businessmen developed two inns, a 
blacksmith shop, and a tavern in the frontier town. Jonesboro quickly 
became the “economic, political, and legal center of the region.”35 In the 
present-day town of Blountville, in Sullivan County, young William Deery 
purchased an old frontier trading post and expanded it to include an inn 
and public house. The financial success of the Old Deery Inn propelled the 
growth of Blountville, and the small frontier community eventually became 
an important stagecoach stop at the turn of the eighteenth century. Simi-
larly, the town of Rogersville, on the banks of the Holston River, owes its 
early growth to the commercial success of town founder Joseph Rogers’s 
frontier inn.36
Most of the early Tennessee Valley inns doubled as taverns or distill-
eries. Whiskey distillation, sales, and consumption remained fixtures in 
frontier America. As one historian commented, “a tavern host typically kept 
a tippling house for the sale of his own beverages.”37 Due to the geographic 
and transportation obstacles confronting frontier farmers, whiskey distilla-
tion served as a fiscally viable use of corn and other grains. The sale of 
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whiskey at the various taverns and inns that dotted the Tennessee Valley 
frontier emerged as an important source of revenue and provided a close 
connection between the region’s developing agrarian and mercantile econo-
mies.38 Bishop Francis Asbury’s complaints of the poor conditions at the 
inns in which he boarded during his mission into the Tennessee backcoun-
try omitted descriptions of the local home brew most travelers imbibed to 
sooth the aches and pains of rigorous mountain travel. The county courts 
customarily fixed prices for distilled spirits. In the early 1780s, the Sullivan 
County Court set the prices of “good distilled rye whiskey at two shillings, 
six pence per gallon and good peach or apple brandy at three shillings per 
gallon.” Some of the most prominent men in the region ran ordinary 
houses in the Tennessee backcountry. William Bean, William Deery, James 
Allison, Isaiah Hamilton, Richard Minton, and Valentine Sevier, the father 
of future state of Franklin governor John Sevier, all operated tippling 
houses. An inventory of Washington County estates illustrates the impor-
tance of whiskey distillation in the early East Tennessee economy. Men like 
Abraham Collet, Thomas Mitchell, and Thomas Dillard listed stills and 
vessels alongside their Bibles and cattle in their estates.39 Captain Thomas 
Amis, one of the most successful early merchants in Tennessee, moved his 
family from Bladen County, North Carolina, and opened a small store and 
tavern in present-day Rogersville. Amis constructed his tavern and store 
“on a high piece of ground in sight of Big Creek” in what eventually became 
Hawkins County. He sold whiskey by the drink in his tavern and in bulk 
at his store.40 Taverns also served as important meeting places in East Ten-
nessee. The state of Franklin held its first senate meeting “in one of the 
rooms of the [Greeneville] town tavern.” Even the presumably abstinent 
Bishop Asbury commented that during his stay at Thomas Amis’s inn and 
tavern his host kept his guests “well-entertained.”41 These early tavern and 
inn owners made a significant contribution to the growth and development 
of the Tennessee Valley.42
Beyond public accommodations and grog shops, East Tennessee’s early 
economy included a wide assortment of other businesses. Thomas Amis’s 
store and tavern eventually grew to include a gristmill and forge, and most 
Tennessee Valley towns employed at least one blacksmith.43 A search of the 
first tax lists for the region reveals trades such as silversmiths, weavers, full-
ers, stone masons, millers, and miners.44 The mineral wealth of the “stone, 
steel, and iron mountains” of  Tennessee’s Unaka Mountain Range remained 
largely untouched until the early 1790s, but the presence of earlier forges in 
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the Tennessee Valley proves that some mining occurred prior to 1790. In 
1770, Moses Embree moved his family into the Tennessee Valley, “took up 
land, erected a cabin, and built a forge making iron.” Embree’s forge is 
typical of an early iron-making operation on the southern frontier. “Moses 
made iron on a limited scale getting his ore up on the top of the hill and on 
Jacob Knaff ’s farm.” According to his descendents, the iron made in Moses’s 
forge “was the first iron wrought in this section,” and “the horses that went 
to [the Revolutionary War Battle of] King’s Mountain were shod from iron 
made” at Embree’s forge.45 In 1784, Colonel James King also constructed 
an iron works in Sullivan County. Using twenty-five-ton flatboats, King 
incredibly shipped his iron nails, produced in an adjoining nail factory, to 
other Tennessee Valley settlements and to cities as far away as New Or-
leans.46 Despite the small size of the furnaces, most producing less than five 
tons of iron a day, forges like the Embree family forge and King’s Ironworks 
provided a vital economic link between the region and distant markets.47
Despite the region’s rich mercantile diversity, agriculture and agriculture- 
related industries dominated the Franklin economy. The rich soils of the 
Tennessee Valley, “well-watered by the small streams issuing from the adja-
cent mountains,” were ideal for crops, and the abundance of open land of-
fered perfect conditions for raising cattle.48 East Tennessee’s temperate 
climate and ample precipitation added to the region’s suitability for com-
mercial farming. Corn, wheat, rye, oats, barley, and millet became staple 
crops in the early East Tennessee agrarian economy.49 Regional farmers 
raised hogs, sheep, horses, and other cattle in the hardwood forests and 
cleared pastureland surrounding their farms and communities.50
Franklin farmers cultivated crops and raised livestock for household 
consumption as well as for local and regional markets. According to the 
Watauga Association of Genealogists, most of the farms in eastern Tennes-
see were “self-sufficient units,” but the few extant store ledgers challenge 
this assertion.51 Most farmers grew at least some corn due to its multiple 
uses in the Tennessee backcountry. A farmer who harvested a good crop of 
corn could sell it to taverns and distilleries for whiskey production, to 
ranchers for feed, or to millers to be ground into meal for sale on the local 
market. According to one historian, “Because it was easy to cultivate and 
matured quickly, corn became so ubiquitous and so central to people’s lives 
that it could serve as a monetary standard and a form of currency.”52 Un-
questionably, many Tennessee Valley farm families relied heavily on their 
own crops, orchards, livestock, and frontier ingenuity to survive in the 
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wilderness, but the proliferation of stores and shops selling locally grown 
agricultural products reflected the connections between agriculture and 
commerce and the reliance on local markets for supplementation.53
Despite the climatic challenges that limited large-scale cultivation of 
cotton or tobacco, an adapted form of commercial agriculture and the use 
of slave labor emerged as early features of the Tennessee Valley frontier 
economy.54 Many of the first Tennessee families that settled the region 
previously owned plantations and farms in North Carolina and Virginia, 
and the “topography of the land was well suited for plantation agriculture 
and the efficient use of slaves.” It is estimated that approximately 10 percent 
of the early Watauga settlers owned slaves.55 Prominent early East Tennes-
seans, such as William Bean, John Carter, and George Lumpkin, brought 
slaves into the region to farm large tracts of land. Franklin governor John 
Sevier brought seven slaves with him when he settled on the Nolichucky 
River. Tax records from Washington County list thirty-two slaveholders 
owning 102 “black poles” for 1779. In 1781, an incomplete tax assessment 
from the same county records seventy-two slaves for just the fifth district.56
Many early Washington County wills record slaves among the estates 
bequeathed to heirs. William Bean left his wife, Liddy, a “negro girl” named 
Grace, and Franklin militia captain John Fain willed his wife, Agnes, “the 
negro Punch.”57 A 1783 assessor return for Greene County, covering two of 
four county court–established tax districts, lists sixty-five slaves, and an 
unidentified tax record from the same year lists thirty-three “negroes.” A 
July 4, 1787, census for Sullivan County, carved out of Washington Coun-
ty in 1779, lists “twenty-three Black male slaves and eighty female” among 
a total county population of 2,066 residents.58 Due to lower tax rates, slave 
owners on the Tennessee frontier preferred to own either female or child 
slaves.59 A Washington County tax assessment from 1787 records eighty-six 
slaveholders owning 223 slaves. In 1788, the final year of the state of 
Franklin’s brief existence, it is believed that approximately 1,500 slaves 
worked in the Franklin counties. Although most East Tennessee slavehold-
ers owned fewer than three slaves, some of the most prominent men in the 
region commanded as many as twenty. The growth of the Tennessee Valley 
population and expansion of commercial agriculture magnified the impor-
tance of slave labor in the regional market economy.60
Early court records and inventories of estates also provide evidence of a 
thriving Tennessee commercial cattle industry. Greene County court re-
cords list dozens of stock farmers registering their cattle marks and brands. 
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In the August 1783 Greene County court minutes, James Wilson noted his 
“poplar leaf” brand and Abraham Carter registered “a C ear mark [and a] 
crop of the right ear and a hole & slit in the left ear.”61 Washington County 
estate inventories list an array of livestock. The 1781 estate of John Bond 
recorded “four head of horses, nine head of cattle, four head of sheep, sev-
enteen head of hogs, and sixteen pigs.”62 Additionally, many of the region’s 
landed elite, including Evan Shelby and John Carter, also maintained sub-
stantial herds of commercial cattle.63 Cattle drives north through the 
Shenandoah Valley of Virginia became a fixture in frontier Tennessee, with 
most Tennessee Valley residents keeping “one or two milk cows” and rais-
ing “the rest of the cattle as beef for local and regional markets.”64 East 
Tennessee’s commercial livestock industry also included hogs, sheep, and 
horses, and the long livestock drives and drovers’ stands provided a constant 
market for both tavern and inn owners as well as for commercial farmers. 
Despite the inadequacies of transportation routes across the region, the 
livestock trade “connected upper East Tennessee to markets extending far 
beyond the Appalachian region.”65
The Tennessee Valley’s backcountry economy was amazingly diverse, 
tightly amalgamated to local and regional markets, and perpetually ex-
panding. Despite the success of the region’s economy, Tennessee’s frontier 
entrepreneurs confronted two major obstacles to their region’s continued 
economic growth: geographic isolation and the economic crisis following 
the American Revolution. The debate over the level of cultural, political, 
and economic isolation in the southern mountains remains a thirty-year 
fixture in Appalachian scholarship, but the Tennessee Valley settlers avoid-
ed economic isolation by cultivating close fiscal connections to local and 
regional markets and to each other. Despite their Herculean trade efforts, 
geographic distances from the centers of commerce and the region’s treach-
erous mountain topography created enormous difficulties for Tennessee 
Valley residents during the region’s frontier stage.
These shared economic challenges and the growing chorus of demands 
for state-funded internal improvements united Tennessee Valley residents 
across class lines. In South Carolina’s developing backcountry, the “expen-
sive, time-consuming, and often hazardous” effort to transport local 
products to coastal markets forged connections between the backcountry 
planter elite and the yeoman farmers.66 In the Tennessee Valley, the landed 
commercial elite maintained a shared interest with the region’s small farm-
ers and merchants in the construction and maintenance of roads and the 
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establishment and efficient functioning of county courts. These appeals for 
internal improvements and feelings of eastern political marginalization 
transcended socioeconomic lines and became a galvanizing force that al-
lowed the Tennessee Valley’s economic elite to win political support from 
many of the region’s small-holders for the Franklin statehood movement.67
The Unaka, Smoky, and Blue Ridge mountain ranges separated the Ten-
nessee Valley from the thriving markets in eastern North Carolina and along 
the Atlantic seaboard. These formidable obstacles made trans-Allegheny 
travel, trade, and communication extremely difficult and forced most early 
travelers to enter and exit the region from the north or south. Pioneering 
mountain merchants on the eastern slope of the Allegheny Mountains 
maintained close southern market connections to South Carolina, Georgia, 
and eastern North Carolina. The challenges of trading across the highest 
mountains in the east forced most Tennessee Valley merchants and com-
mercial farmers to rely almost exclusively on markets in Virginia, Georgia, 
South Carolina, and the blossoming southwestern frontier. Those who did 
venture into upper East Tennessee from the east traversed rugged trans-
montane passes, such as the Unicoi Trail and the Catawba Trail, and 
struggled through treacherous mountain gaps, such as Boone’s Gap and 
Saluda Gap. The Tennessee Valley itself is thirty to fifty miles wide and 
connects to the much larger Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. These two 
valleys provided the perfect corridor for traveling into upper East Tennessee 
from the north, and most of the early traces, or trails, utilized the valleys’ 
gentle slopes. The Tennessee Valley’s northern and western commercial 
orientation fiscally and politically separated the region’s landed elite and 
small-holders from their state government in Hillsboro, and eventually 
fostered a shared sense of alienation and abandonment among them.68
Much like many of the other frontier roads in Appalachia, eastern 
Tennessee’s earliest transportation system utilized well-worn Indian paths, 
most likely first carved out by buffalo or other large mammals thousands of 
years earlier, as the primary corridors to connect the region.69 Prior to the 
settlement of the region, traders, hunters, missionaries, and explorers trav-
eled along the Native American hunting and trading paths that traversed 
the area. In 1673, two Virginians, James Needham and Gabriel Arthur, 
undertook an expedition into the Tennessee Valley and attempted to estab-
lish trade contacts with the Overhill Cherokee communities.70 Men like 
Needham and Arthur crossed into the Tennessee frontier following Indian 
paths like the Occanoechi Path, the Great War Path, and the Great Buffalo 
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Trail to trade English goods for furs and pelts with the native populace. 
These backcountry entrepreneurs became some of the first Europeans to 
witness the grandeur of the Great Valley of Tennessee and to confront the 
challenges the region posed to frontier commerce.71
The first road construction undertaken by Euroamericans in eastern 
Tennessee corresponded with the military preparations surrounding the 
French and Indian War, and most of these early war traces connected Brit-
ish forts, such as Fort Loudon and Fort Robinson. The English laboriously 
built these military roads to defend their Indian allies and economic inter-
ests from the French.72 Europeans, including Colonel William Byrd III of 
Virginia’s Great Road or Island Road,  carved out dozens of traces to trans-
port wagonloads of supplies to the soldiers occupying these remote back-
country forts. The British used many of these military roads to wage war 
against the French-allied Cherokee towns, and eventually, these routes de-
veloped into critical arteries connecting the Tennessee Valley settlements to 
the north and east.73
In 1775, “thirty axe-men” managed by Daniel Boone improved a small 
stretch of the Great Indian War Path, subsequently given the name Boone’s 
Wilderness Trail, Boone’s Trace, or simply the Wilderness Road. The Wil-
derness Road snaked through the northern section of the Tennessee River 
Valley and eventually terminated two hundred grueling miles later in Vir-
ginia’s Kentucky territory. The road became one of the primary routes for 
thousands of frontier families settling East and Middle Tennessee, as well 
as the Kentucky country.74 Boone’s road also fed the rapidly expanding East 
Tennessee economy, and dozens of businesses sprang up along the rugged 
route. From 1775 to 1795, the Watauga communities received a constant 
stream of wayfarers navigating Boone’s Wilderness Road. “At the supply 
stations from Bristol to Long Island, the many thousands of travelers to the 
West stopped to visit with neighbors and friends, gather supplies, repair 
their guns, fill their packs, and push off into the wilderness in large compa-
nies with armed guards.”75 The embryonic communities of the upper Ten-
nessee Valley supplied the settlements in the Cumberland District (Middle 
Tennessee) and the distant Kentucky frontier.76
Following the completion of the Wilderness Road, skilled axe men 
carved out dozens of smaller traces across eastern Tennessee. Most of these 
early roads connected East Tennessee towns and communities to one an-
other and to the region’s principal transportation arteries. Roads became 
the first public works projects in the region. During the American Revolu-
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tion, the town of Jonesboro constructed roads that “linked the town” to 
settlements along the Watauga, Nolichucky, and Holston rivers. The area’s 
economic elite often convinced local courts to build roads to their property 
or privately funded roads linking their own farms and businesses to these 
feeder outlets. Prominent men such as James Stuart, Robert Young, Charles 
Robertson, John Sevier, and John Tipton “marked off” roads to ensure the 
success of their commercial ventures.77 The existence of these early roads 
not only promoted the fiscal links between eastern Tennessee and regional 
markets, but also connected the region’s economic elite and yeoman farm-
ers to each other. Despite the growth of trade and transportation routes 
throughout the 1780s, “the difficulties encountered establishing, maintain-
ing, and using this limited set of roads argues for a powerful sense of re-
moteness.” The shared belief among both wealthy landholders and small 
farmers that North Carolina had failed to adequately improve their region’s 
trade and transportation network emerged as one of the earliest and most 
persuasive arguments for the Franklin separatist movement. Additionally, 
the central role local courts and county political offices played in allocating 
funds for road construction projects meant that controlling these back-
country institutions gained increasing significance to the Tennessee Valley’s 
emerging economic elite.78
Perhaps more than any other single factor, the economic consequences 
of the American Revolution shaped the Tennessee Valley’s economic land-
scape. The financial cost of America’s rebellion exacerbated an already ca-
lamitous national specie shortage and caused a disastrous disruption of the 
Tennessee Valley’s agrarian economy. This turbulent economic climate 
proved to be the ideal condition for the emergence of a land- and natural 
resource–based economy dominated by local landed elites who doggedly 
speculated in land and unyieldingly controlled regional politics.
Following the revolution, the economy of the new American Republic 
experienced a dramatic deflation in the value of both state and federal cur-
rencies and the precipitous loss of the infinitely more stable British pound. 
Additionally, mounting debt, the loss of the lucrative trade with England, 
the fiscal inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation, and the destruction 
of the American merchant fleet and urban centers further exacerbated the 
postrevolutionary financial disaster.79 The frontier economy of the Tennes-
see Valley never relied heavily on paper money for business transactions. 
Instead, most local merchants and farmers utilized a combination of barter, 
trade, and cash payments. During the short-lived existence of the state of 
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Franklin, the cash-starved Franklin government enacted a Legal Tender 
Act that paid its civil officials with animal pelts. The 1785 legislation pro-
vided the governor of Franklin one thousand deer skins annually, the chief 
justice and attorney general five hundred deer skins annually, the secretary 
of state four hundred and fifty otter skins annually, the county clerks three 
hundred beaver skins annually, and the members of the Franklin Assembly 
three raccoon skins per session.80 The economic crisis accompanying the 
American Revolution simply sapped an already cash-poor region of specie 
and forced a greater reliance on traditional modes of exchange.81
By 1782, the state of North Carolina stood on the precipice of financial 
collapse. In order to repay foreign creditors, militiamen, and the federal 
government, the state issued certificates or promissory notes to creditors 
and as payment to her revolutionary soldiers. When the notes became virtu-
ally worthless in a few short months, the results proved to be disastrous. In 
order to repay the revolutionary promissory notes, North Carolina sold off 
huge swaths of its western territory, including some of the land that eventu-
ally became the state of Tennessee. The sale of North Carolina’s western 
territory initiated further state-sanctioned land speculation in the Tennes-
see Valley, but the commercial investment in territory began much earlier 
for the region’s economic elite.82
Speculators settled, developed, and controlled frontier East Tennessee. 
Whether they speculated in land, slaves, natural resources, or commercial 
markets, the region’s earliest settlers sought to cash in on the untapped and 
unclaimed (Cherokee, Creek, and Chickasaw tribes aside) lands of the Ten-
nessee Valley. In a region as specie poor as East Tennessee, slaves and land 
became the most stable mediums of exchange, and those who owned thou-
sands of acres controlled the region’s political and economic fortunes.83
Land speculation and surveying emerged as two of the earliest and 
most lucrative business ventures in the Tennessee Valley.84 The earliest ne-
gotiations for land cessions occurred between the first Watauga settlers, 
who were in fact squatters, and the Overhill Cherokee Indians. In October 
1770, the British Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern Dis-
trict, Captain John Stuart, negotiated the Treaty of Lochaber in South 
Carolina with the Cherokee, which ceded a large “triangle of land” in the 
upper Holston Valley to the British. The Wataugans held no official deeds 
for their settlements, but they hoped that the Treaty of Lochaber legiti-
mized their squatters’ rights. The treaty eventually inspired a second wave 
of backcountry emigration.85 Despite being forbidden by the British gov-
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ernment and the Proclamation Line of 1763 to purchase land from the 
Native Americans, the Wataugans remained determined to secure legal 
rights to the Watauga settlements.86 In 1773, Wataugans James Robertson 
and John Bean negotiated a ten-year lease for land in the Tennessee Valley 
for five to six thousand dollars worth of “merchandise and trade goods, plus 
some muskets and household articles.” Prominent Wataugans John Carter, 
Andrew Greer, and William Bean financed the lease agreement, and James 
Robertson’s cousin, Charles, served as the trustee of the lease. Charles Rob-
ertson (Robinson) established an “informal land office” that collected pay-
ments from Watauga settlers and registered land claims. The success of the 
land lease deal granted temporary possession of the Watauga land, and 
many settlers believed that the lease agreement ensured future permanent 
ownership of their land claims.87
On March 17, 1775, Richard Henderson, a former North Carolina 
judge and successful land speculator, secured 20 million acres from the 
Cherokee for two thousand English pounds and ten thousand pounds 
worth of trade goods. Henderson’s land firm, the Transylvania Company, 
utilized the turmoil surrounding the American Revolution to secure an 
enormous tract of land that encompassed the entire Cumberland Valley in 
Middle Tennessee and the southern section of the Kentucky territory. The 
Henderson Purchase, the largest private land purchase in American history 
to that date, paved the way for the settlement of Kentucky and Middle 
Tennessee and set an important precedent for the Watauga settlers in at-
tendance during the treaty negotiations at Sycamore Shoals.88 Just two days 
after the Henderson Purchase, the Watauga settlers convinced the Cherokee 
to sell the land they previously leased for two thousand pounds. With the 
Watauga Purchase, Tennessee’s earliest inhabitants finally secured two 
thousand square miles of land along the Watauga, Holston, and Great Con-
away (now New) rivers. These two monumental Cherokee land deals al-
lowed Jacob Brown to purchase two large tracts encompassing the 
Nolichucky settlements and John Carter to acquire the land surrounding 
his Carter’s Valley settlements. Despite dubious land claims and under-
handed Indian treaties, these earlier land transactions between the future 
Franklinites and the region’s aboriginal land claimants precipitated a dispu-
tatious wave of speculation that eventually consumed the entire region.89
On April 1, less than a month after the Watauga Purchase, the Watau-
gans opened a land office at the home of John Carter. Charles Robertson 
(trustee), James Smith (land office clerk), and William Bailey Smith (sur-
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veyor) oversaw the administration of the land office. The land office al-
lowed the valley speculators to use the proceeds of the land sales to repay 
the financiers of the Watauga Purchase, to reserve the choicest parcels of 
land for the Watauga settlement’s economic elite, and to “dispose of the 
remainder for the good of the community.” Over the next few months, 
several of the more prominent Wataugans, including John Sevier, John 
Carter, William Bean, Jonathan Tipton, James Robertson, and Robert 
Lucas, purchased large acreages. Despite the accumulation of landed wealth 
by the Tennessee Valley’s economic elite, individual farming families man-
aged to purchase most of the land in two-hundred- to four-hundred-acre 
patents. By facilitating the acquisition of land for many of the region’s small 
farmers, the Tennessee Valley’s ruling class tied their own interests to that 
of the regional small-holders. These economic connections served as the 
first and perhaps strongest bonds uniting backcountry residents across class 
lines.90
These initial land sales served as the first step in the economic stratifi-
cation of frontier Tennessee, but also tied the region’s landed elite to the 
region’s smaller landholders. Challenges to these land claims from the Brit-
ish Empire, North Carolina, the U.S. government, and the region’s Native 
Americans threatened both large and small landholders alike. Shared con-
cerns over the preservation of land claims led both groups to demand the 
construction of county courts and land offices in order to register and pro-
tect their land claims. These same collective interests allowed the Tennessee 
Valley’s ruling class to secure the support of the region’s lower class in the 
Franklin independence movement.91
The American Revolution and corresponding Indian wars accelerated 
the distribution of land in East Tennessee. Campaigns against the British-
allied Cherokee tribe brought thousands of militiamen into the Tennessee 
country, and many of these soldiers purchased land in the region. The con-
tinued threat of Cherokee and Tory attacks in the southern mountains, 
anguished pleas by the mountaineers for protection, and the desire to de-
fend their landholdings led to the eventual annexation of the Watauga set-
tlements by the state of North Carolina. The creation of the Watauga 
District in 1776 and the subsequent formation of Washington County in 
1777 legitimized earlier land purchases, as North Carolina recognized “the 
loyalty of the West to the Patriot cause.”92
The U.S. Continental Congress offered the first federal land grants on 
the Tennessee frontier immediately after declaring independence from Brit-
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ain. Congress lacked the specie to raise an army, so they utilized land boun-
ties to recruit and pay Continental soldiers. Revolutionary leaders like 
Thomas Jefferson believed that offering America’s western lands to yeoman 
soldiers ensured the settlement of western lands and the spread of Republi-
can ideals.93 The 1780 and 1782 land bounty acts guaranteed enlistees 
backcountry acreage, based on military rank, in military districts previ-
ously reserved for recruitment purposes. Because land speculators, valley 
settlers, and the Overhill Cherokee claimed the bulk of the available lands 
in East Tennessee, most of the military land grants issued in what eventu-
ally became the state of Tennessee were in the Cumberland District of 
Middle Tennessee (Davidson County). Due to the complicated and costly 
nature of obtaining a title to the military land claims, many of these grants 
ended up in the hands of land speculators, including a number of promi-
nent Franklinites. Land speculators “had both the money and political 
connections to acquire good land in the military districts,” and to “manage 
the complications and costs” associated with obtaining a title to the land.94 
These “land-jobbers” used their political and economic leverage, and some-
times fraud, bribery, and corruption, to amass enormous tracts of land in 
Tennessee.95
Postrevolutionary land speculation in the Tennessee Valley demanded 
further land cessions by the Cherokee Nation, who claimed vast tracts of 
land in the lower Tennessee Valley, and the acquiescence of the North 
Carolina government to the interests of powerful regional land speculators. 
In 1783, a group of influential and politically connected land speculators, 
led by William Blount, “pushed” the “Land Grab Act” through the North 
Carolina legislature. The act “offered for sale at a price of ten pounds per 
hundred acres all unappropriated land in the Tennessee country, with the 
exception of military counties and the Cherokee Reservation east of the 
Tennessee River and south of the French Broad and Big Pigeon.”96 This 
often-overlooked piece of legislation reinvigorated land speculation in east-
ern Tennessee. The desire for land became so ravenous that the small land 
office opened by the state from October 20, 1783, to May 25, 1784, sold 
nearly 4 million acres of land. This period of wild speculation “created the 
foundations for large fortunes” for several prominent Tennessee Valley en-
trepreneurs and smaller homesteads for thousands of backcountry yeoman. 
The preservation of these land claims played a central role in the Franklin 
independence movement for both groups.97 Over the course of Franklin’s 
brief existence, securing access to the rapidly shrinking aboriginal territo-
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rial claims remained an important priority in the Franklinites’ political and 
economic agenda.98
By the opening of the first session of the Franklin Assembly in August 
1784, the frontier communities of eastern Tennessee had matured into a 
hierarchical society dominated by an entrenched economic and political 
elite. The leaders of the state of Franklin consolidated their political and 
economic power by drawing upon their entrepreneurial spirit, military 
prowess, and most importantly their vast land holdings. These men utilized 
their control of the complex and advancing backcountry economy to deter-
mine the Tennessee Valley’s political course for the next decade, but they 
did so with the support of a large segment of the region’s small-holders. 
Commercial connections, land sales, feelings of political marginalization, 
and a shared interest in the development of the regional economy and the 
preservation of land claims connected the landed elite to the yeoman 
mountaineer. As the opening phase of the Franklin separatist movement 
dawned, the Tennessee Valley landed gentry increasingly relied on the un-
yielding support of the region’s small-holders.
Following the conclusion of the American Revolution, the newly created 
national and state governments found themselves heavily indebted to for-
eign and domestic creditors and on the cusp of a financial catastrophe. 
Many political leaders believed that the most promising and expedient solu-
tion to America’s postrevolutionary economic crisis lay in the sale of the 
“uninhabited” western lands claimed by several expansive and powerful 
states and combative Native American groups. Beginning in 1780, the 
Confederation Congress began lobbying state leaders from New York, Vir-
ginia, Georgia, and North Carolina to cede their western territory to the 
federal government. Congress hoped to sell the land and use the proceeds 
to stall the mounting national debt. New York agreed to cede her lands in 
1780 and Virginia followed suit in 1781, but political leaders in North 
Carolina remained bitterly divided on the subject.1 During the April 1784 
session of the North Carolina General Assembly, the financially embattled 
state finally agreed to surrender her western lands to the national govern-
ment. The state relinquished “all lands west of the Appalachian mountain 
watershed,” including the counties of Washington, Greene, Sullivan, and 
Davidson (in Middle Tennessee), in order to “hasten the extinguishment of 
the debts” incurred during the American Revolution and to avoid paying a 
potential “continental land tax” being considered in Congress.2 This first 
Cession Act proved to be the spark that ignited the combustible fumes of 
backcountry resentment, fear, and separatism lingering in the Tennessee 
Valley. The supporters of western independence waited less than six months 
after the passage of this act to declare their political sovereignty.3
The Franklin statehood movement drove a divisive wedge through the 
once united Tennessee Valley communities and forced the region’s emerg-
ing economic elite, mountain farmers, and backcountry merchants to 
choose sides during the tumult surrounding the separatist affair. Tennessee 
frontier settlers faced crucial decisions regarding their partisan loyalties, 
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and these choices ultimately determined the future political course of the 
state of Franklin and the trans-Appalachian frontier. The determination to 
either support or oppose the Franklin statehood movement was undoubt-
edly an agonizing choice for Tennessee Valley residents, and these decisions 
were not concluded haphazardly. A careful examination of the leaders and 
supporters of both factions during the Franklin affair reveals the multiplic-
ity of factors that combined to determine personal and familial loyalties. 
Although cultural factors undoubtedly influenced backcountry partisan-
ship during the events surrounding Franklin, frontier fidelity transcended 
ethnic, religious, and class lines. Partisan loyalties were closely tied to the 
influence of the region’s leading men, their shared wartime and frontier 
experiences, and their collective economic and political interests. Both fac-
tions understood the relationship between controlling political offices (sher-
iff and surveyor) and county courts (judge and justice of the peace) and 
assuring future economic prosperity, and the leaders of trans-Appalachia’s 
first economic ruling class were well aware of the dire consequences if they 
failed.4
The vast majority of first families settling the upper Tennessee Valley 
migrated to the region from Virginia and North Carolina. Pioneering set-
tlers like William Bean and John Carter emigrated from the Shenandoah 
Valley and tidewater region of Virginia. Frontier entrepreneurs like Jacob 
White and Nashville founder James Robertson came from eastern North 
Carolina. Many prominent Franklin families, including the Sevier, Cocke, 
Carter, Campbell, Cage, Christian, Martin, Donelson, and Looney fami-
lies, once called the Old Dominion home.5 Several of the most important 
families in early Tennessee history, including the White, Hutchings, and 
Love families, embarked from North Carolina counties east of the Alle-
gheny Mountains. Not all influential pioneer Tennesseans migrated from 
North Carolina and Virginia. Powerful regional opponents of Franklin like 
Evan Shelby and John Tipton arrived in eastern Tennessee from Maryland, 
and several other eminent Tennessee Valley families relocated from Penn-
sylvania and South Carolina.6
For a region long considered predominantly Scots-Irish, the ethnic 
composition of frontier East Tennessee is surprisingly heterogeneous. The 
vast majority of the earliest inhabitants of the region traced their roots back 
to the British Isles. In a survey conducted of the roughly 31,913 residents of 
the Tennessee country in 1790, approximately 83.1 percent were English, 
11.2 percent were Scots-Irish, and 2.3 percent were Irish. The study con-
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cluded that “From these percentages it is evident that Tennessee was consid-
erably ahead of the United States in the number of its citizens who traced 
their ancestry back to the British Isles.” Despite being less than 12 percent 
of the total population of Tennessee, many scholars continue to argue that 
the Ulster-Scots comprised the largest ethnic group of first families in Ten-
nessee, meaning families who arrived before Tennessee was granted state-
hood in 1796.7 The story of the politically and religiously oppressed 
Ulster-Scots and their flight to America is entrenched in the history of the 
Appalachian region, but it often obscures East Tennessee’s cultural diversity 
and the contributions made by these disparate ethnic groups.8
In addition to the ethnically dominant Anglo-Saxon strains, the 1790 
ethnic survey included Germans, Welsh, Dutch, Swiss, Alsatians, Africans, 
and French Huguenots.9 Many of the region’s leading frontier families traced 
their ancestry back to these minority ethnic groups. The Sevier, Vincent, 
and Amis families emigrated from France with groups of Huguenots who 
fled religious persecution and traveled among the Protestant congregations 
of William Penn.10 Eminent Welsh families like the Shelby, Conway, Evans, 
and Williams families also called Tennessee home in the late eighteenth 
century. The ethnic diversity of the Tennessee Valley contributed to the de-
velopment of the region’s distinct political and social culture.11
The men at the epicenter of the state of Franklin controversy are repre-
sentative of the region’s multiethnic composition. Franklin’s only governor, 
John Sevier, descended from French Huguenots from the village of Xavier, 
who fled France after 1685 when Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes 
and began imprisoning the Protestant minority.12 William Cocke, Franklin’s 
emissary to the American Congress, and Landon Carter, Speaker of Frank-
lin’s first senate, traced their ancestry to England.13 The families of James 
White, founder of Knoxville and “early speaker” in the Franklin Senate, 
and Gilbert Christian, Speaker of the Franklin Senate in 1786, emigrated 
from Ulster.14 The descendents of Presbyterian minister Samuel Doak, the 
Franklinites’ spiritual and educational advisor, migrated from Ireland, and 
the well-traveled mercenary George Elholm, adjutant general of the Frank-
lin militia, came to America at the beginning of the Revolutionary War 
from the Duchy of Holstein in Denmark.15 Even the opponents of the 
Franklin movement, usually referred to as Tiptonites after their leader John 
Tipton, came from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Colonel John Tipton’s fam-
ily claimed its origins in Scotland, and Evan Shelby, probably the most 
politically influential opponent of Franklin, was of Welsh descent. Both 
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leading Franklinites and Tiptonites and their rank and file supporters 
clearly exhibited the Tennessee Valley’s ethnic variance, and therefore eth-
nic identity does little to explain the motives behind the hardening of par-
tisan loyalties during the events surrounding the Franklin struggle.16
The region’s cultural diversity did lead to the growth of several socially 
and politically influential religious denominations in the Tennessee back-
country. By 1784, ministers representing no less than five denominations 
proselytized in upper East Tennessee, including Presbyterians, Baptists, 
Methodists, Moravians, and Quakers. These leaders and their churches 
played critical roles in the political, educational, and cultural development 
of the Tennessee Valley and the state of Franklin. From the earliest explora-
tion of the region, organized religion helped to transform the Tennessee 
Valley. Early frontier explorers like Daniel Boone and Nathan Gist were 
“traditionally Baptists,” and ordained ministers often accompanied groups 
of would-be settlers into the backcountry. In 1758, Presbyterian missionar-
ies from the Society for Managing the Mission and Schools traveled into 
the future state of Tennessee to propagate the gospel among the Overhill 
Cherokee. Led by such ministers as John Martin and William Richardson, 
these Presbyterian missionaries became the “first ministers to preach the 
gospel in the Tennessee country.”17 In 1761, North Carolina Baptist preach-
er Jonathan Mulkey accompanied a party of explorers venturing into the 
region. Mulkey eventually settled in Carter’s Valley in 1775, where he came 
under attack by a group of Cherokee Indians less than a year later. Presby-
terian missionaries constructed Taylor’s Meeting House in 1773, and the 
small log building became the first structure used for religious instruction 
in the Tennessee backcountry. Circuit riders from various denominations 
often catechized from the log cabin, and also used the rustic structure as a 
fort and a school.18
The Watauga residents organized the two earliest permanent churches 
in the region during the American Revolution, Sinking Creek Baptist 
Church and Buffalo Ridge Baptist Church. The Reverend Matthew Tal-
bott, from Bedford County, Virginia, established Sinking Creek Baptist 
Church (originally called Watauga River Church) sometime between 1775 
and 1783. Talbott, an early Watauga landowner, constructed the church on 
a small tributary of the Watauga River in what is now Carter County, Ten-
nessee.19 The first extant records from the church date back to July 5, 1785, 
and include a plea to an unknown “Virginia [Baptist] Association” to end 
“the [unspecified] divisions between us.”20 Remarkably, the church is still 
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in existence and is now considered the “oldest church in Tennessee occupy-
ing its original location and foundation.” Tidence Lane founded Buffalo 
Ridge Baptist Church between 1778 and 1779, considered by most state 
historians to be Tennessee’s first church. Reverend Lane migrated from 
Sandy Creek, North Carolina, to Watauga in 1776, and constructed his 
church atop Buffalo Ridge in Washington County. The founding of these 
two frontier churches initiated a dramatic proliferation of Baptist churches 
across the Tennessee Valley.21
Presbyterians soon followed these early Baptist churches onto the Ten-
nessee frontier. In 1780, Presbyterian minister Samuel Doak organized 
Salem Church near Jonesboro, and soon after, Samuel Houston and Heze-
kiah Balch, Presbyterian ministers from Mecklenburg County, North 
Carolina, joined Doak in the Tennessee Valley.22 These Presbyterian leaders 
played important roles in the development of the state of Franklin and used 
their pulpits for catechizing and politicking. The blending of god and poli-
tics ultimately fostered divisions within the Tennessee Valley and the 
Franklin movement, but the contributions of these Presbyterian ministers 
led to the creation of an exceptional frame of government and the establish-
ment of the Tennessee Valley’s first educational institutions.23
Reserving the in-depth discussion of the debate over the Franklin Con-
stitution and the role played by Presbyterian ministers in the Franklin 
movement for a later chapter, it is important to note the relationship be-
tween the Tennessee Valley’s first schools and the efforts of Presbyterian 
ministers in the backcountry. The “pioneering Presbyterian ministers” of 
East Tennessee “brought with them the traditional Scottish practice of 
founding a school beside each church.”24 In 1780, Samuel Doak erected the 
first school west of the Appalachian Mountains beside his Salem Church. 
Doak’s Martin Academy, named after North Carolina governor Alexander 
Martin, eventually received an official charter from the North Carolina 
Assembly in 1783. In 1785, the Franklin government supported the acade-
my, often called “Doak’s Log College” by local residents, and in 1795 the 
school became Washington College.25
During the early formative months of the state of Franklin, education 
emerged as a politically divisive issue. East Tennessee’s influential Presbyte-
rian ministers led the effort to construct public schools and to utilize tax 
revenue to finance the construction and administration of these institu-
tions. During the 1785 debates surrounding the drafting and ratification of 
the Franklin Constitution, the Reverend Samuel Houston, a Washington 
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County Presbyterian minister, coauthored a radical constitution (ultimate-
ly rejected by the Franklinites) that included provisions for building and 
financing schools in the state. According to section thirty-two of this docu-
ment, “All kinds of useful learning shall be encouraged by this common-
wealth.” The constitution called for the construction of “one University” 
and “a Grammar School” for each county, and the employment of “a 
[school] master or masters of approved morals and abilities.” Reverend 
Houston proposed paying for these educational improvements through an 
endowment funded through the collection of taxes on land purchases and 
surveys and the sale of indigo, flour, and tobacco.26 Reverend Houston’s 
effort to establish a state university and public school system in 1785 is re-
markable considering that the state of Tennessee made no attempt to create 
a tax-supported public school system until the middle of the nineteenth 
century.27
Although the constitutional debates surrounding the public school ef-
forts did not survive, most Tennessee historians believe that the Presbyte-
rian minister Hezekiah Balch led the effort to abandon the progressive 
Franklin Constitution. Section forty-one of the compromise constitution 
provided for a drastically scaled-back version of Houston’s original proposal. 
The alternative constitution provided for “a [public] school or schools” and 
“one or more universities” to be established by the [Franklin] legislature for 
the “convenient instruction of youth,” and for the teachers’ salaries to be 
“paid by the public, as may enable them to instruct at low prices.”28 The 
new constitution failed to provide the same levels of financial support or 
urgency for the construction of public schools and universities. The contro-
versy surrounding public school and university funding in the state of 
Franklin became one of numerous contentious issues that fractured the 
Tennessee Valley communities following the American Revolution.29
Supporters of Franklin’s public school initiative argued that education 
would have a civilizing effect on the Tennessee backcountry and curtail 
crime and moral indiscretions.30 According to Episcopal minister Charles 
Woodmason, whose missionary work led him to visit the Carolina back-
country, the educationally deficient southern frontier was rampant with 
“Lewd, impudent, abandon’d Prostitutes, Gamblers, Gamesters of all 
Sorts—Horse Thieves, Cattle Steelers, Hog Steelers—Branders and Mark-
ers, Hunters going naked as Indians. Women hardly more so. All in a Man-
ner useless to Society, but very pernicious in propagating Vice, Beggary, 
and Theft.” An examination of the surviving East Tennessee county and 
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court records from the years surrounding the state of Franklin reveals a very 
different community than the one described by Reverend Woodmason in 
1768. Residents of the Tennessee Valley were both highly literate and 
largely law abiding. The images of rough and tumble frontier communities 
in the Tennessee Valley do not hold up under scrutiny.31
From the earliest settlement, the Tennessee Valley residents concen-
trated their efforts on maintaining law and order and protecting private 
property. As the Tennessee Valley communities and regional economy ad-
vanced, the emerging economic ruling class quickly determined that control 
over the county courts and judicial offices were the key to securing back-
country hegemony. According to one historian, the earliest residents of 
Washington County “lived, administered their laws, established courts and 
laid their penalties upon evil-doers according to the legal system of their 
parent States.” Tennessee Valley settlers held the first court in the region on 
February 23, 1778, at the home of Charles Robertson. The lack of a perma-
nent courthouse forced the Washington County residents to hold court in 
several private homes.32 Despite this limitation, the earliest court records 
reveal a community concerned with crime and punishment. At the second 
court meeting, local leaders appointed Valentine Sevier Jr. (brother of the 
clerk of the court, John Sevier) sheriff of Washington County. During the 
August 27, 1778, meeting, the frontier court ordered its tax collectors for 
the several districts in the county to collect “sums” for the construction of 
a “court house, prison, & stocks.” These early court sessions provided the 
leadership of Washington County with an opportunity to establish tax 
rates, pay officials, fix prices on essential items, and, most importantly, sell 
and purchase landed property.33
A survey of the Washington County court records from 1777 through 
1789 shows the preponderance of early cases to be breach of contract suits 
and land fraud cases. A typical example of a breach of contract case oc-
curred on March 15, 1789, with a suit brought by Andrew Grier against 
Mark Mitchell. According to court records, Mitchell “made a certain prom-
issory note . . . to pay unto the said Andrew . . . one-hundred and eight 
pounds Virginia money” for an undisclosed amount of land. Grier stated 
that Mitchell intended “to deceive” him and refused to “pay him the said 
sum of money.” In a region so heavily reliant upon land for credit, exchange, 
investment, and growth, it is not surprising that cases involving land dis-
putes most frequently appear in court records. As the region’s landed elite 
and yeoman small-holders increasingly expanded their land holdings and 
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external scrutiny of these controversial land claims intensified, the impor-
tance of establishing ascendancy over county courts and judicial offices 
dramatically increased. During the state of Franklin’s existence, competi-
tion for Tennessee Valley courts and court positions became fierce, emerg-
ing as another critical factor shaping partisan loyalties within the 
backcountry rank and file.34
Several court cases dealing with relatively minor criminal offenses, 
usually theft of livestock or slander suits, also dot the early Washington 
County court records. In a July 29, 1781, case, William Deal accused Mar-
shall Higdon of “having taken [several horses] in a clandestine manner.” 
The August 18, 1789, case of Henry Colback v. William Blevins involved 
accusations of “scandalous and defamatory” speech. According to court 
records, Blevins sullied Colback’s “good name” when he accused him of 
“stealing John Gorsach’s Bridle.” Colback defended himself by stating that 
he “was good and honest and always kept himself free and clear from theft.” 
In addition to larceny and slander cases, several Tennessee Valley women 
initiated cases against men for fathering illegitimate children. In a Decem-
ber 28, 1779, case, Jane Odell stood before the court and accused Absalom 
Booring of “begetting [her] said child.” John Tipton and Henry Nelson, 
the two Washington County justices of the peace, ordered Booring arrested 
and brought before the court to “answer these charges.” Booring ultimately 
paid a small fine for having “carnal knowledge of her body.” These nonvio-
lent cases abound in the Washington County court records.35
Despite the relative peacefulness within the communities themselves, 
East Tennessee remained a dangerous and violent region throughout the 
eighteenth century. Native American attacks, revolutionary warfare, frontier 
Toryism, and bitter partisanship surrounding the state of Franklin fostered 
a lingering sense of fear and acrimony within the Tennessee Valley. The 
military efforts to confront these threats elevated several of the Tennessee 
Valley’s economic elite into positions of unrivaled backcountry authority. As 
these leading men commanded backcountry farmers-turned-militiamen in 
deadly pitched battles with British forces and terrifying irregular warfare 
against regional Indians, their political influence among the Tennessee 
Valley’s residents solidified. Shared Revolutionary War experiences and the 
prolonged threat posed by the Cherokee and Creek Indians to their com-
munities further united the Tennessee Valley’s ruling class and yeoman 
farmers. The growing influence of East Tennessee’s leading men and the 
wartime strengthening of their bonds with mountain farmers and mer-
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chants played a critical role in the coalescence of support for the Franklin 
statehood movement.36
A detailed analysis of the relationship between the regional Native 
American tribes and white East Tennesseans is contained in later chapters, 
but it is critical to briefly mention that violent clashes between frontier 
whites and the southeastern tribes remained a powerful permanent feature 
of the region until the early nineteenth century. From the struggle between 
the British and the French-allied Cherokee warriors at Fort Loudon during 
the French and Indian War to the extremely bloody Cherokee and Creek 
wars following the collapse of the state of Franklin, the constant threat of 
Native American violence served as a salient political and economic issue 
that united Tennessee Valley residents across socioeconomic lines. Com-
munal cohesion among Tennessee Valley inhabitants remained largely in-
tact until the rancorous Franklin political debates severed these bonds.37
Most of the leading Tennessee Valley men served in some military ca-
pacity, and several of their forebearers participated in the agrarian radical-
ism of the North and South Carolina Regulator movements. Prior to the 
American Revolution, the South Carolina Regulators demanded that local 
government officials halt the roving bands of thieves, bandits, and crimi-
nals terrorizing their backcountry agrarian communities. South Carolina 
backcountry settlers and a “fledgling” group of slaveholding planter elite 
banded together to form extra-governmental police units, calling them-
selves Regulators, to end the anarchic situation and to defend their families 
and property. The Palmetto State Regulators also demanded the establish-
ment of much-needed courts, the construction of jails, and the strengthen-
ing of the woefully inadequate backcountry legal system.38 In North 
Carolina, backcountry settlers, also calling themselves Regulators, sought to 
end governmental and fiscal corruption by their local and state government 
officials, unscrupulous creditors, and land speculators. The North Carolina 
Regulators formed a quasi-military force that challenged North Carolina 
governor William Tryon and the state’s political and economic leadership. 
On May 16, 1771, Governor Tryon and several thousand well-trained colo-
nial troops crushed the backcountry insurgency at the bloody Battle of Ala-
mance Creek, and many of the surviving supporters of the movement fled 
the region. The Regulator movement is often hailed as the “first battle of the 
American Revolution,” and several scholars maintain that many supporters 
of the movement immigrated into the Tennessee Valley to escape retaliation 
for their actions and to find “freedom.”39 Other historians challenge the 
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assertion that “the colonization of the trans-Appalachian region” occurred 
as a “result of the Regulator trouble,” arguing that the earliest settlers of the 
region “were seeking land rather than freedom” when they settled in the 
Tennessee Valley. Historians disagree over the significance of the Regulator 
movement in the settlement of the trans-Appalachian frontier, but it is clear 
that at least a few former supporters and leaders of the movement, including 
Jacob Brown and James Robertson, settled in the upper Tennessee Valley. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that many of the grievances and goals of 
both Carolina Regulator movements and the supporters of the Franklin 
movement were remarkably analogous, including demands for courts, land 
offices, enhanced political influence, internal improvements, and improved 
frontier defenses. Despite these similarities, there is little evidence to prove 
any direct connection between the ideologies of backcountry regulation 
and trans-Appalachian separatism.40
The internal threat posed by local Tories and British-allied Indians, 
combined with the participation of many of the residents in the combat 
surrounding the American Revolution, altered the socioeconomic dynam-
ics within the Tennessee Valley and forged a strong bond between the re-
gion’s emerging ruling class and yeoman soldiers. The American Revolution 
became the economic and political springboard for many of the region’s 
leading men, and the events that occurred in the rolling hills of the North 
Carolina piedmont transformed a ragtag group of backwoods farmers and 
merchants into the “Rearguard of the Revolution.” The involvement of 
Tennessee Valley settlers in the Revolutionary War fostered the rank and 
file loyalty and radical separatism defining the state of Franklin movement, 
as well as the political allegiance to North Carolina underlying the ideology 
of the Anti-Franklinites.41
Prior to 1780, the American Revolution seemed like a distant event for 
most residents of the upper Tennessee Valley. The only significant manifes-
tations of revolutionary violence in the region came in the form of increased 
numbers of Overhill Cherokee attacks on white settlements and the arrest, 
prosecution, and execution of backcountry Tories. Trade relations and con-
tinued land encroachment by American colonists ensured the British sup-
port from the Overhill Cherokee, and the intensification of Indian raids on 
American settlements created a highly volatile situation in the backcountry 
communities.42 In response to the threat of Cherokee violence, the Tennes-
see Valley settlers organized several revolutionary committees of safety, 
bolstered their frontier defenses and armaments, and expanded the ranks of 
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their militia companies. The American Revolution opened an epoch of 
warfare between the Overhill Cherokee and Tennessee Valley settlers that 
lasted for several decades.43
Second only to the Cherokee, the danger posed by Tennessee Tories 
loomed as the greatest internal revolutionary threat to the valley settle-
ments. Exact statistics regarding the level of loyalist support in the 
Tennessee backcountry remain obscure, but Tennessee Valley settlers un-
questionably believed Toryism to be a grave threat to their communities.44 
Backcountry leaders and militia companies targeted known pockets of 
loyalists, forcing them to take loyalty oaths to the United States, to flee the 
region, or to languish in local jails. East Tennesseans targeted “nests of 
Tories” on the Nolichucky River and in the Watauga settlements, capturing 
roughly seventy suspected loyalists.45 Adding to the challenges confronting 
Patriot supporters in the Tennessee backcountry, many eastern Tories fled 
across the trans-Appalachian frontier to escape prosecution in the east. By 
1780, tales of Tory conspiracies and sabotage spread across upper East Ten-
nessee. According to one John Sevier biographer, in the fall of 1779, Sarah 
Hawkins Sevier, John Sevier’s first wife, helped to foil a plot to assassinate 
Colonel Sevier by a “noted and infamous Tory” named Jacob Dykes. 
Dykes’s wife divulged the plan to Sarah Sevier “after receiving favors [a 
quart of meal and a slice of meat] from the [Sevier] family.”46
In response to the elevated threat of Tory violence, the Tennesseans 
formed two companies comprised of thirty “dragoons” to “patrol the whole 
country,” and to “capture and punish with death all suspected persons.” 
These patrols succeeded in capturing several high-profile Tory leaders, in-
cluding Isam Yearley and Captain Grimes.47 Many of the captured Tories 
faced their American accusers in the Washington County court. On Febru-
ary 23, 1778, an unidentified Tory was “imprisoned during the [remainder] 
of the present war with Britain, and the sheriff take the whole of his estate 
into custody.” In another case, a loyalist identified as “J.H.” received a sen-
tence of one year in prison “in order to prevent further and future practices 
of [a] pernicious nature.”48 A patrol unit led by Robert Sevier captured and 
executed several Tories, including two loyalists accused of conspiring to 
assassinate John Sevier. In all, the Washington County court tried fourteen 
cases of high treason from 1778 to 1783.49 Tories like Dykes, Halley, Jesse 
Green, and John Gibson did not have the luxury of a court trial. Valley 
militiamen hanged these men for their loyalty to the British cause. In 1850, 
the son of Franklin judge David Campbell recounted the backcountry ex-
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ecution of a Tory named Hopkins. After a two-mile chase up the Holston 
River, David Campbell and a small party of frontier militiamen cornered 
the desperate Hopkins. Upon being confronted by his pursuers, Hopkins 
plunged his horse off a twenty-foot bluff into the Holston River. David 
Campbell managed to throw Hopkins from his horse and wrestle him to 
the ground. During the violent struggle, Hopkins, “the strongest man,” 
nearly drowned Campbell before “Edmiston and several others” rushed to 
his aid. With their assistance, Hopkins “was subdued and taken to the 
bank” of the Holston River. David Campbell’s son described what hap-
pened next: “Some of the company knew him, and knew some of his acts of 
felony—all knew his desperate character. . . . The company held a consulta-
tion & decided that they would hang him and did so forthwith by sticking 
his neck into the fork of a leaning sycamore which bent over the river.”50 
The arrests, prosecutions, and executions of local Tories galvanized the 
largely pro-American Tennesseans and stoked the flames of backcountry 
patriotism.51
The Tennessee Valley’s first external participation in the American 
Revolution occurred early in 1780 when the British launched the southern 
offensive of their struggling American campaign. After British general John 
Burgoyne’s stunning defeat at the Battle of Saratoga in upstate New York in 
October 1777, King George III and his military planners decided to move 
the war from the mid-Atlantic region to the southern colonies.52 This shift 
brought the main British thrust to the doorstep of the Tennessee Valley 
residents. During Britain’s 1780 winter assault on Charleston, South Caro-
lina, North Carolina general Henry Rutherford sent a request to the resi-
dents of his state to dispatch their militia units “for the defense of their 
sister state [South Carolina].” On March 19, 1780, the militia officers of 
Washington County, including John Sevier, Jonathan Tipton, Robert Se-
vier, Landon Carter, John McNabb, Godfrey Isbell, Joseph Wilson, and 
William Trimble, met “in order to raise one hundred men, agreeable to the 
command of the Honorable Brigadier Rutherford, to send aid to South 
Carolina.” The city of Charleston fell to the British on May 12, 1780, but 
the militiamen of Washington County remained committed to Rutherford’s 
call.53 In Sullivan County, Colonel Isaac Shelby recruited volunteers to fill 
the ranks of the Sullivan County militia. Despite the failure to save Charles-
ton and British victories in South Carolina at Waxhaw, Ninety-Six, and 
Camden, Sevier and Shelby succeeded in raising roughly four hundred 
militiamen for the mission into South Carolina. The willingness of the 
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Valley settlers to volunteer for a losing southern effort and to leave their 
homes and families largely unprotected from the Cherokee Indians demon-
strates their level of commitment to the American cause and growing trust 
in the Tennessee Valley’s military leadership.54
Led by Colonel Isaac Shelby, the Tennessee volunteers saw their first 
revolutionary action during the assault on Fort Anderson at the Battle of 
Thicketty Creek. Fort Anderson, a small fort in the piedmont of South 
Carolina, housed both British soldiers and a large contingent of South 
Carolina Tories. On July 30, 1780, Colonel Shelby dispatched William 
Cocke, whose diplomatic skills would be relied upon heavily during the 
Franklin affair, to demand the surrender of Fort Anderson. The British 
commander of the fort, Captain Moore, eventually agreed to surrender the 
post, and the Washington County militia captured ninety-three loyalists, 
two hundred and fifty weapons, and one British sergeant-major. Following 
their victory in South Carolina, the East Tennesseans engaged the British 
and their regional loyalists at skirmishes near Cedar Spring and Musgrove 
Mill. These encounters served as a prelude to the defining revolutionary 
moment for East Tennessee, the Battle of King’s Mountain.55
In May 1780, British general Charles Cornwallis established his south-
ern military headquarters at Camden, South Carolina. From Camden, 
Cornwallis and Major Patrick Ferguson drew upon the recent British mili-
tary successes and waning southern support for the American cause to re-
cruit local loyalists. By the fall of 1780, the ranks of Major Ferguson’s 71st 
Regiment Highlanders had swollen with the addition of Tories drawn from 
across the Carolinas. After sending a request to loyal North Carolinians to 
join the British cause, Ferguson, nicknamed “Bull Dog” for his tenacity in 
battle, menacingly paraded his regiment across the Carolina frontier, cap-
turing Patriots and recruiting additional Tories. Ferguson’s backcountry 
campaign created confusion within the Tennessee Valley communities.56 
Hundreds of “refugee” American supporters fled across the Allegheny 
Mountains seeking shelter among the East Tennesseans. One of these refu-
gees, Samuel Philips, carried a message from Major Ferguson threatening 
to “march his own men over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay the 
country to waste with fire and sword.”57
The danger posed by Ferguson’s forces strengthened the resolve of the 
valley residents. Led by Colonel John Sevier (Washington County), Colonel 
Isaac Shelby (Sullivan County), Charles and Joseph McDowell (Burke 
County, North Carolina), Andrew Hampton (Rutherford County, North 
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Carolina), and William and Arthur Campbell (Washington County, Vir-
ginia), a combined force of Tennessee Valley, North Carolina, and Virginia 
troops met on September 25, 1780, at Sycamore Shoals on the Watauga 
River. The next day, the assemblage of roughly one thousand militiamen 
commenced their march toward the fateful conflict atop King’s Mountain. 
Before they departed, the Reverend Samuel Doak treated the volunteer mi-
litia force to a passionate sermon. Mixing spirituality and patriotism, Doak 
urged the soldiers to “Go forth then in the strength of your manhood to the 
aid of your brethren, the defense of your liberty and the protection of your 
homes. And may the God of justice be with you and give you victory.”58
After a grueling ten-day march across the Appalachian Mountains, on 
the evening of October 6, 1780, the expanded force of fifteen hundred 
men made contact with Major Ferguson’s loyalist regiment in the foothills 
bordering the two Carolinas. The next day, the militia forces surrounded 
the British troops taking a defensive position atop King’s Mountain. Sevi-
er’s Washington County militiamen formed a column on the right f lank, 
and Shelby’s Sullivan County troops joined the Virginia forces to form a 
column in the center. Aided by North Carolina troops commanded by 
colonels Charles and Joseph McDowell and Benjamin Cleveland, the 
Tennessee Valley men launched a withering attack on Ferguson’s forces. 
Utilizing guerilla warfare tactics honed during their irregular encounters 
with the southeastern Indians, the Patriot militia engaged the Loyalist 
forces for a little more than an hour. As the black powder smoke cleared 
from atop King’s Mountain, the Tennesseans found themselves victorious. 
The American troops succeeded in capturing 716 and killing 225 British 
loyalists, including Major Patrick Ferguson. American forces suffered 
only twenty-eight dead and sixty-two wounded militiamen. The continued 
threat of Cherokee attacks against their communities did not allow the 
triumphant East Tennesseans to bask in their momentous victory, and soon 
after the battle’s conclusion, Sevier and Shelby led their troops back across 
the rugged southern mountains to a heroic welcome in the Great Valley of 
the Tennessee.59
The Battle of King’s Mountain and the mythology surrounding the 
men who fought there created a sense of civic pride and solidarity among 
East Tennesseans. The leaders of the assault on Ferguson’s forces parlayed 
their exploits into further political and economic hegemony in the rapidly 
expanding Tennessee frontier. The relationship between political and fiscal 
power and the battle some historians refer to as “the turning point of the 
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American Revolution” is unmistakable. An examination of the militia lead-
ers during the expedition reveals that most of the Tennessee Valley’s able-
bodied leading men served in leadership capacities during the battle. This 
connection extended into the postrevolutionary Franklin movement, where 
men like John Sevier, Landon Carter, and William Cocke all held prominent 
positions both in the revolutionary militia and the Franklin government. 
Even the opponents of Franklin, men like Jonathan Tipton and Isaac Shelby, 
served as colonels in the King’s Mountain volunteer militias and held posi-
tions of power in the North Carolina government. There is no discernable 
difference between the percentages of King’s Mountain participants among 
the rank and file supporters or opponents of the Franklin statehood move-
ment, and it appears that postrevolutionary developments on the Tennessee 
frontier played a much more critical role in determining state loyalties dur-
ing the Franklin debacle. Each side drew heavily upon the rhetoric and ide-
ology of the revolution and their experiences, both real and romanticized, 
during the Battle of King’s Mountain to win local, regional, and national 
support for their causes. The influence wielded by these leading men played 
an important role in securing support from the backcountry rank and file 
during the partisanship surrounding the Franklin movement.60
Participants on both sides of the state of Franklin controversy came 
from comparably mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds, and also shared 
similar experiences with localized Indian violence and revolutionary com-
bat. These factors created deep personal connections between East Tennes-
see’s emerging economic elite and yeoman mountaineers, and therefore fail 
to explain the development of bitter regional factionalism surrounding the 
state of Franklin movement. In fact, the communities, leadership, and resi-
dents of the Tennessee Valley emerged from the American Revolution more 
united than at any other time in the region’s brief history.
At its core, backcountry partisanship was rooted in the cutthroat post-
revolutionary competition between two factions of the Tennessee Valley’s 
economic elite for control over the enormously lucrative regional economy. 
Land speculation and ownership served as the primary method for accu-
mulating wealth and influence in the Tennessee Valley’s mixed economy, 
and control over local, county, and state political and judicial offices stood 
as the most effective means of securing and ensuring regional hegemony. 
Within this economic and political framework, regional support for the 
Franklin movement is intimately connected to the efforts of both wealthy 
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and “middling” mountaineers alike to expand personal land holdings, de-
fend land claims, and remove any barriers to financial success.
A brief examination of the postrevolutionary Tennessee Valley ruling 
class reveals a significant concentration of wealth among a relatively small 
number of families. During the state of Franklin’s brief existence, John 
Sevier served as the embattled state’s only governor. As one might expect, 
Sevier and his family maintained extensive land holdings in the Tennessee 
Valley. “Nolachucky Jack,” as the soldiers who served under him lovingly 
referred to him, owned roughly 84,000 acres of land spread out in several 
counties and military districts. Sevier’s brother Valentine claimed approxi-
mately 900 acres in Washington County. Landon Carter, Franklin’s Speaker 
of the Senate and secretary of state, claimed more than 31,000 acres in the 
Tennessee Valley. The state of Franklin’s most prominent attorney and 
skilled diplomat, William Cocke, owned 11,000 acres of land, and Alexan-
der Outlaw, sheriff of Greene County and one of Franklin’s primary 
Cherokee negotiators, claimed nearly 19,000 acres. In all, the leadership of 
the state of Franklin maintained a disproportionately high level of land 
holdings, averaging approximately 6,600 acres, in a region where most resi-
dents owned only a few hundred acres. In a time when property ownership 
became essential to fully participating in the embryonic American Repub-
lic, the leaders of the state of Franklin movement utilized their substantial 
land holdings to control the socioeconomic dynamics and political destiny 
of an entire region.61
Franklinites were not the only regional leaders with high concentra-
tions of landed wealth. The Anti-Franklinites, or Tiptonites, also owned 
large swaths of land in the Tennessee Valley, but these acreages did not 
compare to the significant tracts controlled by the Franklinite leaders. John 
Tipton, leader of the efforts to derail the Franklin movement, claimed ap-
proximately 2,750 acres of land, and North Carolina congressman Thomas 
Hutchings, a loyalist during the Franklin affair, owned roughly 4,360 acres 
in East Tennessee. Evan Shelby, perhaps the most politically powerful op-
ponent of Franklin, maintained the largest landholdings, roughly 6,000 
acres of fertile bottomland. In sharp contrast to the Franklinites, the Tip-
tonite’s leadership claimed an average of 2,600 acres. These figures lead to 
the conclusion that political influence in postrevolutionary East Tennessee 
corresponded to regional land holdings.62
Despite the high concentration of landed wealth among the leading 
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families of both Franklinite and Tiptonite factions, most Tennessee Valley 
residents managed to acquire smaller tracts of land. External threats from 
North Carolina and the national government and internal threats from 
Native Americans and local competitors united yeoman small-holders and 
mountain elites in their effort to defend their land claims and economic 
interests. As the Tennessee Valley population expanded and the postrevolu-
tionary uncertainty in the trans-Appalachian frontier escalated, competi-
tion for control over the region’s economic and political future rent the once 
united backcountry communities. The bonds forged by revolutionary com-
bat, the loyalist presence, and the Native American threat were shattered as 
two competing political coalitions emerged. Leaders of both the Tiptonites 
and the Franklinites maintained disparate visions for the political and eco-
nomic future of the Tennessee Valley, and support and opposition for 
Franklin’s statehood became the platform upon which these ruling men 
promoted their agenda and galvanized local support.63
The inhabitants of the Tennessee Valley remained largely united 
throughout the American Revolution, but the Franklin separatist move-
ment transformed these backcountry communities. The strong communal 
connections, built upon cultural, economic, and martial bonds, were cata-
strophically strained by the postrevolutionary struggle for control over the 
trans-Appalachian frontier. It was this fight for political and economic su-
premacy between two groups of backcountry leading men that forced the 
region’s small farmers and merchants to choose sides during the political 
chaos surrounding the state of Franklin. The resulting partisanship would 
be disastrous for the inhabitants of the Tennessee Valley, and ultimately 
doomed the state of Franklin.
The residents and communities of the Tennessee Valley emerged out of the 
violence and chaos of the American Revolution largely united. The eco-
nomic expansion, eastern political marginalization, and backcountry war-
time experiences of the previous decades muted any potential underlying 
tensions fostered by commercial and political competition. However, the 
postwar materialization of a determined separatist movement within these 
same backcountry communities led to the polarization of the region’s rul-
ing and laboring classes. From the debate over the passage and meaning of 
North Carolina’s 1784 Cession Act to the public dispute over the ratifica-
tion of the state of Franklin’s egalitarian frame of government, gaping fis-
sures appeared among the trans-Allegheny’s leading men and their rank 
and file supporters. These men knew that their political and economic 
fortunes were at stake, and the Franklin statehood movement represented a 
fundamental divergence of opinion over the policy decisions that best served 
the collective fiscal and political interests of the region’s inhabitants. Parti-
san supporters of the Franklin separatist movement believed that an inde-
pendent Tennessee Valley would allow them to expand and enhance the 
region’s economy by (a) removing the political barriers blocking a more 
aggressive Native American policy, (b) allowing for the utilization of re-
gional taxes for internal improvements, and (c) permitting the backcountry 
ruling class to wield greater political influence than under the governance 
of the state of North Carolina.
As the residents of the Tennessee Valley struggled to make sense of the 
postrevolutionary political decisions emanating from their state capital at 
Hillsboro, a small contingent of regional frontier leaders met on December 
14, 1784, at Washington County’s rustic log courthouse in Jonesboro to 
address the tenuous situation the communities of the upper Tennessee Val-
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ley found themselves in after the passage of the Cession Act a few months 
prior. This diverse group, comprising the region’s economic, military, po-
litical, and religious leadership, confronted the political ambiguities created 
by the actions of the North Carolina Assembly. During this meeting of the 
as yet unnamed Franklin Assembly, the delegates debated declaring the 
Tennessee Valley counties of Washington, Sullivan, and Greene indepen-
dent from the state of North Carolina.1 One attendee rose in front of the 
assemblage and impassionedly drew upon the legacy of the American Revo-
lution to attempt to inspire and unify the delegates. The future Franklinite 
pulled from his coat pocket a copy of the Declaration of Independence and 
began to “show that a number of the reasons which induced their separa-
tion from England . . . applied to the [Tennessee Valley] counties.”2 In what 
became the first of many contentious decisions made by the increasingly 
fractured leadership of the Tennessee Valley, a majority of the members of 
the convention fatefully cast their vote to adopt the state of Franklin’s dec-
laration of independence.3
The events of that winter day simultaneously obscured the political and 
economic realities underlying the North Carolina Cession Act and illumi-
nated the dawning of the regional factionalism that steadily divided the 
Tennessee Valley communities and ultimately destroyed the state of Frank-
lin. The Franklin separatist movement never stood as a unified political 
movement to secure the independence of the westernmost section of North 
Carolina in order to protect and defend the communities of the Tennessee 
Valley. From its conception in the mind of Washington County, Virginia, 
resident Arthur Campbell, to its collapse in the fall of 1788, economic mo-
tivations, partisan divisions provoking communal discord, and the suppres-
sion of backcountry democratization characterized the movement. Upon 
closer scrutiny, the “noble beginnings” and enlightened revolutionary po-
litical agenda propagated by the leadership and supporters of the movement 
melt away and reveal essentially a conservative movement rejecting social, 
political, and economic innovation in exchange for the preservation of 
landed property, political hegemony, and the backcountry status quo. The 
leadership of Franklin quashed the efforts of more progressive elements 
within the Tennessee Valley to bring about meaningful political and social 
change within the region, thus further dividing the region’s inhabitants. An 
examination of the struggle over the Franklin Constitution and the inner 
workings of the Franklin government from 1784 to the end of 1785 ex-
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poses the movement’s fiscal motivations, political conservatism, and divisive 
impact on the Tennessee Valley.
The Franklin separatist movement originated in neighboring Washing-
ton County, Virginia.4 Colonel Arthur Campbell of Royal Oak called 
Washington County, just across the heavily disputed northern border sepa-
rating Virginia and North Carolina, home. In addition to his geographical 
proximity, Colonel Campbell also maintained close military, economic, 
and personal ties to the Tennessee Valley. During Virginia governor Lord 
Dunmore’s 1774 Ohio Valley campaign against the Shawnee and their Na-
tive American allies, Major Arthur Campbell fought alongside several 
prominent Tennessee Valley leading men and future Franklin supporters, 
including Evan Shelby, Anthony Bledsoe, William Cocke, Samuel Newell, 
John Carter, and Gilbert Christian. During the American Revolution, 
Campbell also served with Evan Shelby and William Campbell (his cousin) 
as lieutenant of the 70th Regiment of the Washington County militia. Al-
though he “missed” the Battle of King’s Mountain in order to protect 
Washington County from local British loyalists, Campbell’s Virginia mili-
tiamen rendezvoused with the Tennessee Valley’s Overmountain Men at 
Sycamore Shoals in 1780.5 The Washington County militia triumphed 
alongside Sevier’s and Shelby’s troops at King’s Mountain, and also joined 
in the joint Virginia–North Carolina campaigns against the Overhill and 
Chickamauga Cherokee Indians that followed the defeat of the British 
forces.6 In addition to serving during Dunmore’s War and the American 
Revolution with several of the Tennessee Valley’s leading men, Colonel 
Campbell was also related to several influential Franklinites, including his 
brother David Campbell, who served as Franklin’s “chief judge.”7 Camp-
bell’s connections to the region also included extensive landholdings in 
Sullivan County, North Carolina, where the Virginia resident owned ap-
proximately 1,240 acres along the Holston River.8 Campbell’s important 
ties to the Tennessee Valley gave him tremendous political influence among 
the Tennessee Valley inhabitants and a great personal stake in the region’s 
economic fortunes.9
In January 1782, Colonel Campbell became aware that the state of 
Virginia had recently passed a resolution expressing willingness to cede her 
western territory to the U.S. Confederation Congress. Despite mounting 
criticisms that he was “mainly interested in private aggrandizement,” Colo-
nel Campbell used his political and economic clout within southwest Vir-
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ginia to win support for a new western state.10 In a scene foreshadowing the 
Franklin movement, Campbell argued that the ineptitude of the Virginia 
state government in dealing with the Cherokee tribe and the shared eco-
nomic interests of the western residents made the creation of a new state the 
obvious decision.11
In April 1782, Campbell circulated a proposal among his fellow Wash-
ington County residents to gauge the level of support for a new state. 
Campbell’s proposal received popular support from many Washington 
County residents, and his vision of a new western state rapidly gained mo-
mentum.12 By the summer of 1782, the boundaries of Campbell’s indepen-
dent state carved out of southwestern Virginia grew to include portions of 
western North Carolina, including the Tennessee Valley settlements, and 
Virginia’s newly developing Kentucky territory. He began contacting Ten-
nessee Valley leaders to garner support for his statehood effort, and it was 
within these correspondences that Campbell and future Franklin leaders 
John Sevier, William Christian, William Cocke, and David Campbell for-
mulated the plan and principles for a popularly supported trans-Appalachian 
statehood movement. The exchanges between the members of the Tennessee 
Valley ruling class and the Washington County, Virginia, militia colonel 
reveal the strategy utilized by both parties to win support for their indepen-
dence movements. In a series of legal depositions taken between 1785 and 
1786 during the state of Virginia’s prosecution of Arthur Campbell for “mal-
practices and misconduct in his Office of a Justice of the Peace,” it was di-
vulged that Campbell defiantly implored his fellow westerners to refuse to 
pay Virginia’s public taxes or to elect citizens to Virginia’s General Assembly. 
Additionally, Campbell’s accusers leveled accusations of treason, stating that 
he “openly and secretly, [attempted] to induce the Inhabitants of Washing-
ton County to Separate from this [Virginia] Commonwealth.”13 Campbell’s 
communications with the Franklinites exposed his resentment toward Vir-
ginia for not using more forceful tactics to halt Cherokee Indian violence, 
for failing to utilize state taxes for desperately needed internal improvements 
in the region, and for denying the western leaders political influence within 
their state government in Richmond. These arguments supporting separa-
tion led to regional partisan divisions and failed to receive broad and sus-
tained support in southwest Virginia, but resonated among Campbell’s 
neighbors in Washington County, North Carolina.14
The rationale offered by Arthur Campbell for independence reemerged 
during the turmoil surrounding the controversial North Carolina Cession 
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Act of 1784. The North Carolina cession debate polarized North Carolina’s 
political leadership. Supporters of the Cession Act argued that by passing 
the legislation North Carolina could diminish much of its enormous revo-
lutionary debt and aid the struggling federal government in “defraying the 
expenses of the late war.”15 Opponents of the act believed that it was not in 
the interest of North Carolina to cede its vacant land to Congress because 
of the growing number of taxpayers moving into the region and the unwill-
ingness of state leaders to abandon their Tennessee Valley constituency. 
These patriotic and nationalistic arguments masked the ulterior motives of 
many of the partisans on both sides of the debate.16
In reality, the cession debate centered on the struggle to control North 
Carolina’s valuable western lands. Many of the leaders of the future Frank-
lin statehood movement doggedly lobbied the North Carolina Assembly to 
pass the Cession Act. These same delegates in turn used the eventual pas-
sage of the Cession Act to justify their political separation, arguing that 
their December 1784 declaration of independence came as a reluctantly 
forced response to the abandonment of their communities by their parent 
state. In truth, most of the economic leadership of the Tennessee Valley 
supported the Cession Act of 1784 and hoped to capitalize on the postrevo-
lutionary political confusion and fiscal crisis plaguing North Carolina and 
the federal government to secure political and economic control over their 
own communities and, more importantly, the vast swath of unclaimed and 
valuable western lands.17 Powerful regional land speculators and local rul-
ing elites, including Stockley Donelson (surveyor for the Franklin govern-
ment), Charles Robertson (Speaker of the Franklin Senate), Joshua Gist 
(Franklin judge and member of the constitutional convention), and David 
Looney (justice of the peace under Franklin), voted for the passage of the 
Cession Act. The issue of cession divided the residents of the Tennessee 
Valley, but despite the controversy surrounding the legislation across the 
state, in an unusual collaborative effort, the Tennessee Valley leaders sup-
porting the territorial cession joined with members of North Carolina’s 
eastern economic elite to secure passage of the act in April 1784.18 Eastern 
supporters of the act defended their decisions by arguing that the Tennessee 
Valley residents’ perpetual war with the regional Native American tribes 
was unnecessary and exceedingly costly, and several outspoken members of 
the North Carolina Assembly branded “the inhabitants of the Western 
Country” as “the scourings of the Earth” and “fugitives from Justice.”19
The passage of the Cession Act of 1784 awakened the separatist senti-
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ments planted into the political consciousness of the inhabitants of the 
Tennessee Valley by Arthur Campbell. According to one critic of Tennessee 
Valley separatism, “The whole history of the State of Franklin grew out of 
the miscarriage of the plans of the land speculators.”20 Regional supporters 
of the Cession Act believed that passage of the legislation would open up 
land the state of North Carolina previously reserved for the Cherokee by 
allowing for the renegotiation of land treaties and the intensification of lo-
calized warfare against the embattled tribe. Other proponents of the act 
believed that “congressional ownership of the western land would raise land 
prices,” and since “one of the provisions of the Carolina [land] cession was 
the guarantee of all land entries already made,” many large land owners 
outside and inside the region stood to financially benefit from the legisla-
tion.21 The Cession Act indeed removed several of the political obstacles to 
expanding the Tennessee Valley’s economy and furthering regional land 
speculation by allowing the land-hungry residents to intensify their geno-
cidal campaign against the Cherokee Nation. The passage of the Cession 
Act may have polarized the Tennessee Valley’s political leadership, but it 
also allowed the leaders of the Franklin movement to galvanize a large por-
tion of the backcountry populace under the banners of self-defense, politi-
cal alienation, economic prosperity, and popular sovereignty.22
During their first convention, held on August 23 and 24, 1784, the 
leadership of the Tennessee Valley met at the Jonesboro log courthouse to 
address the political uncertainty created by the passage of the Cession Act. 
The forty delegates to the August meeting agreed to form an association, 
similar to the Watauga Association; to maintain law and order; and to de-
fend themselves from the “tomahawk of the savages.”23 The assemblage 
elected John Sevier president and Landon Carter clerk of the convention, 
and the body also formed a committee to “take under consideration the 
state of affairs” within the region. Finally, the group agreed to petition 
North Carolina for “countenance” regarding the possibility of forming a 
separate government and drafting a state constitution. Before adjourning 
on August 24, the valley delegates agreed to hold a second convention the 
following month and reappraise the situation.24
As news of the August convention traveled across the Appalachian 
Mountains, North Carolina’s eastern political leaders became furious at the 
actions of the Jonesboro delegates. Many of North Carolina’s congressional 
leaders believed that the residents of the Tennessee Valley willfully violated 
the provision of the Cession Act requiring that the ceded lands “be deemed 
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a common fund, for the benefit of all existing and future States of the 
Union.”25 The Cession Act also mandated congressional consent before a 
new state could be created out of the ceded lands. For simply contemplating 
the possibility of forming a separate state, opponents of the Cession Act 
leveled accusations of treason against the Tennessee Valley leaders. The 
Cession Act emerged as a divisive political issue in the 1784 state elections, 
and eastern congressional leaders recently opposing the legislation again 
attacked the act in the fall session of the North Carolina Assembly. At the 
October 22 session held in Newbern, North Carolina, oppositional state 
congressional leaders forced a vote on repealing the Cession Act, arguing 
that the act failed to adequately compensate the state of North Carolina for 
her territorial donation and did not provide reimbursement for the money 
the state spent on backcountry Indian diplomacy and warfare. Under con-
siderable protest, in late October North Carolina’s congressional leadership 
passed an act to repeal the Cession Act by a vote of thirty-seven to twenty-
two in the House of Commons, and nineteen to eleven in the state senate. 
North Carolina defiantly reclaimed her western territory and thrust the 
Tennessee Valley separatists into a partisan political firestorm that eventu-
ally engulfed the entire region.26
It was during the third convening of Tennessee Valley leaders that the 
first signs of bitter internal factionalism emerged. The forty-three delegates 
met again at the Jonesboro courthouse on December 14 and quickly real-
ized that the repeal of the Cession Act divided them over the issue of 
forming “a distinct state, independent of North Carolina.”27 The delegates 
supporting the creation of a separate state argued that, by ceding their west-
ern territory, North Carolina left the Tennessee Valley communities ex-
posed to attacks by regional Indian tribes. Proponents of statehood also 
charged the state of North Carolina with unfairly raising taxes in their re-
gion and failing to use the tax revenue to improve their communities and 
regional economic infrastructure. In a report presented by William Cocke 
to the assembled Tennessee Valley leaders, the supporters of statehood fur-
ther defended their case for separation. The report stated that the creation 
of an independent state would encourage people to settle the region, “which 
would strengthen us, improve agriculture, perfect manufacturers, encour-
age literature and everything truly laudable.” The report went on to assert 
that a self-governing state offered solutions to the regional shortage of specie 
and allowed regional taxes to be used to improve the local situation.28 After 
a short prayer offered by the Reverend Samuel Houston, twenty-eight del-
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egates agreed with the committee’s report and voted “yea” on statehood, 
including the Reverend Houston, Gilbert Christian, William Cocke, and 
Valentine Sevier. No one at the convention pointed out the hypocrisy of 
Charles Robertson, Stockley Donelson, and Joshua Gist, leading Tennessee 
Valley men who had openly supported territorial cession a few months 
earlier but now were using the passage of the Cession Act to justify their 
affirmative vote for an independent state.29
Initially, John Sevier, the future governor of the state of Franklin, led 
the regional opposition against forming a new state. The North Carolina 
Assembly had recently appointed Sevier brigadier general of the newly 
formed militia of the District of Washington, and the expansion of the re-
gional militia into a full brigade, coupled with the repeal of the Cession 
Act, apparently resolved his concerns regarding the region’s vulnerability to 
Indian attacks and political abandonment. Just prior to the opening of the 
December convention, Sevier conceded, “The grievances which the people 
complained are redressed, and my recommendation to them is that they 
proceed no farther in their design to separate from North Carolina.”30 Se-
vier’s popularity among his Tennessee Valley neighbors necessitated that 
the proponents of statehood secure his support for their movement. The 
separatist leaders charged William Cocke with this difficult task, and the 
future Franklin diplomat conducted “an interview with him and [tempo-
rarily] erased” his resistance to the statehood effort. Sevier eventually voted 
in favor of a separate state, and Colonel John Tipton, David Looney, and 
Daniel Kennedy led the “nays” during the contentious vote. After a vote of 
twenty-eight to fifteen, a delegate rose and “declared the three western 
counties independent of North Carolina.”31 The elected assemblage of Ten-
nessee Valley community leaders, now calling themselves the “Assembly at 
Frankland,” agreed to reconvene early in 1785 to discuss “public sentiment” 
regarding their actions and the ratification of a Franklin constitution. The 
December vote signaled the birth of the state of Franklin as well as the be-
ginning of a unrelenting resistance to the statehood movement. From the 
ashes of political defeat, John Tipton erected a powerful anti-statehood 
movement seeking to destroy the state of Franklin and elevate himself and 
his supporters into positions of political dominance.32
As a new year opened, the residents of the Tennessee Valley found 
themselves embroiled in a controversy threatening to tear apart their back-
country communities. The first months of 1785 initiated a new round of 
political contentiousness among North Carolina, her regional loyalists, and 
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the Franklinites. The internal divisions within the region and the vulnera-
bility of the Franklin movement itself left the embryonic state with an un-
certain future. Many of the members of the Franklin Assembly continued 
to maintain reservations regarding the constitutionality and benefits of 
declaring their independence. In a letter dated January 2, 1785, John Sevier 
shared his lingering concerns with Colonel Daniel Kennedy of Greene 
County. Sevier reasserted that North Carolina’s repeal of the Cession Act 
and bolstering of the regional militia strength “satisfy the people with the 
old state” and made the creation of “a new state” unnecessary.33 Sevier also 
sent an “official address to the people of Greene County” cautioning them 
to “decline all further action in respect to a new government.”34 Despite 
Sevier’s warnings, the wheels of statehood continued to grind forward.35
In March 1785, the elected delegates from the three Tennessee Valley 
counties comprising the state of Franklin reconvened at the Jonesboro court-
house. It was during this first official meeting of the Franklin Assembly that 
the supporters of statehood learned the full extent of North Carolina’s resis-
tance to the state of Franklin. During the spring meeting, the Franklin leg-
islature elected John Sevier, finally convinced of the necessity and 
advantages of statehood, to be Franklin’s first governor. The assembly pro-
ceeded to elect David Campbell judge of Franklin’s Superior Court, Joshua 
Gist and John Anderson as assistant judges, Landon Carter as Speaker of the 
Senate, Thomas Talbot as clerk of the senate, William Cage as Speaker of 
the House of Commons, and Thomas Chapman as clerk of the House of 
Commons.36 Franklin’s first elected political leadership wielded enormous 
economic power within the region and maintained in excess of 131,000 
acres in Tennessee Valley land claims.37 With thousands of acres of landed 
wealth at stake, it comes as little surprise that the first legislation passed by 
the Franklin Assembly established “the legal claims of persons claiming 
property under the laws of North Carolina, in the same manner as if the 
State of Franklin had never formed itself into a distinct and separate State.”38 
The legislature went on to pass a number of additional pieces of legislation 
on March 31, of which two more were concerned with defending landed 
property. The other acts dealt with taxation and additional economic poli-
cies, the election and compensation of government and judicial officials, the 
creation of four new counties (Wayne, Spencer, Caswell, and Sevier), the 
establishment of a state militia, the procurement “of a great seal for the 
State,” and finally, “an act for the promotion of learning.”39
In addition to the election of legislative leaders and the passage of nu-
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merous individual pieces of legislation, the Franklinites also elected “state 
officers,” court officials, and military personnel. Those appointed to impor-
tant positions within the Franklin state government included: Landon 
Carter, secretary of state; William Cage, treasurer; Stockley Donelson, sur-
veyor-general; Daniel Kennedy and William Cocke, brigadier generals of 
the state militia; and William Cocke, “Commissioner of Franklin” to Con-
gress. James Sevier (Washington County), John Rhea (Sullivan County), 
Daniel Kennedy (Greene County), Thomas Henderson (Spencer County), 
Joseph Hamilton (Caswell County), and Samuel Weir (Sevier County) com-
prised the state’s judicial leadership. These men also commanded significant 
economic influence within the Tennessee Valley and laid claim to hundreds 
of thousands of acres across the trans-Allegheny frontier. From these posi-
tions of political power, the leading Franklinites finally secured control over 
the Tennessee Valley’s political and economic future.40
The Tennessee Valley’s landholding elites were not the only interested 
parties present at the March Franklin Assembly. By February, North Caro-
lina governor Alexander Martin had grown increasingly concerned regard-
ing the actions of the Franklinites. Governor Martin dispatched Major 
Samuel Henderson, brother of Judge Richard Henderson, to travel to the 
Tennessee Valley and apprise him of whether the Franklin movement drew 
its support from “a few leading men” or “whether it be the sense of a large 
majority of the people that the State be dismembered at this crisis.”41 Hen-
derson carried with him a letter from Martin addressed to Brigadier Gen-
eral John Sevier, which the governor read before the Franklin Assembly. 
The exact content of that letter did not survive for scrutiny, but judging by 
the hasty response of the Franklinites, the letter unquestionably challenged 
their declaration of statehood, and demanded a full disclosure of reasons 
behind their actions. The frenetic excitement surrounding the creation of 
the Franklin government gave way to the defense of political sovereignty.42
On March 22, William Cage and Landon Carter crafted a response to 
Governor Martin’s inquiry. In a carefully worded defense of the indepen-
dence movement, the Franklinites argued that the passage of the Cession 
Act and the “unjust reproaches” of the North Carolina legislature “con-
vinced [us] it was the Sense of the [North Carolina] Genl. Assembly to get 
rid of” the Tennessee Valley communities. According to Cage and Carter, 
the state of Franklin emerged out of necessity in order to “obtain the best 
terms” possible from the federal government and to defend themselves from 
the “frequent murders committed by the Indians.” Additionally, the two 
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Franklinites argued that both the North Carolina Constitution and the 
U.S. Confederation Congress “encourage” and “consent” to the formation of 
new states in the west. The letter concluded by stating, “We unanimously 
agree that our lives, Liberties, and Property Can be more secure & our 
happiness Much better propagated by our separation, & Consequently that 
it is our duty and inalienable right to form ourselves into a New Indepen-
dent State.”43 A personal letter from John Sevier to Governor Martin ac-
companied the legal and constitutional defense composed by Carter and 
Cage and endorsed by the legislature of the state of Franklin. Sevier’s cor-
respondence purported to convey the true sentiments of the rank and file 
supporters of the Franklin movement, stating, “The people of the Country 
Consider themselves Illy Treated, first being ceded without their consent, 
Secondly by repealing the act in the same measure,” and that the failure of 
North Carolina to compensate the Indians for lands previously purchased 
have made “an Indian War [likely] This Summer.” Both letters attempted 
to appease Governor Martin by stressing that the Franklinites considered 
themselves to be “friends” of North Carolina and by “begging” Martin to 
allow the state of Franklin to exist without interference. These appeals ulti-
mately fell upon deaf ears, as Governor Martin, North Carolina’s political 
leadership, and Franklin’s regional opponents launched their efforts to dis-
solve the new state.44
On April 25, Governor Martin responded to the Tennessee Valley 
separatists with a calculated and threatening public manifesto. The procla-
mation challenged the arguments for statehood presented by the Franklin-
ites in their March letters and asserted that “a considerable number, if not a 
majority” of the “leaders of the present revolt,” actually voted for the Ces-
sion “Act they now deem impolitic, and pretend to reprobate, which in all 
probability would not have passed but through their influence and assidu-
ity.” The governor also stated that the North Carolina Assembly repealed 
the Cession Act because of the “uneasiness and discontent” it caused the 
Tennessee Valley residents. Additionally, by expanding the Washington 
County militia district and establishing a court in Washington County, 
Martin believed that the state government removed “the only general in-
convenience and grievance they [Tennessee Valley residents] labour under.” 
Martin’s manifesto systematically refuted the arguments put forth by the 
Franklinites for separation, asserting that “restless ambition and a lawless 
thirst of power” are behind the movement and that the citizens of the Ten-
nessee Valley “have been seduced from their Allegiance” through “specious 
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pretences and the Acts of designing Men.” Martin demanded that the 
Franklinites “return to their allegiance and duty, and forebear paying any 
obedience to any self-created power and authority unknown to the Consti-
tution of the State, and not sanctioned by the Legislature.” Martin remind-
ed the Franklin supporters that “far less causes have deluged States and 
Kingdoms with blood,” and that the actions of the Franklinites could set a 
precedent for other groups to engage in “dangerous and unwarranted pro-
cedures” that may ultimately topple the new American Republic.45
The foreboding declaration circulated widely among the Tennessee 
Valley residents, and the two distinct responses offered to Martin’s mani-
festo illustrate the passionate communal dichotomy emerging within the 
region. The Franklinites’ counter manifesto accused Governor Martin of 
attempting to “create sedition and stir up insurrection among the good 
citizens of this State, thinking thereby to destroy that peace and tranquility 
that so greatly abounds among the peaceful citizens of the new happy coun-
try.” The Franklinites argued that North Carolina’s “own acts . . . invited 
us to the separation,” and that the creation of the state of Franklin “saved 
the State [of North Carolina] from impending [financial] ruin.”46 The re-
sponse from John Tipton and his Anti-Franklin supporters further polar-
ized the Tennessee Valley and forced the Franklinites to attach a warning 
to their counter-manifesto demanding that all Tennessee Valley residents 
obey the laws of the new state. In a May 13 letter to Governor Martin, 
Tipton pledged his obedience to North Carolina and to Martin’s 
“commands.” Tipton informed his “Excellency” Governor Martin of his 
willingness to “continue to discountenance the lawless proceedings of my 
neighbors.”47 These two divergent reactions to Martin’s pleas for the aban-
donment of the statehood movement highlighted the expanding partisan 
rift emerging within the Tennessee Valley communities. The relatively 
sparse regional population and intimate communal connections ensured 
that the frontier communities could not escape the impending political 
fallout.48
In the spring of 1785, the growing tensions between the Franklin gov-
ernment and its parent state gradually subsided with the election of Richard 
Caswell to the North Carolina governorship. Governor Caswell maintained 
close personal and economic ties to the Tennessee Valley, and he and Frank-
lin governor John Sevier remained both intimate friends and business 
partners. Prior to the Franklin movement, Sevier, Caswell, William Blount, 
Griffith Rutherford, John Donelson, and Joseph Martin formed a land 
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company to purchase the Muscle Shoals territory on the Tennessee River. 
The fertile Muscle Shoals bottomlands, at the “bent” of the Tennessee 
River in present-day Alabama, offered a tremendous economic windfall for 
land speculators and farmers able to secure its purchase from the various 
Native American claimants.49 The governors of Franklin and North Caro-
lina did not limit their joint speculation to the Muscle Shoals land deal. In 
a bizarre business arrangement, newly elected North Carolina governor 
Richard Caswell and the governor of the rebellious state of Franklin actu-
ally speculated in land together during the Franklin affair. According to 
North Carolina land grant records, Sevier and Caswell purchased a two- 
hundred-acre plot of land in Greene County. The two partners applied for 
the grant on June 7, 1784, and received the grant on November 15, 1787. In 
addition to Governor Caswell’s business dealings with John Sevier, Caswell 
also owned 5,480 acres of land in Sullivan, Greene, and Washington coun-
ties.50 Governor Caswell maintained a substantial economic stake in the 
avoidance of partisan bloodshed in the Tennessee Valley. In a letter dated 
May 14, 1785, Sevier informed Governor Caswell of the accusations leveled 
by former Governor Martin and reiterated that the leadership of Franklin 
“will not be intimidated” into abandoning their plans.51 Both Sevier’s letter 
and Caswell’s June 17 response reflected a more civilized tone. Caswell as-
sured Sevier that he did not intend to pursue a policy of confrontation and, 
in fact, hoped to delay action against the Franklin government until after 
he consulted with the North Carolina Assembly.52 The animosity between 
the two states further abated when John Sevier assured Richard Caswell 
that the Franklinites “wish to do nothing that will be inconsistent with the 
honor and interest of each party.” Sevier closed his May correspondence by 
extending his government’s “hearty and kind wishes” to “the parent state.”53 
As one Franklin supporter jubilantly exclaimed, “We have now the most 
friendly assurances from North Carolina, since Governor Martin’s admin-
istration has expired.”54 These amicable exchanges marked an amazing de-
escalation of the friction between the governorships of the two sides but 
failed to calm the rising tension between partisans inside the Tennessee 
Valley.55
During the closing months of 1785, backcountry separatism finally 
bore fruit when the Franklin government entered into its first treaty nego-
tiations with the Cherokee tribe. On June 10, a small delegation of Frank-
linites, including John Sevier, Joseph Hardin, Luke Boyer, Ebenezer 
Alexander, Joshua Gist, and Alexander Outlaw, traveled to the mouth of 
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Dumplin Creek to purchase “all the lands lying and being on the South side 
of Holeson [sic] and French Broad Rivers, as far South as the ridge that di-
vide the Waters of Little River from the Waters of Tenesee [sic]” from the 
Overhill Cherokee. The parlay conducted at Dumplin Creek represented a 
new phase in frontier negotiations with the Cherokee. The Franklin nego-
tiators invited only a fraction of the Cherokee’s leadership, eschewing native 
leaders resistant to land cessions, and demanded that the tribe relinquish a 
huge swath of their remaining lower Tennessee Valley lands.56 The Treaty 
of Dumplin Creek added an enormous tract of land to Franklin’s state 
boundaries, provided new territory for the expansion of the regional econo-
my, opened up new speculative opportunities for the landed elite, and en-
couraged hundreds of new families to settle in the Tennessee Valley. Despite 
leading to the escalation of warfare between the white inhabitants of the 
Tennessee Valley and the Cherokee, Franklin’s political leaders hailed the 
treaty as a major political and economic triumph. The treaty negotiations at 
Dumplin Creek and the resulting backcountry warfare repudiated the con-
ciliatory postrevolutionary Indian policies of both North Carolina and the 
Confederation Congress. The Native American inhabitants of the Tennessee 
Valley no longer stood as an impediment to the economic, territorial, and 
political ambitions of the region’s landed elite and small-holders.57
Despite the success of the Treaty of Dumplin Creek, the leaders of the 
Franklin movement failed to secure approval from the U.S. Congress for 
their state’s admittance into the confederation of states. On May 16, 
Franklin’s emissary to Congress, William Cocke, traveled to New York and 
presented Franklin’s case for statehood before that esteemed body. In a 
memorial presented to the Confederation Congress, Cocke reiterated the 
reasons behind the statehood movement and formally requested “Congress 
to accept the offered [North Carolina] cession and to receive us into the 
federal union.”58 On May 20, a congressional committee took under con-
sideration “whether Congress had, or had not a right to Accept the cession, 
& whether it was not still binding upon the State, notwithstanding the 
repealing Act.” The committee issued their opinion the very same day, 
accepting “the cession of western territory made by North Carolina.”59 Ac-
cording to North Carolina congressman Richard Dobbs Spaight, who was 
absent from the deliberations and adamantly opposed to Congress uphold-
ing the Cession Act, “Contrary to the established rule, the report was taken 
up, and Acted on, the same day [May 20] without allowing any time for 
consideration or giving any notice to the member from the State.”60 Even 
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without the participation of North Carolina’s state representative, the state-
hood report failed to garner the necessary two-thirds majority required by 
the Articles of Confederation to win Franklin congressional consent. New 
Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Hampshire, Pennsylva-
nia, and Georgia voted for recognizing Franklin; Maryland and Virginia 
voted against recognizing Franklin; and South Carolina split its vote on the 
issue.61 Despite being denied congressional recognition by a single vote, 
William Cocke and his fellow Franklinites believed they faired well in New 
York. Virginia governor Patrick Henry wrote to Thomas Jefferson that 
“The new Society sent Wm. Cocke to Congress to solicit [sic] Admission 
into the Union. His Mission was fruitless, tho’ he said the contrary as I am 
told.”62 Congress accepted their argument against the repeal of the Cession 
Act, and a number of powerful states, including New York and Pennsylva-
nia, openly supported their statehood movement. The savvy Cocke re-
mained in New York for several weeks attempting to increase support for 
Franklin, but the effort to secure congressional approval for America’s four-
teenth state remained stalled for the immediate future.63
Against the backdrop of the Indian negotiations at Dumplin Creek and 
Cocke’s failed effort to secure congressional approval for his state, the 
Franklin legislature officially met for a second time at the log courthouse in 
Jonesboro. During this brief August session, the Franklinites discussed the 
daunting task of drafting a permanent Franklin constitution. The delegates 
resolved to meet at the Greeneville Presbyterian Church, in the new Frank-
lin capital of Greeneville, “on the second Monday in November . . . for the 
express purpose of adopting the then existing frame of government or alter-
ing it as the people see proper.”64 The November constitutional debate ir-
reparably fractured the Franklin movement and further widened the breach 
between Franklin’s supporters and her opponents. The constitution contro-
versy also revealed the extent to which Franklin’s leadership would go to 
ensure their political worldview at the expense of an expanded backcountry 
electorate.65
Prior to the November constitutional convention, the state of Franklin 
existed under a slightly modified version of North Carolina’s state constitu-
tion. At the December 1784 meeting of the future Franklin Assembly, the 
delegates had agreed to accept a temporary constitution modeled on that of 
their parent state and to reconvene within a year to adopt a permanent 
frame of government. According to the Franklinites, they “patronized her 
[North Carolina] constitution and laws” in order to “influence Congress to 
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precipitate our reception into the federal union.”66 The sixty-four delegates 
to the constitutional convention represented both the political and eco-
nomic leadership of the Tennessee Valley, but the region’s Presbyterian reli-
gious leaders led the heated clash over the ratification of the document.67
On November 14, the first day of the constitutional convention, the 
Reverend Samuel Houston, minister of the Providence Presbyterian Church, 
read before the Franklinites for the first time a radically democratic frame 
of government. Houston’s former teacher the Reverend William Graham, 
head of Liberty Hall Academy (now Washington and Lee University) in 
Lexington, Virginia, and Virginia separatist Arthur Campbell aided Hous-
ton in composing the extraordinary document.68 The constitution, entitled 
A Declaration of Rights and a Constitution, made by the representatives of the 
freemen of Frankland, blended the visionary democratic principles of Camp-
bell with the Presbyterian morality of Graham to create one of the most 
unique frames of government ever conceived. The authors of the Houston-
Graham Constitution divided the document into two sections, A Declara-
tion of Rights and The Constitution or Form of Government. The Declaration 
of Rights closely resembled the state of North Carolina’s 1776 Declaration 
of Rights, with the first clause powerfully asserting the concept of popular 
sovereignty. The document also listed twenty-four civil liberties, including 
the right to be treated fairly before the law, the freedom of the press, the 
right to bear arms, the right to assembly, and the freedom “to worship Al-
mighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences.” The 
constitutional section offered sweeping changes to the North Carolina 
Constitution and greatly expanded the electorate in the Tennessee Valley. 
The Houston-Graham Constitution “limited the power of the [political] 
officials and provided for a wide participation in the government” by call-
ing for a unicameral legislature and population-based political representa-
tion, and allowing “Every free male inhabitant of this State . . . a vote in 
electing all officers chosen by the people, in the county where he resides.” 
The document restricted the influence of the region’s entrenched political 
leadership by forcing representatives to reside in the county which they 
represented, limiting the terms of elected officials, allowing for direct popu-
lar elections of most state officials and militia officers, and publishing “all 
Bills of a public and general nature . . . for the consideration of the people, 
before they are read in the General Assembly for the last time.” In addition 
to these political elements, the constitution also encouraged “learning” by 
erecting one regional university “near the center of the state” and allocating 
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land and tax revenues for the construction of “a Grammar School” in each 
county. Interspersed among these democratic ideals, the Presbyterian archi-
tects of the constitution inserted several unusual religiously oriented politi-
cal restrictions, including denying citizens “of an immoral character, or 
guilty of such flagrant enormities as drunkenness, gaming, profane swear-
ing, lewdness, or Sabbath breaking” from holding political offices, and re-
stricting political access to citizens who deny the Judeo-Christian god, 
heaven and hell, the Old and New Testaments, or the Christian Trinity. 
The proposed Franklin Constitution also established several secular limita-
tions on political participation, including prohibiting ministers, lawyers, 
and doctors from serving in the Franklin Assembly, and placing property 
qualifications on members of the House of Representatives.69
The Houston-Graham Constitution’s melding of Enlightenment prin-
ciples and the Protestant Reformation generated an enormous amount of 
controversy among the convention attendees. After completing his reading 
of the constitution, the Reverend Houston moved the assembly to vote on 
ratifying the document. In response, assembly members opposed to the 
Houston-Graham Constitution asked that the Presbyterian minister Heze-
kiah Balch be allowed to address the convention. Despite not being a mem-
ber of the Franklin Assembly, the Reverend Balch “animadverted severely 
upon the manuscript constitution.”70 Those in attendance did not record 
the nature of Balch’s criticisms, but his arguments appear to have been ef-
fective. In a vote of twenty-four to nineteen, opponents of the Houston-
Graham Constitution defeated the proposed frame of government. Governor 
John Sevier immediately moved to formally ratify the modified North 
Carolina Constitution. Despite the efforts of the Reverend Houston and 
his supporters to replace the North Carolina Constitution, the Franklin 
Assembly voted to accept Sevier’s constitution as the permanent frame of 
government for the state of Franklin. The rejection of the Houston-Graham 
Constitution by the leadership of Franklin reflected their desire to domi-
nate Tennessee Valley politics by containing the democratic impulses un-
leashed by the American Revolution. By defeating passage of the radical 
frame of government and ratifying North Carolina’s less egalitarian docu-
ment, the faction of the Tennessee Valley’s landed elite comprising the 
leadership of Franklin ensured their economic and political hegemony.71
The ratification of the amended North Carolina Constitution initiated 
a fiery “pamphlet war” between partisans on both sides of the issue. Despite 
residing in a region devoid of printing presses, supporters of both frames of 
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government blanketed the Tennessee Valley with political tractates pro-
claiming their positions on the constitutional debate. A group supporting 
the Houston-Graham Constitution, calling themselves the Franklin 
Commonwealth Society, published two pamphlets defending the rejected 
constitution. The two pamphlets were entitled “Principles of Republican 
Government by a Citizen of Frankland” and “Essay on Government by a 
Citizen of Frankland.”72 A third William Graham–penned pamphlet, en-
titled “An Address to the Inhabitants of Frankland State,” sharply criticized 
the federal government, members of the clergy, and opponents of the 
Houston-Graham Constitution. Graham’s pamphlet evoked such ire among 
leading Franklinites that “the [Washington County] court directed the 
sheriff to burn it,” and “an effigy of Graham was [also] burned.”73 Support-
ers of the new Franklin Constitution countered by publishing their own 
pamphlets and utilizing legal and physical intimidation to curtail dissen-
sion. Eventually Hezekiah Balch “brought charges against [William] Gra-
ham before the predicatory of the Presbyterian Church” in Philadelphia, 
and the Philadelphia Presbytery ultimately censored Graham.74
The Greeneville constitutional convention “brought about a sharp 
conflict . . . between the advocates of political equality and the partisans of 
privileges for a few.” On one side, the group led by Arthur Campbell and 
Presbyterian ministers Samuel Houston and William Graham advocated a 
frame of government based on a union between democratic principles and 
moralistic religiosity. On the other side, the group led by the Reverend 
Hezekiah Balch, John Sevier, and William Cocke hoped to mitigate radical 
changes in the Franklin government and Tennessee Valley politics by rati-
fying the existing modified North Carolina Constitution.75 John Sevier 
and supporters of the modified North Carolina Constitution hoped to 
maintain control over the political and economic fortunes of the Tennessee 
Valley by blocking the democratization of regional politics. The intercon-
nectedness of political and landed power and the challenges the proposed 
radical “clerical” constitution presented to Sevier and his supporters threat-
ened to dilute the regional hegemony of Franklin’s leading men. The leaders 
of Franklin who orchestrated the effort to defeat the Houston-Graham 
Constitution did so to ensure that they could determine who served in in-
fluential political, judicial, and military positions within the Tennessee 
Valley.76
The stormy debate over the Franklin Constitution highlights the inter-
nal discord among the early supporters of statehood. An examination of the 
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nineteen convention members who dissented from the ratification of the 
modified North Carolina Constitution reveals that men holding high-level 
positions within both the Franklin government and the opposition contin-
gent supported the Houston-Graham Constitution. The nineteen members 
of the Franklin state government opposing the adopted constitution in-
cluded David Campbell, David Looney, and Samuel Newell. The rejection 
of the Houston-Graham Constitution expanded the ranks of the Anti-
Franklinites by attracting several prominent Tennessee Valley residents to 
their cause. Several of these men initially supported statehood, but the de-
bates within the Franklin constitutional convention ultimately led to their 
defection. After expressing their opposition to the modified North Carolina 
Constitution, Robert Love, James Stuart, Peter Parkinson, and George 
Maxwell joined John and Joseph Tipton in their effort to destroy the state 
of Franklin. The controversy surrounding the Franklin Constitution exac-
erbated the lingering hostilities between the Tiptonites and the Franklinites, 
and the rejection of the far more democratic plan of government expressed 
in the Houston-Graham Constitution alienated several of the new state’s 
most ardent supporters.77
During the final days of 1785, the residents of the upper Tennessee 
Valley found themselves in an increasingly precarious position. Their state 
government remained in political limbo after failing to secure recognition 
from the federal government. The Tennessee Valley communities, once 
united behind shared political and economic interests, the American Revo-
lution, and perpetual Indian warfare, found themselves torn between two 
bitter factions competing for control over their region’s political and eco-
nomic fate. The passage of an act by the North Carolina Assembly in No-
vember that offered “to put into oblivion” the actions of the residents of 
Washington, Greene, and Sullivan counties promoting “an independent 
government” further threatened the fragile loyalties of Tennessee Valley 
supporters of statehood.78 Despite these challenges, the leadership of the 
state of Franklin remained confident in the success of their movement and 
believed that the concerns over internal and external resistance to Franklin 
paled in comparison to the potential financial and political rewards inde-
pendence offered the Tennessee Valley’s ruling class.
As the year 1786 dawned, the residents of the Tennessee Valley found 
themselves embroiled in a bitter partisan contest to determine the political 
future of their increasingly divided communities. During the previous two 
years, competition between two ruling backcountry factions polarized 
trans-Appalachian North Carolina. The contentious interregional debates 
over the constitutionality of the Franklin statehood movement and the 
Franklin Constitution exasperated antagonisms between supporters and 
opponents of statehood and political democratization. From January 1786 
until the winter of 1787, defenders and enemies of the state of Franklin in-
tensified their partisan efforts within the Tennessee Valley. The debilitating 
failure of William Cocke’s congressional lobbying effort, the escalation of 
opposition to statehood from a swelling minority faction within the Ten-
nessee Valley, and North Carolina’s increasingly deft political leadership 
ensured an uncertain and perilous future for the Franklinites. Franklin’s 
leadership attempted to divert political ruin by launching an intense public 
relations campaign to attract support from influential state and national 
political figures. In conjunction with this propaganda blitz, the Franklinites 
continued their efforts to expand their state’s boundaries and their personal 
landholdings by reengaging in further speculative land ventures at Muscle 
Shoals on the “Great Bend” of the Tennessee River. The Muscle Shoals land 
scheme eventually drew the Franklinites into an aborted military coalition 
with the state of Georgia against the unfortunate landholding Upper Creek 
tribe.
As the Franklinites escalated their efforts to defend their political and 
economic interests, opponents of Tennessee Valley separatism redoubled 
their campaign to derail the statehood movement and secure control over 
the region’s political and judicial offices. Under the direction of Governor 
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Richard Caswell, North Carolina’s savvy political leadership initiated an 
effective “divide and conquer” political strategy within the region that 
sought to exploit preexisting communal divisions and erode internal sup-
port for Franklin. With the backing of John Tipton’s Anti-Franklinite sup-
porters, this “divide and conquer” strategy combined the lure of economic 
and political concessions with the extension of a parallel North Carolina 
state bureaucracy into the region to intensify internal opposition to the state 
of Franklin. For roughly two years, the residents of the Tennessee Valley 
“were presented with the strange spectacle of two empires exercising at one 
and the same time over one and the same people.” The violent political and 
economic repercussions and communal discord resulting from the uproari-
ous competition over the Tennessee Valley’s principal organs of government 
sowed the seeds of Franklin’s violent demise.1
The emergence of North Carolina’s strategic détente with the Franklin 
government can be traced to the relationship between North Carolina gov-
ernor Richard Caswell and the embattled state’s political leadership. Gover-
nor Caswell’s very public friendship with Franklin governor John Sevier, 
extensive regional landholdings, and his own western speculative desires 
undoubtedly influenced his strategy for dealing with the rebellious Frank-
linites. In a letter dated July 12, 1786, to Governor Sevier, Caswell ac-
knowledged the strangely amicable relationship between himself and the 
rebellious Franklin leader. Governor Caswell lamented the fact that his 
position as “chief executive” of a state that refused to “recognize the State of 
Franklin” made it “impolitic & inconsistent with my Station to carry on a 
correspondence with you under that Character whatever my private senti-
ments may be,” but assured his longtime friend that “it always did and will 
give me pleasure to Correspond with you and that it is my intention to do 
so either in public or private life, at all convenient opportunities.”2 In strik-
ing contrast to the animus that characterized former North Carolina gover-
nor Alexander Martin’s policies toward the Franklinites, the Caswell 
administration’s “divide and conquer” strategy sought to peel off partisan 
support from within the region and topple the Franklin government with 
as little loss of life and disruption to the land-based regional economy as 
possible. The Caswell administration’s new diplomatic tactics proved to be 
both tremendously effective and tragically deadly.3
In an act passed at their November 1785 session, the North Carolina 
legislature attempted to further fragment the residents of the Tennessee 
Valley by introducing legislation offering to pardon Franklinites for their 
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previous rebellious actions contingent upon the return of their political al-
legiance to their parent state. The “act of pardon” served as the first diplo-
matic salvo in Governor Richard Caswell’s political strategy for restoring 
the valuable Tennessee Valley territory and the residents’ political loyalties 
to North Carolina without initiating civil war.4 The November legislation 
also directed backcountry loyalists to organize regional elections to select 
representatives to the North Carolina legislature from Washington, Sulli-
van, and Greene counties and to appoint regional civil, judicial, and mili-
tary officials. In essence, the North Carolina Assembly asserted that the 
“governmental posts held by individuals who were still in rebellion” must 
be filled with state loyalists.5 The Caswell administration hoped to further 
divide the Franklin movement by “building on the dissension that the Tip-
ton [Anti-Franklinite] camp was generating.”6 The 1786 regional elections 
confirmed the existence of a growing internal opposition to the state of 
Franklin and offered Anti-Franklinites their first opportunity to effectively 
express political dissent. The existence of dual state mechanisms within the 
Franklin communities added to the growing confusion and hostilities 
within the region. The results of holding the North Carolina–governed 
elections in Franklin paid significant political dividends for the Caswell 
administration and the Tiptonites.7
In response to North Carolina’s election demands, on July 19, 1786, 
acting Washington County sheriff George Mitchell hesitantly announced 
that “there will be an election held the Third Friday in August next, at 
John Rennoe’s near the Sycamore Shoals to choose members to represent 
Washington county in the General Assembly of North Carolina.”8 The 
Franklinites rallied their own regional supporters and began preparations 
to hold separate elections for the North Carolina Assembly on the very 
same day. The Franklinites intended to demonstrate the level of regional 
support for their independence movement by electing their own officials 
to the legislative assembly of the state from which they had recently re-
belled.9 The Franklinites believed that the election of two representatives 
to the North Carolina Assembly might convince North Carolina legisla-
tors to agree to support Franklin’s statehood bid in the upcoming Novem-
ber state legislative session. The August elections revealed the rising 
intensity of partisanship engulfing the Tennessee Valley communities and 
the importance both factions placed upon controlling the region’s political 
and judicial bureaucracy.10
Throughout the summer of 1786, partisans from both sides prepared 
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to hold the contentious elections in the Franklin counties. As political cam-
paigning intensified, the two opposing parties riotously rallied under the 
banners of “new state” and “old state” men.11 By the opening of the August 
elections, both groups managed to secure substantial political backing for 
their candidates, but the surging level of regional support behind the Anti-
Franklinite (old state) faction illustrated the growing opposition to the 
statehood movement within the Tennessee Valley. The results of the August 
elections came as little surprise to the region’s voters, since both sides erect-
ed their own polling stations and calculated their own election returns. The 
Franklinites held their elections in Jonesboro and unanimously elected 
Landon Carter and Thomas Chapman to serve as Franklin’s representatives 
to the North Carolina legislature. Despite accusations of voter intimidation 
by local Franklinites, old state supporters managed to hold their own elec-
tions at the home of John Rennoe on Sinking Creek in Sycamore Shoals. 
The Tiptonite faction predictably elected John Tipton as senator and cast 
their votes for two outspoken critics of the state of Franklin, James Stuart 
(Stewart) and Richard White, to serve as representatives to the North 
Carolina House of Commons.12 “Without violence and in an orderly man-
ner,” both sides managed to conduct elections in the state of Franklin. The 
ramifications of these two elections ultimately proved to be far from “or-
derly” or nonviolent.13
An examination of the results of the August 1786 elections demon-
strates the growing sectional fragmentation of political support within the 
Tennessee Valley and the importance of “neighborhood affiliations” in de-
termining partisan loyalties.14 Although hard polling numbers are scarce, 
there is a distinct voting pattern in the Franklin counties. In the counties in 
which the two leading figures of the political clash resided, John Tipton in 
Washington County and John Sevier in Sullivan County, local residents 
tended to lend their political support to their neighbors. In Sullivan Coun-
ty, support for John Sevier and the “new state” movement remained strong. 
According to the returns made by polling inspectors, all 254 votes went to 
the two Franklinite candidates. In Washington County, an area in which 
“disaffection to the Franklin government began to manifest itself,” citizens 
cast all 179 ballots for Tipton’s old state candidates. The overwhelming 
support given to three old state men in Washington County proved to be 
another “ill-omen to the future fortunes of Franklin.”15
The August legislative elections served as just the beginning of North 
Carolina’s effort to weaken the Franklin movement by exacerbating the 
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growing antagonisms within the Tennessee Valley. As support for Franklin 
began to diminish, old state loyalists commenced electing and appointing 
civil, judicial, and military officials to influential posts within the region. 
New state supporters quickly countered these efforts by electing Franklin-
ites to many of these same positions. In Washington County, Tiptonite 
forces appointed Jonathan Pugh “North Carolina sheriff,” and in Sullivan 
County Franklin supporters commissioned Andrew Caldwell sheriff.16 The 
erection of competing state bureaucracies quickly involved the region’s judi-
cial system, as both sides appointed their own judges and clerks and orga-
nized parallel court systems. The Franklinites appointed John Sevier’s son 
James to be Washington County court clerk, and the Tiptonites selected 
Thomas Gourley as their clerk of court. As lecturer William A. Henderson 
described in his 1873 speech to Knoxville, Tennessee’s Board of Trade, 
“Each county had a Franklin sheriff and a North Carolina sheriff, two sets 
of legislators were running at the same time, two courts held their sessions 
as regularly as the other side would let them.”17
The existence of competing legislative and judicial systems predictably 
led to clashes between the opposing Tennessee Valley factions. The re-
gional court systems became the battleground in which proponents on each 
side of the Franklin issue waged disruptive campaigns in order to cement 
their control over the region’s judicial system. In the competing Washing-
ton County courts, John Tipton held sessions “under the authority of North 
Carolina” at Buffalo, and James Sevier presided over the Franklin court just 
ten miles away in the town of Jonesboro. The distance separating these two 
courts failed to prevent violent confrontations from occurring throughout 
1786 and into 1787. According to one Tennessee historian, “As the pro-
cesses of these courts frequently required the sheriffs to pass within the ju-
risdiction of each other to execute them [state laws], a recounter [sic] was 
sure to take place. Hence it was necessary to appoint the stoutest men in the 
country to the office of sheriff.”18 One such encounter occurred in late 
1786, when John Tipton and fifty armed men burst into James Sevier’s 
Jonesboro courtroom and removed court papers from the court clerk and 
threw the “justices out the doors.” The Franklinites responded by invading 
John Tipton’s courtroom in Buffalo, reclaiming the Franklin court docu-
ments, stealing North Carolina court papers from court clerk Thomas 
Gourley, and turning “the court out of doors.” The courtroom violence 
eventually involved the two leading political figures in the Tennessee Val-
ley. The only direct physical confrontation between John Sevier and John 
Strange Spectacle of  Two Empires 77
Tipton occurred in the Jonesboro courthouse.19 A verbal altercation be-
tween the two former Revolutionary War soldiers eventually escalated into 
violence, “when Sevier, no longer able to bear the provocations which were 
given to him, struck Tipton with a cane. Instantly the latter began to annoy 
him with his hands clinched. Each exchanged blows for some time in the 
same way with great violence and in convulsions of rage.” Eventually those 
present at the courthouse brawl managed to separate the two combatants, 
but incidents like this one became commonplace—so routine, in fact, that 
one Franklin chronicler quipped, “families took lessons in pugilism from 
each other at public meetings.”20 These disturbing episodes increasingly 
forced Tennessee Valley residents to choose political camps in this escalat-
ing affair.21
The presence of two independent civil and judicial systems in the Ten-
nessee Valley led to confusion among the region’s inhabitants in the most 
fundamental areas of everyday life. Beginning in late 1786, it became nec-
essary for residents of the Franklin counties to be married in both court 
systems in order to ensure the legality of their nuptials in the future. Ac-
cording to one writer, “When some Franklinite would win or steal some 
North Carolina maid, it is said that, if the lady was at all political and self-
willed, the ceremony had to be performed under both governments, from 
which we may conclude that it was not unusual to find a man who had been 
twice married, but had never had but one wife.”22 In addition to the matri-
monial befuddlement caused by the competing court systems, residents of 
the Tennessee Valley also confronted the fiscal dilemma of choosing which 
state government should receive their tax contributions. Most citizens re-
solved this quandary by “choosing to pay neither” state’s taxes, but “citizens 
who elected to deal exclusively with one side risked the wrath of the other.”23 
In an April 9, 1787, letter to his state’s namesake, Benjamin Franklin, Gov-
ernor Sevier conveyed his anger toward the bureaucratic anarchy gripping 
the region. Sevier stated, “They [North Carolina] have, contrary to the in-
terest of the people in two of the counties, to wit, Washington and Sullivan, 
by their acts removed the former places of holding courts to certain places 
convenient to the disaffected [Tiptonites], as we conceive, in order that they 
might have a pretext to prevaricate upon.”24
Amid the political chaos unleashed by North Carolina’s “divide and 
conquer” strategy, in October 1786 the Franklin Assembly convened once 
again at the rustic Greeneville capital building. The deteriorating political 
situation within the region, a potentially lucrative land deal, and a proposed 
78 Th e Lost State of Franklin
joint invasion of Creek territory with the state of Georgia dominated the 
legislative session. During the meeting, the Franklinites appointed two of 
their most eloquent and experienced spokesmen, William Cocke and Da-
vid Campbell, to attend the upcoming November session of the North 
Carolina Assembly. Franklin’s leadership charged the envoys with the un-
enviable task of convincing the North Carolinians to relinquish their chal-
lenge to Franklin’s statehood. Once again, the Franklinites placed their 
state’s political destiny in the hands of their most skilled orator, William 
Cocke.25
As the November legislative session approached, Governor Sevier dis-
patched a letter to Governor Caswell intended to again persuade his guber-
natorial counterpart of the justness of the Franklin separatist movement. 
Sevier’s letter is a masterful attempt at diplomacy and reflects the continued 
amicable relationship between the two governors and business partners. 
Sevier informed Caswell of the Franklin legislature’s appointment of “Some 
Commissioners to Wait on the parent State” to “cheerfully Consent to the 
separation as they once before did” with the Cession Act of 1784. The 
Franklin governor also assured Caswell that “It gives us inexpressible Con-
cern to think that any disputes should Arise between Us.” Sevier reminded 
Caswell that the Franklin statehood movement resulted from an “Act of 
your Assembly” and the Tennessee Valley’s political leadership never ex-
pected the “Cession Act would be Repealed, otherwise Matters might Not 
have been Carried to the length they are.”26 He affirmed that the Franklin-
ites did “not Wish to separate from you on any Other terms but those that 
may be perfectly Consistent with the Honour and interest of each party.” 
Sevier concluded his appeal with one final plea for separation. Sevier writes, 
“there is no Set of people Can think more highly of your Government than 
those who Want separation, and they only wish it to answer There better 
Conveniency, and tho’ want to be separated in Government, wish to be 
united in friendship.”27 Sevier’s correspondence succeeded in convincing 
Governor Caswell to reconsider the Franklin movement, but Franklin del-
egates William Cocke and David Campbell faced a much more difficult 
challenge in swaying the unyielding representatives of the North Carolina 
legislature.
The November session of the North Carolina legislature held in Fay-
etteville provided yet another opportunity for the Franklinites to present 
their case for separation and to garner backing from within their parent 
state for the movement. Attendees of the fall meeting witnessed the effort 
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by the Franklinites to redefine and expand the reasons for their disunion 
from North Carolina.28 During the Cession Act debates of 1784, the Frank-
linites asserted that North Carolina’s abandonment of the Tennessee Valley 
communities forced their separation from the parent state. Sevier reiterated 
this idea in an October 28, 1786, letter sent to Governor Caswell, but the 
same letter also contained several new arguments promoting separation. 
Sevier contended that Tennessee Valley’s “Trade and Commerce is Alto-
gether Carried on With other States,” and the “five to eight hundred Miles” 
separating the trans-Appalachian communities from the center of North 
Carolina political power prevented his neighbors from enjoying “the [same] 
blessings of Civil Government as their Neighbors who live East, South, or 
any other point.”29
At the Fayetteville convention, William Cocke presented Franklin’s case 
to the distinguished and skeptical body. In what one delegate sarcastically 
described as “pathetic,” Cocke “depicted the miseries of his distressed coun-
trymen,” and implored the representatives to support Franklin’s effort to 
create an independent state.30 Cocke’s principal argument for Franklin’s po-
litical sovereignty focused on the necessity of collecting state taxes to main-
tain a militia force for the defense of their communities from the threats 
posed by the region’s aboriginal “savages.” Cocke maintained that neither 
the state of North Carolina nor the federal government “had any interest in 
their safety.” Cocke again contended that the creation of Franklin occurred 
out of necessity, and he bluntly asked the delegates, “What were the people 
of the ceded territory to do to avoid the blow of the uplifted tomahawk?” 
The gifted barrister reflected, “Immediate and pressing necessity called for 
the powers to concentrate the scanty means they possessed of saving them-
selves from destruction. A cruel and insidious foe was at their doors. Delay 
was but another name for death.” Cocke concluded his lengthy address with 
an eloquent appeal to “let us remain as we are, and support ourselves by our 
own exertions; if otherwise, let the means for the continuance of our con-
nection be supplied with the degree of liberality which will demonstrate se-
riousness on the one hand and secure affection on the other.”31
In a letter to Governor Caswell dispatched by the gravely ill Franklin 
judge David Campbell, the Franklinite urged the North Carolina governor 
to support “the ratification of our independence.” Campbell offered essen-
tially identical reasons for Franklin’s separation from North Carolina. He 
wrote, “If we set out wrong, or were too hasty in our separation, this coun-
try is not altogether to blame, your state pointed out the line of conduct, 
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which we adopted; we really thought you in earnest when you ceded us to 
Congress.” Campbell also addressed the Native American conflict that 
threatened the Tennessee Valley settlements and astutely concluded, “Our 
laws and government must include these people [the Cherokee] or they will 
become dangerous.” Remarkably, Campbell closed his correspondence by 
claiming, “Nature has separated us; do not oppose her in her work; by 
acquiescing you will bless us, and do yourself no injury, because you lose 
nothing but people who are a clog on your government, and to whom you 
cannot do equal justice by reason of their detached situation.” The Frank-
linites combined economic concerns, political marginalization, geographic 
isolation, and the looming threat of Native American violence with the 
earlier abandonment claim to create a persuasive justification for indepen-
dence. Unfortunately for the new state supporters, these arguments fell 
upon deaf ears in the Fayetteville assembly.32
The North Carolina Assembly clearly failed to see urgency in the 
Franklin issue, with both the senate and House of Commons waiting three 
weeks to even address the Franklinites’ petitions for statehood. In a stinging 
report, the North Carolina Senate stated that “the Legislature of North 
Carolina cannot accede to a separation at this period.” While empathizing 
with the “sense of suffering of those people [Tennessee Valley residents] 
during the anarchy which has long prevailed among them,” the distin-
guished legislative body deflected the Franklinites’ arguments for separa-
tion. Responding to the Franklinites’ abandonment claims, the senate 
charged “that some designing persons in that Country have so far deluded 
many of the citizens as to make them wish a separation under an Idea that 
they, by the act of cession passed in June 1784, were forever secured from 
this Government and its protection, and would be an emancipation from 
slavery.” In sharp contrast to the Franklinites’ accusations of political mar-
ginalization, the North Carolina senators argued that the Tennessee Valley’s 
political leadership “were equal partakers with the rest of the State in the 
mild influence of its Constitution and Laws and were equally represented 
in its Councils.”33 The senators also openly condemned Franklin’s leader-
ship, blaming them for the “recent anarchy” and characterizing the recent 
policies of the Franklin Assembly as “highly reprehensible.”34
The North Carolina Senate also included an offer of reconciliation 
with its firm rebuke of the Franklin movement. Undoubtedly influenced by 
the Caswell administration’s détente, the senate attempted to strengthen 
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support for North Carolina in the Franklin counties by again passing “an 
act of oblivion, so as to conciliate and quiet the minds of those who may 
have, through Blindness or passion” supported the state of Franklin. In 
addition to extending a full pardon to the Franklinites for a second time, 
the senate offered to “release” the Tennessee Valley residents “from the pay-
ment of taxes which have become due for the years 1784 and 1785.” The 
representatives concluded that the Tennessee Valley inhabitants “enjoyed 
none of the benefits of [the North Carolina] government” during those 
years; therefore “they ought not in Justice to be taxed with its burthens.” 
The senate closed its December report by further extending a diplomatic 
olive branch. In a generous concession eventually supported by Governor 
Caswell, the senate stated, “altho’ a separation is at this time impracticable, 
yet whenever wealth and numbers of the Citizens on the western waters so 
much increase as to make the same necessary, that then we are free to say a 
separation may take place upon friendly and reciprocal terms and under 
certain Compacts and Stipulations.” The senate accepted the report and 
forwarded the document to the House of Commons, where on December 
15 its members “concurred.” The report diminished any hope among the 
Franklinites that North Carolina could be convinced to agree to their sepa-
ration, and over the next several weeks the North Carolina government 
continued its effective “divide and conquer” strategy.35
The North Carolina Assembly next turned its attention to the recent 
violence surrounding the Tennessee Valley’s judicial system. In an attempt 
to prevent a repeat of these events and to strengthen the position of Frank-
lin opponents, both the senate and the House of Commons passed acts re-
moving “the place of holding Courts in the County of Sullivan.” In a clear 
swipe at Franklin governor John Sevier and the Sullivan County Franklin-
ites, the North Carolina Assembly attempted to destroy the principal court 
used by the Franklin government. The assembly also targeted the Franklin 
court at Jonesboro in Washington County by passing a bill that restruc-
tured the county courts and appointed “Commissioners to fix on the most 
convenient place for holding” the new court. In a final effort to assert their 
authority in the rebellious Franklin counties by controlling the Tennessee 
Valley judicial system, both the house and senate agreed to a resolution “to 
prevent doubts as to the right of Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in and over 
the Counties of Washington, Sullivan, & Greene.” The failed diplomatic 
efforts of Sevier, Cocke, and Campbell and a North Carolina Assembly 
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determined to maintain political dominion over the Tennessee Valley forced 
the Franklinites to look elsewhere to preserve and expand support for their 
statehood movement.36
In response to the defeat of their bid to secure acquiescence for their 
movement from within the North Carolina Assembly, the Franklinites 
initiated a remarkable propaganda campaign aimed at earning the approval 
for their separation from influential state and national leaders. In June 
1786, leading Franklinites opened a line of communication between them-
selves and their state’s namesake, Benjamin Franklin. In addition to their 
nomenclatural tribute, the Franklinites hoped to align themselves with one 
of America’s most celebrated and respected citizens. In two separate letters, 
the Franklinites subtly requested Franklin’s support for their statehood ef-
fort. In an April 1787 communication, Governor Sevier informed Franklin 
of the state’s failed efforts within the North Carolina Assembly and the 
rapidly deteriorating situation in the Tennessee Valley caused by the com-
peting state bureaucracies. Sevier then revealed the true intentions of his 
correspondence, beseeching Franklin to “give us your approbation,” “write 
on the subject,” and offer “any advice, instruction, or encouragement, you 
may think we shall deserve.”37 The aged revolutionary leader never respond-
ed to Sevier’s requests, and apparently the Franklinites ultimately failed to 
win Franklin’s political endorsement.
The events unfolding in the Tennessee Valley drew the attention of 
other prominent Americans, including Patrick Henry, James Monroe, Rich- 
ard Henry Lee, Alexander Hamilton, George Washington, and Thomas 
Jefferson. Unfortunately for the Franklinites, most of these figures opposed 
their efforts, or at least the manner in which their movement was being 
carried out. In a letter mailed from Paris, Thomas Jefferson, now serving as 
America’s minister to France, described his feelings regarding the state of 
Franklin to George Washington. Jefferson wrote of his “increased anxiet-
ies” caused by the “late example of the state of Franklin,” and warned 
Washington that these separatist tendencies could spread to Virginia.38 In a 
letter to Virginia congressman Richard Henry Lee, Jefferson again described 
his displeasure with the actions of the Franklinites, stating, “I am anxious 
to hear what is done with the states of Vermont and Franklin. I think that 
the former is the only innovation . . . which ought to be admitted. If Con-
gress are [sic] not firm on that head, our states will crumble to atoms by the 
spirit of establishing every little canton into a separate state.”39 The inability 
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of the Franklinites to convince one of the United States’ most vocal propo-
nents of western expansion and the creation of new western states exempli-
fies the enormous challenges facing their diplomatic effort.40 Even Jefferson’s 
fiercest political foe, Alexander Hamilton, offered a trenchant criticism of 
the state of Franklin. In his essay Federalist #6, Hamilton utilized the “re-
volt of a part of the State of North Carolina” as proof for the necessity of a 
strong federal government. Hamilton warned against “those who endeavour 
to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility between the 
States.”41 Had the Franklinites managed to secure the support of at least one 
of these prominent Americans, then perhaps their efforts to win approval 
within the halls of the U.S. government and the North Carolina Assembly 
might have been more successful.42
Despite waning support within the Tennessee Valley and public con-
demnation from political leaders across the United States, the resilient 
Franklinites managed to form a brief alliance with the state of Georgia. The 
two states formed their accord upon a shared political and economic objec-
tive, securing the coveted bottomlands stretching from the great bend of 
the Tennessee River to the North Carolina border, an area collectively 
known as Muscle Shoals.43 Land speculation at Muscle Shoals commenced 
two years prior to the formation of the state of Franklin. In 1783, a group 
of prominent North Carolinians, including William Blount, Richard Cas-
well, John Donelson, Joseph Martin, and John Sevier, formed the Muscle 
Shoals Company in order to raise venture capital to purchase the valuable 
property from the Native American claimants. The investors hoped to con-
vince the aboriginal tribes, which included at various times the Creek, 
Chickasaw, and Cherokee, to peacefully relinquish their lands so that the 
speculators might profit from land sales to would-be settlers and the result-
ing market opportunities. The Muscle Shoals land “was valuable for farm-
ing purposes and for trade with both the neighboring Indian tribes and the 
growing white settlements in the Mississippi Valley.”44 Before separatist 
sentiments plunged the region into chaos, North Carolina congressman 
and prominent land speculator William Blount and his business partners 
secured a controversial claim to the Muscle Shoals land from the Chickasaw 
claimants for roughly $5,000 in trade goods and lobbied the Georgia legis-
lature to consider establishing a new county, to be named Houston, out of 
the Muscle Shoals acquisition. The original Muscle Shoals Company dis-
solved during the inception of the Franklin movement, but the former in-
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vestors in the aborted venture, many of whom joined the Franklin government, 
did not relinquish their desire to profit from speculating in Native Ameri-
can land.45
The Muscle Shoals land scheme inevitably became intertwined with 
the state of Franklin’s “expansionist plans.” The valuable lands on the “Bent 
of the Tennessee River” and the Native Americans who remained the prin-
cipal obstacle to the success of the lucrative land deal cemented the bond 
between the state of Georgia and the Franklinites.46 The Muscle Shoals 
connections between these two governments are multifold. First, after a 
1782 survey of the territory, surveyors determined that the Muscle Shoals 
district, originally thought to be within North Carolina’s borders, lay 
within the territorial bounds of Georgia. Additionally, a number of influen-
tial Georgians, described by William Blount as having “a great Thirst for 
Tennessee Lands,” served as members on the original Muscle Shoals Com-
pany commission.47 The links between the Tennessee River land deal and 
the Franklin government are also readily apparent, with John Sevier, Valen-
tine Sevier, Anthony Bledsoe, and John Donelson (father of Franklin’s chief 
surveyor Stockley Donelson) all serving in leadership capacities in the 
original Muscle Shoals Company. The political and economic leadership of 
Georgia and Franklin believed that the Muscle Shoals district could remedy 
their states’ mounting fiscal problems, encourage frontier settlement, and 
increase their own personal fortunes. Both governments also conveniently 
subscribed to similar policies for expanding their states’ borders, including 
the use of violence and intimidation to force the Native American populace 
to acquiesce to land cessions.48
In 1786, hostilities between the state of Georgia and the Upper Creek 
tribe, led by mixed-blood Alexander McGillivray, erupted and again 
plunged the Muscle Shoals land deal into question. The designs of land 
speculators and the westward expansion of white settlements by Georgians 
onto Creek lands in the Mississippi River Valley forced McGillivray to raise 
“the red hatchet” of war.49 An unidentified Virginian who maintained con-
tact with the Creek chief described to an associate McGillivray’s intention 
to use “his utmost exertions to engage the Creek Indians in a War not only 
with Georgia but with the Western parts of Virginia and No. Carolina.” 
Additionally, he believed McGillivray’s “object is to make war as hot as 
possible at first, which will induce overtures for peace, and make the 
United States be glad to grant advantageous terms, such as to acknowledge 
the independence and sovereignty of the Creek nation, and admit them as 
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a member of the federal Union.”50 The Creek War ultimately drew the po-
litical leadership of Franklin and Georgia into an alliance because Georgia 
lacked the financial and military resources to mount a successful assault on 
the Creeks, and the Franklinites lacked any legal territorial claims to the 
Muscle Shoals lands and desperately needed a way to bolster support among 
the Tennessee Valley’s small-holders. Additionally, McGillivray’s Creek forces 
allied with Dragging Canoe’s Chickamauga Cherokee to drive white set-
tlers from the Cumberland District in Middle Tennessee and the southern 
communities of Franklin.51 In exchange for Georgia’s political support for 
the Franklin movement and the cession of Muscle Shoals land to the Frank-
linites, the leadership of the state of Franklin agreed to join the Georgians 
in their war with the Creeks.52 One politically astute North Carolinian of-
fered his view of the events unfolding on the Tennessee River, bluntly de-
claring, “If I were to venture a conjecture, the good of the commonwealth 
is not at the bottom, but the views of a few crafty land-jobbers, whom you 
know, who are aiming at purchasing the great bend of the Tenasee [sic] 
from the Indians, and if not successful that way, to contrive a quarrel, and 
drive the natives out by force.”53
Throughout 1785 and 1786, the leadership of Franklin and Georgia, 
many former partners in the original 1783 land company, continued to 
correspond regarding the future of Muscle Shoals. Under the direction of 
the recently formed Bend of the Tennessee Company, the Franklin govern-
ment briefly attempted to operate a land office to parcel out the Muscle 
Shoals lands before eventually being driven out of the region by the Creeks.54 
The efforts to settle the “Great Bend of the Tennessee” intensified during 
the spring of 1786. North Carolina governor Richard Caswell clearly un-
derstood the concerns of the Creek Nation and expressed his empathy in a 
letter to Creek leader Alexander McGillivray. Caswell assured McGillivray 
that the North Carolina Assembly “expressed a concern that any citizens of 
this State should have given your people any just cause of Complaint by 
their encroachments upon the Hunting grounds of the Creek Nation.” The 
governor reassured the Creek chief that “nothing shall be done under the 
authority of the State respecting your people but what shall be strictly Con-
sistent with the Ties of Friendship.”55
Amid the intensification of Creek warfare and Caswell’s efforts to avoid 
further bloodshed, Georgia governor Edward Telfair and the Franklinites 
initiated preparations to rend the Muscle Shoals lands. Colonel Anthony 
Bledsoe described the resulting Creek reaction in a May 12, 1786, letter to 
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Governor Caswell. The Franklinite reported that John Taylor, “the half 
breed that we sent to the Cherokees,” informed him that “there is one hun-
dred and fifty Creeks coming against this Country to lay waste, and in all 
probability anything in the future will be done in the name of the Creeks.” 
Bledsoe then requested that Caswell “write to the Governor of Georgia on 
the subject.”56 Governor Caswell also articulated his concern over the mount-
ing frontier tensions caused by the disputed Muscle Shoals land in a July 
1786 letter to John Sevier. Caswell expressed his pleasure “respecting the 
conduct of the [Muscle Shoals] Commissioners & the business transaction 
regarding the Tenesa [sic] Lands” and stated that he “was very glad the at-
tempt for settling them was not made, or rather no Attempt was made to 
Survey the Lands.”57
Despite the “land-jobbers” and the state of Georgia’s willingness to 
delay the survey and settlement of the Muscle Shoals lands, Alexander Mc-
Gillivray and his Creek followers continued their effort to drive whites from 
their lands. In another letter to Governor Caswell, Alexander Outlaw, a 
representative to the Franklin legislature, described Creek attacks on fron-
tier settlers that left several Indians and whites dead on the banks of the 
Holston River. Despite Caswell’s rising alarm regarding the future of the 
Muscle Shoals land scheme, he remained “hampered by [his] obligations to 
North Carolina” and could not “render” any meaningful support for the 
efforts against the Creeks.58
Continued resistance to white encroachment by the Upper Creeks has-
tened the opening of discussions for a joint campaign against the tribe by 
the states of Georgia and Franklin. In a May 14, 1786, letter to Georgia’s 
Governor Telfair, John Sevier warned, “The success of the Muscle Shoals 
enterprise, greatly depends on the number [of troops] that will go down to 
that place. A small force will not be adequate to the risk and danger that is 
encountered, and the people here [Franklin] will not venture to so danger-
ous a place with a few.”59 Governor Telfair dispatched Major Caesar Augus-
tus Christian George Elholm to serve as arbiter for the proposed alliance. 
Elholm emigrated from the Duchy of Holstein (present-day northern Ger-
many) during the American Revolution and fought alongside Georgia 
troops at the siege of Savannah and along the banks of the Ogeechee River.60 
His service to the state of Georgia during the revolution “so ingratiated 
himself with [newly elected Georgia] Governor [George] Mathews and the 
Legislature, that he was received by the Executive Council with marks of 
honor [and] was invited to a seat in their meetings.”61 After the war, the 
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state of Georgia commissioned Elholm adjutant general of the Georgia 
militia. During the war, Elholm also served under South Carolina general 
Francis Marion and probably first met future Franklin governor John Se-
vier during the southern campaign of 1780–1781. Sevier and Elholm’s ca-
maraderie made him the obvious choice to broker a military alliance 
between Georgia and Franklin against McGillivray’s Creeks. Elholm spent 
much of 1785 and 1786 in the Tennessee Valley hammering out the logis-
tics with the Franklinites.62 By the outbreak of the Creek War in the spring 
of 1786, the leadership of Franklin considered George Elholm one of their 
own, and during one of his trips back to report to Governor Mathews, the 
battle-tested veteran reciprocated his admiration for the Franklinites by 
lifting a toast wishing “Success to the State of Franklin, his Excellency John 
Sevier, and her virtuous citizens.”63
By the fall of 1786, Georgia and the Tennessee Valley Franklinites suc-
ceeded in finalizing the details of their military alliance. In a resolution 
passed on October 13, 1786, the Franklin legislature agreed to aid the state 
of Georgia in its war against the Creeks. The resolution stated that “the 
Creeks had declared war against the white people, and had committed 
several murders on the frontier of late.” As a consequence of Creek aggres-
sion, Governor Telfair “sent a Peace Talk to the nation of Indians,” and the 
Upper Creeks responded by informing the Georgia governor that “they in-
tended to make vigorous assaults on the white people, as soon as they 
[Creeks] gather corn.” The Franklinites expressed their willingness to join 
Georgia’s “vigorous campaign against the Indians,” planned to commence 
“by the first of November next.”64 The resolution also pledged “one-fourth 
of the militia of each [Franklin] county . . . to march on horse to the fron-
tiers of this state [Georgia].” Alexander Outlaw reiterated the arrangement 
to Richard Caswell. Outlaw explained that “The Georgians are now carry-
ing on a Campaign against the Creeks and have sent for our Assistance.” 
Outlaw informed Caswell that he expected “that the [Franklin] Men will 
March from here against the Creeks” and suggested that the North Caro-
lina “Assembly should take our local Situation under consideration and pass 
a separation Act on such conditions as will do justice to us all and make the 
purchase from the Indians.”65
In September 1786, Major Elholm returned to Georgia carrying the 
Franklin legislature’s “sealed instructions” relating their intent to provide 
Georgia “one thousand rifleman and two hundred cavalry” in their im-
pending war with McGillivray’s Creeks.66 Sevier also sent Governor Telfair 
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a personal note informing him that the Creek attack may need to be “pro-
crastinated” in order to give the Franklin army adequate time to muster.67 
As 1786 drew to a close, both states hurriedly made preparations for the 
impending assault on the Upper Creeks.
As the military commanders of Georgia and Franklin continued to or-
ganize their troops, the economic and political leadership of both states drew 
increasingly cordial in their diplomatic relations. In an extract from the 
Georgia Executive Council minutes recorded by Secretary J. Meriweather, 
the governing body declared that they “entertain a high Sense of the friend-
ly relations of the People of Franklin, and at the same time feel every Dispo-
sition to Continue the Correspondence between the Honorable John Sevier 
and his State.”68 For the struggling Franklinites, the military alliance with 
the Georgians offered desperately needed support for their faltering state-
hood movement. In a letter sent to Governor Mathews, Governor Sevier 
bemoaned the continued resistance to their independence being offered by 
the state of North Carolina. Sevier then included an impassioned appeal for 
further support for his state. He informed the Georgia governor that the 
Franklinites “remember the bloody engagements, we have fought together 
[during the revolution] against the common enemy, the friendly, kindly, and 
mutual supports afforded between the State of Georgia and the people of 
this country.” He entreated Mathews and his state’s government to “afford 
the State of Franklin, such of your countenance, in promoting the interest of 
our infant republic, and reconciling matters between us and the parent state, 
in such a manner as you in your magnanimity and justice, may think most 
expedient and the nature of our case deserve.”69 By their willingness to ally 
with the Franklinites, the state of Georgia helped to legitimize the state of 
Franklin. Undoubtedly, the Franklinites hoped that the precedent set by 
Georgia’s recognition of their state might influence the actions of other states 
and, more importantly, the U.S. government.70
As preparations continued throughout the opening months of 1787, 
letters of encouragement from prominent Georgians reached the Tennessee 
Valley. In February 1787, General Elijah Clark dispatched a letter from 
Augusta, Georgia, to his compatriot and fellow revolutionary soldier John 
Sevier containing much-needed words of reassurance. Clark assured Sevier 
of his “ardent friendship” and pledged the “approbation of all our citizens, 
and their well wishes for your prosperity.” He acknowledged the shared 
“benefit the friendship of yourself and the people of your state will be to 
Georgia” and implored Sevier and his fellow Franklinites to “Open a land 
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Office as speedily as possible” to sell the Muscle Shoals lands and to 
“never [re]join North-Carolina more.” Clark concluded his correspondence 
by predicting that, under the Franklin government, the residents of the 
Tennessee Valley “will prosper as a people.”71 In another exchange with 
Governor Sevier, Clark again pledged his support for Franklin and reiter-
ated his disapprobation with the ongoing policies of the North Carolina 
government. Clark expressed his indignation over the inability to “peace-
ably” establish the state of Franklin and the prolonged “unhappy conten-
tion . . . with the State of North-Carolina.” Clark vowed to defend 
Franklin if North Carolina “thinks of reducing you by force of arms,” and 
again expressed his belief that “it is the received opinion of the sensible 
part of every rank in Georgia, that you will, and ought to be, as indepen-
dent as the other states in the Union.”72 Another Georgian, described as a 
“gentleman of distinction and character,” also professed his support for the 
fledgling state. He assured Governor Sevier that the “different opinions of 
a number of the greatest politicians in our state respecting yours . . . [is] 
that it will support itself without a doubt; and from what I understand, 
would give every assistance in their power.” The show of allegiance ema-
nating from Georgia cast a much needed ray of hope across the Tennessee 
Valley for the Franklinites.73
The proposed joint military campaign against the Creeks also provided 
the Sevier administration with a diversion for the Tennessee Valley residents 
from the escalating political factionalism within their own communities. In 
what eventually became a recurring strategy, the leadership of the state of 
Franklin utilized Indian warfare to distract the region’s inhabitants from 
the political turmoil and Indian policies threatening their homes and fami-
lies. According to one Tennessee historian, “The only chance of preserving 
the integrity of his [Sevier’s] government, was that the projected campaign 
would silence the clamour of the malcontents, and restore harmony and 
concert to the distracted members of his little republic.” In a region galva-
nized by revolutionary and frontier combat, Nolachucky Jack sought to 
unify his constituency once again under the glory of his battle flag. Despite 
Sevier’s martial designs, the Creek campaign never came to fruition.74
In October 1787, Alexander McGillivray and his Creek followers 
broadened their insurgency against the white settlements on the Holston 
River. Washington County, Virginia, resident Arthur Campbell described 
the deteriorating situation to Virginia governor Edmund Randolph. Camp-
bell warned Governor Randolph that “a large body of Creek Indians had 
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crossed the Hiwasee river, and was in full march against the Holstien In-
habitants.” Campbell went on to describe a six-hour engagement between 
Georgia militiamen led by General Elijah Clark against a force of “500 
Creeks.” Campbell also alerted Randolph to a threat posed by the Creeks to 
the “Settlements on the French Broad [River].”75 The increasingly bleak 
circumstances surrounding the conflict with the Creek tribe, a series of 
failed peace negotiations, and numerous logistical delays in the joint cam-
paign placed increasing pressure on the financially unstable Georgia trea-
sury. By the close of 1787, the state’s finances had become “more and more 
disordered” and “munitions supply more and more depleted.” The state of 
Georgia “had a war on her hands without the means to wage it.”76
During the opening months of 1788, newly elected Georgia governor 
George Handley was forced to open formal diplomatic negotiations with 
the Upper Creeks. In conjunction with his state’s ratification of the U.S. 
Constitution, Governor Handley agreed to pursue the federal government’s 
fiscally pragmatic policy of peacefully negotiating with the Native Ameri-
can tribes.77 Distracted by plans by Franklin surveyor Landon Carter to 
“make as many surveys as possible” of the Muscle Shoals territory, John 
Sevier remained totally unaware of the treaty negotiations.78 In a February 
19, 1788, correspondence, Governor Handley finally delivered the disap-
pointing news to Sevier. Handley informed the Franklin leader that the 
U.S. “Congress, agreeable to their act of the 26th of October, ordered one 
Commissioner to be appointed from each of the states, North-Carolina, 
South-Carolina, and Georgia, to hold a treaty with the Indians, and we 
now only suspend our operations till the determinations are known.”79 The 
tremendous political and financial rewards held out by the planned military 
alliance dissolved and again delayed the acquisition and development of the 
Muscle Shoals territory.80
The collapse of the Muscle Shoals speculative venture and the aborted 
coalition with the state of Georgia added to the bitter disappointment cre-
ated by the Franklinites’ ineffectual diplomatic efforts in the North Caro-
lina Assembly and among some of the United States’ most influential 
statesmen. By the end of 1787, the majority of Franklin’s political leadership 
began to realize that their state’s days were numbered. The communal dis-
order fueled by North Carolina’s “divide and conquer” political strategy 
and the mercurial rise of a strident opposition faction within the Tennessee 
Valley forecasted the mayhem that clouded the final months of the malig-
nant state of Franklin.
On June 8, 1787, Cherokee chief King Fisher (Kingfisher) delivered an 
emotional “talk” to U.S. Indian Agent Joseph Martin. The aging King 
Fisher pleaded with Martin to “move these people [Franklin settlers] off 
our lands” so that “our people have room to live and hunt.” The Cherokee 
chief implored him to see to these “matters so that our young seed may 
grow up in peace,” and the “few of us left” might keep “the land we live on.” 
King Fisher’s conversation with Joseph Martin encapsulated the tragedy of 
the previous twenty-five years of Euroamerican-Indian relations in the Ten-
nessee Valley.1
The defining elements of the Euroamerican Indian policy are all pres-
ent in the chief ’s “talk.” First, the primary goal of Euroamerican Indian 
policies centered on the unrelenting pursuit of coveted Indian land. Second, 
the tactics utilized by whites to acquire Indian territory involved some com-
bination of extralegal white encroachment, the creation of paternalistic re-
lationships through treaties and trade relations, and the uncompromising 
use of violence and physical intimidation. King Fisher’s appeal also reveals 
the complex diplomatic strategy utilized by the southeastern tribes in their 
efforts to avoid bloodshed and preserve what was left of their way of life. 
These frontier dynamics existed from the beginning of permanent white 
settlement in the Tennessee Valley, and continued largely unabated until 
the Tennessee Valley’s white settlers reduced the regional tribes and their 
land holdings to insignificant levels at the close of the eighteenth century. 
The leadership of the state of Franklin and their Native American policies 
fit onto this tragic continuum, but their ferocity and unquenchable thirst 
for land dramatically escalated regional violence in the Tennessee Valley. 
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The potential land speculation opportunities and the rapidly advancing 
regional population and economy fueled the desire to expand Franklin’s 
geographical boundaries and natural resource–based market economy. The 
leaders of the Franklin government believed that these determined regional 
Indian tribes and North Carolina and the Confederation Congress’s Native 
American diplomatic agenda served as the primary obstacles to the Tennes-
see Valley’s socioeconomic growth and stabilization. The trans-Appalachian 
separatist movement freed the leaders of Franklin from the diplomatic 
shackles placed upon them by their parent state and allowed them to pursue 
one of the most draconian Native American policies of the eighteenth cen-
tury.2 An examination of the relationship between leaders and supporters of 
Franklin and the Tennessee Valley’s principal tribe, the Overhill Cherokee, 
reveals the tragic consequences of the abandonment of conciliatory diplo-
macy and the intensification of postrevolutionary Indian warfare. Despite 
the remarkable diplomatic efforts engaged in by the Cherokee, the Franklin 
Indian policy, aimed at securing Indian land through dubious treaties, 
undermining armistice attempts, and engaging in perpetual bloody war-
fare, plunged the Tennessee Valley into decades of turmoil.
The earliest interaction between the Tennessee Valley’s first inhabitants 
and the Spanish adventurers who first journeyed into the region appeared 
to be congenial. In the summer of 1540, Spanish conquistador Hernando 
de Soto and a group of approximately six hundred treasure-seeking Spanish 
soldiers traveled north from Florida, crossed the Blue Ridge Mountains at 
Swannanoa Gap, and followed the French Broad River into the Great Val-
ley of the Tennessee. De Soto and his men became the first-known Europe-
ans to traverse the daunting Appalachian Mountains and make contact 
with the region’s native peoples.3 De Soto briefly visited several Indian 
towns on the Little Tennessee and French Broad rivers before departing 
southward toward present-day Alabama. After a short visit by another 
Spanish explorer, Juan Pardo, in 1567, the Native Americans living in the 
Tennessee River Valley did not encounter another white traveler until the 
second half of the seventeenth century.4 One can only imagine the miscon-
ceptions and mythology that emerged during the 150-year absence of whites 
among the Amerindian people. Despite the relatively peaceful beginnings 
of Euroamerican-Indian relations, the Spanish explorers’ demands for food, 
women, and information on potential riches foreshadowed the pending 
tensions between the two cultures, one rooted in capitalist expansion, the 
other in cultural and territorial preservation.
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During the century-and-a-half absence of Europeans, the once expan-
sive and powerful Mississippian Culture chiefdoms splintered, and smaller 
tribal bands quickly filled the vacuum.5 In the upper Tennessee Valley, the 
Overhill Cherokee emerged as the dominant tribal group. The Cherokee, 
or “principal people,” rapidly extended their political, economic, and cul-
tural influence throughout the Southeast. They maintained a matrilineal, 
clan-based society, devoid of notions of private property and the accumula-
tion of land or wealth. The Cherokee’s “communal subsistence” economy, 
utilizing a combination of agriculture, hunting, and gathering, required 
vast amounts of land to provide for the populace.6 The Cherokee people 
lived in a relatively peaceful community, where a system of privileged re-
taliation mitigated intertribal warfare, and the existence of powerful war 
chiefs in each town ensured a strong cohesive military preparedness.7 The 
socialist utopias often used by some historians to depict pre-contact Indian 
societies did not exist. Throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries, the Overhill Cherokee forced the remaining Indian tribes out of 
the region and rapidly cemented their control over the Tennessee Valley. By 
the time of the second arrival of whites in the region, the Cherokee popula-
tion numbered roughly ten thousand to twelve thousand people.8
Prior to permanent white settlement in the Tennessee Valley, most 
contact between Europeans and the Cherokee involved trade and Protestant 
missionary efforts. During the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
white traders ventured into the Tennessee River Valley to trade with the 
Overhill Cherokee. In July 1673, British trader James Needham and his 
teenage indentured servant, Gabriel Arthur, traveled from Fort Henry on 
the Appomattox River into the Tennessee frontier in an effort to open direct 
trade with the interior tribes.9 Needham and Arthur made contact with the 
Overhill Cherokee at the town of Chota on the Little Tennessee River, but 
despite their efforts, geographical distance and Cherokee suspicions derailed 
their attempts to secure permanent trade relations with the Overhill Chero-
kee. Large-scale trade between the two groups did not materialize for sev-
eral more decades.10
By the opening of the eighteenth century, entrepreneurs from the 
Carolinas, Virginia, and Georgia finally established commercial relations 
with the Overhill Cherokee. These backcountry businessmen traveled great 
distances to trade inexpensive British goods, such as guns, hatchets, farm 
implements, and other metal wares, for the furs and pelts of whitetail deer 
and smaller game animals. The demands for furs in Europe created an 
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enormous market for animal pelts, and Cherokee hunters supplied this 
growing global commercial market. The fur trade resulted in tremendous 
socioeconomic consequences for the Cherokee tribe. Prior to the fur trade, 
Cherokee hunters maintained a sacred relationship with their prey and 
treated any animal harvested with respect and a deep sense of appreciation. 
The Cherokee took great pains to utilize the entire animal, including meat, 
bones, pelt, internal organs, and bodily fluids. As profits replaced necessity, 
the European fur trade destroyed the spirituality of the hunt. The fur trade 
also increased intertribal conflicts by stretching the available hunting lands, 
depleting animal stocks, and introducing cutthroat capitalist competition 
into the Native American communities.11
The fur trade drew the Cherokee into a disastrous dependent relation-
ship with the Europeans.12 The Tennessee Valley’s Native American com-
munities became reliant upon European trade goods for survival, and these 
financial relationships quickly became military alliances as European na-
tions competed for control over North America and its rapidly emerging 
colonial economy.13 By the opening of the French and Indian War in 1756, 
the Cherokee found themselves faced with a critical decision. The tribe 
maintained significant trade relations with both the French and the British, 
and both nations sought to draw the tribe into a military coalition. The 
English constructed Fort Loudon in the Tennessee Valley to bolster Chero-
kee support for their war effort. Despite the efforts of the British in the re-
gion, the Cherokee’s lucrative economic relationship with the French and 
often acrimonious business dealings with the English convinced the major-
ity of them to side with their French “fathers” during the conflict.14 From 
the opening of hostilities in the area in 1758 until the signing of the Treaty 
of Holston on November 19, 1761, Cherokee warriors fought ferociously 
against British troops and their Native American allies.15 Amid a ruinous 
smallpox epidemic and against insurmountable odds, the Tennessee Valley’s 
principal people assaulted English forts, plundered British towns, and 
fought pitched battles with well-trained and heavily armed British regulars. 
As the fighting subsided in the so-called Cherokee War, both warring par-
ties faced the consequences of battle. Fort Loudon lay in ruins, and several 
important Cherokee towns no longer existed. The human casualties proved 
to be staggering, as hundreds of Cherokee and British combatants sacrificed 
their lives for European imperialism.16
The end of the French and Indian War signaled a new phase in 
Cherokee-Euroamerican relations and inadvertently paved the way for the 
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first white settlements in the Tennessee Valley. In November 1763, the 
Cherokee Nation attended a large peace conference, held in Augusta, Geor-
gia, in which they agreed to “a treaty of mutual peace and friendship.” The 
British used the Treaty of Augusta as part of a larger strategy to resuscitate 
the war-torn Indian trade network.17 Also in the fall of 1763, the British 
created an artificial geographical barrier separating eastern white settle-
ments from the rapidly retreating Native American communities of the 
trans-Appalachian frontier. The Proclamation Line of 1763 demarked an 
imaginary boundary running along the crest of the Appalachian Mountain 
chain that served as a dividing line for the two seemingly incompatible so-
cieties. The proclamation prohibited white settlement and land speculation 
west of the Appalachian Mountains and created a border between the two 
generally hostile peoples.18 In reality, the Proclamation Line of 1763 only 
briefly appeased the Native Americans, as illegal white encroachment by 
British colonists increased significantly with the conclusion of Indian hos-
tilities at Augusta. The Overhill Cherokee left the Augusta meeting con-
vinced of the security of their Tennessee Valley homes and hunting grounds, 
but the years between the conclusion of the French and Indian War and the 
American Revolution witnessed the steady advance of Anglo-American 
settlements.19
The period between the closing of the French and Indian War in 1763 
and the development of the Watauga settlements in the 1770s is often called 
the decade of the Long Hunter. During the 1760s, hunters from across the 
Southeast traveled into the Tennessee frontier to hunt the region’s plentiful 
wildlife. Men like Daniel Boone, William Bean, Samuel Callaway, Henry 
Scaggins, and Elisha Walden spent months (thus the moniker long hunter) 
tracking deer, bear, and buffalo across the Tennessee Valley. Many of these 
long hunters returned to their communities with descriptions of the region’s 
abundant wildlife, unclaimed arable lands, and economic potential. These 
frontier accounts inspired the first permanent white settlement of the re-
gion. The long hunters became the first whites to ignore the Proclamation 
Line of 1763, but soon itinerant traders and devout Protestant missionaries 
followed in their footsteps.20
It comes as little surprise that the resumption of Cherokee hostilities 
coincided with the development of the Watauga settlements. The illusion 
of royal protection from white encroachment quickly faded away as British 
Indian agents and colonial entrepreneurs pressured the Cherokee to volun-
tarily cede their lands. Treaties conducted at Hard Labor in 1768 and 
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Lochaber in 1770 forced the Cherokee to relinquish huge sections of their 
land to British Indian agents and land speculators.21 According to Chero-
kee historian James Mooney, “While these transactions were called trea-
ties, they were really forced upon the native proprietors, who resisted in 
each turn and finally signed only under protest and on most solemn assur-
ances that no further demands would be made.”22 Even in these early ne-
gotiations with British officials, the Cherokee demonstrated the remarkable 
ability to engage in tense diplomatic negotiations. As hundreds of white 
settlers illegally poured into their lands and “guns ratted all over the 
Holston hills,” the Cherokee attempted to mitigate the inevitable loss of 
land by simultaneously appealing to the British Crown and negotiating 
with frontier entrepreneurs.23 Unfortunately, the Cherokee’s desire and 
ability to defend their land could not withstand the march of Euroameri-
can expansion. Diplomacy turned into despondency, and negotiations 
gave way to violent resistance.24
The settlement of the upper Tennessee Valley exacted a steep price from 
both the Overhill Cherokee and the Watauga settlers. Early settlers like 
William Bean, James Robertson, Jacob Brown, and John Carter erected il-
legal communities on territory claimed by the Cherokee and protected by 
the Proclamation Line of 1763. The Wataugans’ total disregard for tribal 
sovereignty and British authority stoked the coals of smoldering Cherokee 
resentment. In addition, the gradual replacement of the Indian fur trade 
with a land- and natural resource–driven market economy further eroded 
the relationship between the Tennessee Valley’s white squatters and the 
Overhill Cherokee. Isolated incidents of Cherokee aggression occurred spo-
radically in the buildup to the American Revolution, but epidemic diseases 
and casualties incurred during the French and Indian War depleted the 
Overhill Cherokee population and prevented the tribe from successfully re-
pelling the white squatters.25 The Cherokee instead chose to continue to 
utilize diplomatic negotiations and incremental territorial concessions to ap-
pease the Wataugans. This delaying tactic culminated in a series of massive 
land sales, including the purchase of huge tracts of land by frontier specula-
tors like Richard Henderson, Jacob Brown, and John Carter. The Tennessee 
Valley settlers became increasingly aware of the Overhill Cherokee’s grow-
ing anger over continued white encroachment and the abandonment of 
mutually beneficial business arrangements.26 The Wataugans created the 
quasi-governmental frontier organization known as the Watauga Associa-
tion to unite the disparate Tennessee Valley communities together against 
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the Cherokee and to defend their “illegal” land claims.27 The preservation 
of these land claims eventually drew the Watauga settlers into a bloody war 
against the Cherokee and convinced the Tennessee Valley’s principal people 
to ally with the British during most of the American Revolution.
By the end of 1774, powerful land speculators controlled hundreds of 
thousands of acres of Cherokee land in the Tennessee Valley, and much of 
the tribe’s leadership began to question the policy of white appeasement. 
Cherokee leaders like Dragging Canoe criticized large white land purchases 
and agitated for armed conflict in a desperate effort to preserve their hunt-
ing grounds.28 Dragging Canoe informed a British Indian agent that the 
Cherokee “were almost surrounded by White People, that they had but a 
small spot of ground left for them to stand upon and that it seemed to be 
the Intention of the White People to destroy them from being a people.”29 
The previous decades of conciliation, trade and military relations, strategic 
acculturation, and racial intermixing created deep divisions among the 
Cherokee. Indian leaders like Atakullakulla (Little Carpenter) and Oconos-
tota hoped to continue to utilize diplomacy to preserve their tribal sover-
eignty, but internal pressures for war against the white squatters continued 
to mount.30 As the first shots of America’s war for independence rang out 
across the rolling hills of Massachusetts, the Cherokee began their own 
struggle for tribal sovereignty in the Tennessee River Valley.31
According to one Cherokee historian, “The outbreak of the Revolu-
tionary War was viewed as a godsend by the leading warriors of the Chero-
kee nation. It seemed to give them the opportunity to correct the mistakes 
they had made in the years from 1769 to 1775.”32 The growing disillusion-
ment among the Cherokee over the failure of peaceful diplomacy and incre-
mental land cessions to halt white encroachment created the ideal 
opportunity for the British to convince the tribe to join their cause. The 
Cherokee’s disastrous decision to cast their lot with the soundly defeated 
French during the French and Indian War did little to deter their willing-
ness to again ally with another European nation to protect their interests. 
The Cherokee’s leaders believed in the inevitability of a British victory over 
the rebelling American colonists, and more importantly over the Tennessee 
Valley squatters. The desperate tribe trusted that British military success 
equated to the removal of the white trespassers from their Tennessee Valley 
hunting grounds.33
In 1776, the Cherokee “plunged the upper Tennessee frontier into a 
racial conflict that . . . resulted in an overwhelming defeat of the tribes-
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men.”34 Cherokee chief Dragging Canoe led the Overhill Cherokee during 
the second Cherokee War. The Cherokee’s plan for the 1776 invasion of 
East Tennessee called for approximately seven hundred Cherokee warriors 
to form three separate divisions to attack the scattered white settlements in 
the Tennessee Valley’s recently established Washington District. The first 
group of three hundred Cherokee warriors, led by Cherokee chief Old 
Abraham of Chilhowe, hoped to lay waste to the Nolichucky and Watauga 
settlements. The plan also called for a Cherokee chief identified only as the 
Raven to take a small detachment and destroy the Carter’s Valley settle-
ment. The remaining Indians, led by Dragging Canoe, targeted the south-
ernmost settlements at Long Island.35 The three-pronged attack might have 
succeeded in its goal of the total obliteration of the Tennessee Valley settle-
ments if not for the actions of the Cherokee’s “Beloved Woman,” Nancy 
Ward. Using white traders as go-betweens, Ward warned the valley settlers 
of the impending attack and undoubtedly saved hundreds of Wataugans.36
During the months that followed, the Tennessee Valley militiamen re-
pelled the Cherokee warriors at the Battle of Island Flats and the assault on 
Fort Watauga. As Cherokee forces retreated, a retaliatory force of several 
thousand Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia militiamen, led by Colo-
nel William Christian, invaded the Cherokee territory. As the Anglo-
American forces surrounded several Cherokee towns, many of the tribe’s 
leaders met to weigh the options presented to them by Colonel Christian.37 
When faced with the decision to either “treat or be destroyed,” most of the 
tribe’s leaders wisely supported negotiating with Colonel Christian, but a 
small vocal faction, led by Dragging Canoe, refused to submit.38 As Drag-
ging Canoe and his supporters secretly escaped to Chickamauga Creek 
(near present-day Chattanooga, Tennessee), the remaining chiefs sent word 
to Colonel Christian that they were prepared to negotiate a peace treaty.
On July 20, 1777, several months after the Cherokee War’s conclusion, 
Cherokee leaders met with Nathaniel Gist, an emissary dispatched by 
George Washington, at Long Island to negotiate the terms of the treaty.39 
The subsequent Great (Long) Island Treaty required the Cherokee to re-
main neutral during the remainder of the revolution and to return white 
prisoners and stolen livestock to the Tennessee Valley settlers. The Great 
Island Treaty also demanded that the Cherokee cede millions of acres, “ev-
erything east of the Blue ridge [Mountains],” to their white conquerors. 
The Cherokee War left hundreds dead on both sides and several critical 
towns, settlements, and forts destroyed.40 The brief and bloody conflict also 
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increased the ranks of Dragging Canoe’s Chickamauga Cherokee, an in-
creasingly desperate, determined, and violent Cherokee splinter group now 
calling themselves the Ani-Yunwiya (“the real people”).41
The signing of the Great Island Treaty of 1777 failed to curtail Chero-
kee violence on either side of the Appalachian Mountains. Cherokee war-
riors from Dragging Canoe’s Chickamauga Cherokee continued to conduct 
raids on the upper Tennessee Valley settlements, and Cherokee tribal lead-
ers from the Middle and Lower towns escalated their war efforts against 
Americans in South Carolina and Georgia. The Great Island Treaty further 
fractured the Cherokee Nation, which was never really politically unified to 
begin with, and rendered the more moderate elements within the tribe inef-
fectual. The controversial terms of the Great Island Treaty and the resulting 
polarization of the Cherokee Nation ensured that “the Cherokee War had 
not ended but only begun.”42
In the Tennessee Valley, tensions between the Cherokee and the white 
squatters continued to mount, and another cycle of backcountry violence 
seemed inevitable. British Indian agents supplied the Cherokee tribe with 
weapons and pressured their warriors to attack valley settlers.43 Dragging 
Canoe’s Chickamauga Cherokee terrorized the Tennessee Valley settle-
ments, and in April 1779 Colonel Evan Shelby retaliated with a raid on the 
group’s forces at Chickamauga Creek. By using boats to launch a stealthy 
attack, Shelby’s force of six hundred militiamen caught Dragging Canoe’s 
soldiers by surprise. The Chickamauga Cherokee fled their homes and 
Shelby’s forces torched all twelve of the group’s towns.44 The final revolu-
tionary conflict between the trans-Appalachian Cherokee and the Tennes-
see Valley militiamen occurred shortly after the militia force’s resounding 
victory at the Battle of King’s Mountain in 1780. The combined forces of 
John Sevier’s Washington County, North Carolina, militiamen and Arthur 
Campbell’s Washington County, Virginia, militiamen swooped down on 
the Overhill Cherokee. The raid on the Cherokee towns proved to be cata-
strophic for the tribe. John Sevier’s youngest son, James, only sixteen at the 
time, described the engagement. After pursuing a small group of Overhill 
Cherokee for ten miles, Sevier and his party found a large body of Indians 
“prepared for battle.” After the two sides exchanged fire, “the Indians broke 
for a cane-brake” in an effort to “save themselves” from the Franklin militia’s 
withering assault. “Thirty or more [Cherokee], however were run into the 
open pine wood, [and] killed.” According to James Sevier, “this last battle 
was fought & so many Indians killed,” but “not a single white [man was 
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killed], & but one slightly wounded.”45 The frontier militia forces destroyed 
all but two of the Cherokee towns in the Tennessee Valley and burned their 
yet to be harvested cornfields. The Cherokee “once again gambled [by sid-
ing with a European nation] and lost.” The ultimate defeat of the British in 
the American Revolution left the Cherokee Nation “abandoned to their 
worst enemies.”46
The conclusion of the American Revolution did not halt frontier vio-
lence between the Tennessee Valley settlers and the Cherokee. White en-
croachment continued and many of the Cherokee remained steadfast in 
their efforts to protect their territory. The persistence of violence on North 
Carolina’s western edges resulted in tremendous financial expenditures for 
the fiscally struggling state. The postrevolutionary financial crisis coupled 
with the expenses of Indian warfare further exacerbated the region’s dire 
economic situation. The state of North Carolina reevaluated their postrevo-
lutionary Indian policies and began to rely more heavily on cost-efficient 
diplomacy rather than cost-intensive armed conflict. The Tennessee Valley’s 
leadership viewed the return to Cherokee appeasement as a huge mistake. 
Despite the reservations of western settlers, North Carolina restored diplo-
matic relations with the Overhill Cherokee, and for a brief period following 
the revolution it appeared as though further frontier violence might be 
avoided. These hopes quickly vanished as the political and economic lead-
ership of the Tennessee Valley began to clamor for independence and vo-
cally criticized North Carolina’s conciliatory Indian policies.
The beginning of the political conflict between North Carolina and 
the future Franklinites occurred immediately after the destruction of the 
Overhill Cherokee towns in 1780. The defeat of the Cherokee initiated a 
new wave of white encroachment in the Tennessee Valley. By 1781, white 
squatters extended their western settlements to “within a day’s walk” of 
many of the Overhill Cherokee’s most important towns. The Cherokee’s 
leadership pleaded with North Carolina governor Alexander Martin to 
“have all your people moved off our land.”47 In a correspondence between 
Governor Martin and Overhill Cherokee chief Old Tassel, the desperate 
Cherokee informed the governor, “Your people from Nolichucky are daily 
pushing us out of our lands. We have no place to hunt on. Your people built 
houses within a day’s walk of our towns. We don’t want to quarrel.”48 North 
Carolina’s eastern leadership did not “want to quarrel” either. In 1783, the 
state began to make concessions to the Cherokee, including the establish-
ment of a new boundary line against white settlements. Despite the efforts 
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of eastern North Carolinians to curtail frontier violence, Tennessee Valley 
settlers continued to press southward and westward. The region’s militia 
units engaged in dozens of raids on Cherokee towns throughout 1783 and 
continued to argue in the North Carolina Assembly that the state needed to 
increase military expenditures for the safety and security of their western 
frontier. The two divergent strategies to deal with the Overhill Cherokee 
created palpable tensions between the state’s eastern and western leaders.49
With the passage of the 1784 Cession Act, the North Carolina legisla-
ture decided to rid itself of its Indian problem. The nearly bankrupt state 
hoped to repay its revolutionary debt to the federal government while re-
moving itself from the impossible task of balancing the interests of the 
Cherokee and the Tennessee Valley settlers. North Carolina governor Alex-
ander Martin wrote to the Cherokee in 1784 “that the Great Council of 
thirteen American States [the Continental Congress], at Philadelphia 
should transact all affairs belonging to the Red People.” The Land Cession 
Act of 1784 provided the political opening for the Tennessee Valley’s fron-
tier leadership to enact their new Cherokee policies. A future Franklinite 
outlined the objectives of the new policy as “the disposal of the Indian 
country,” and to “fix the limits of the new State [Franklin], and appropriate 
the lands, as a fund, to the support of our own government.” The Franklinites 
rejected the ideology of Indian appeasement and initiated a new strategy that 
combined the threat and focused use of violence with increasingly corrupt 
Indian negotiations. The Cession Act supplied the rationale for the trans-
Appalachian statehood movement, and the birth of the state of Franklin 
provided the political freedom to radically transform Euroamerican-
Cherokee relations on the Tennessee frontier.50
In 1785, the newly established Franklin government wasted little time 
in initiating their new Indian policy and expanding their backcountry set-
tlements. By passing the Cession Act, North Carolina ceded much of her 
influence over frontier Indian diplomacy to the federal government, and 
the Confederation Congress initially proved unable or unwilling to inter-
vene in the Tennessee Valley. North Carolina and Virginia Indian agent 
Joseph Martin wrote several letters to Virginia governor Patrick Henry re-
garding the fulminant situation. Martin warned Governor Henry that 
“Gov. [Alexander] Martin Tells me he is well informed that the Greatest 
part of the Cherokee and Creek Indians are for war, occasioned by the State 
of Franklyn [sic] passing an Act to Extend their Boundery [sic] within 
Twenty [miles] of Chota without Holding any Treaty with them.” Martin 
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also communicated to Henry that the North Carolina governor “has De-
clined holding any Treaty with the Indians, as the people [Franklinites] 
over the mountains has separated themselves from North Carolina.”51 In 
another exchange, Joseph Martin attempted to persuade Governor Henry 
that it was imperative for him to “insist upon the observance of a strict 
neutrality towards the citizens of Virginia” in the impending Indian war. 
Martin advised the Virginia leader to “give very particular attention to the 
subject” of Franklinite “encroachment . . . on Cherokee Lands,” and if he 
found the trespass “likely to terminate in hostilities” that could “reach our 
[Virginia] settlements,” the Indian agent recommended that Governor 
Henry “communicate to the Indians in somewhat specific manner a solemn 
assurance that the State of Virginia is not a party, ordering or assisting in 
the encroachment on their territory.”52
Despite the efforts to prevent further bloodshed on the southwestern 
frontier, the leaders of the state of Franklin remained free to pursue their 
own Indian stratagem unimpeded by the federal government, Virginia, or 
North Carolina, and unencumbered by revolutionary financial obligations 
or unwanted outside influences. The Franklin Indian policy served as one 
aspect of a larger strategy aimed at organizing the Tennessee Valley’s scat-
tered communities into a unified state and then creating a public domain 
out of the unimproved and unclaimed territory to finance the nation’s four-
teenth state. In addition to the internal partisanship surrounding the sepa-
ratist movement, the Franklin political strategy faced another serious 
hurdle. The Overhill Cherokee maintained claims to the only remaining 
substantial tracts of unsettled land in the region, and the embattled tribe 
did not intend to make any further land cessions. To the Tennessee Valley’s 
ruling class, the Overhill Cherokee represented the single greatest obstacle 
to their efforts to consolidate the Tennessee frontier, strengthen the region’s 
land- and resource-dependent economy, and maintain their political and 
economic hegemony.53
On May 31, 1785, the Franklinites negotiated their first formal treaty 
with the Overhill Cherokee. The two sides held the diplomatic discussions, 
ironically called “a Treaty of Amity and Friendship,” at the mouth of 
Dumplin Creek and the French Broad River (in present-day Jefferson 
County, Tennessee). Alexander Outlaw, Joseph Hardin, Luke Boyer, Joshua 
Gist, Ebenezer Alexander, and John Sevier represented the state of Franklin, 
while Anchoo (Ancoo), chief of Chota; Abraham of Chilhowe (Chelhowa); 
the Bard, head warrior of the Valley towns; the Sturgion of Tallassee; the 
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Leach from Settico; and the Big Man Killer from Tallassee represented the 
Cherokee.54 The Franklinites dispatched their most skillful negotiators and 
most experienced Indian fighters, including their governor, their Speaker of 
the House of Commons, an assistant judge, and a militia captain. Many of 
the most influential and circumspect Cherokee chiefs did not attend the 
meeting, including Old Tassel, Dragging Canoe, and Hanging Maw.55 The 
Franklinites chose not to invite Cherokee leaders possibly resistant to fur-
ther land cessions. The absence of the principal Cherokee chiefs imbued the 
Treaty of Dumplin Creek with a sense of illegitimacy and offered the 
Franklinites an unmistakable advantage in the treaty negotiations.56
The Treaty of Dumplin Creek provides an archetypal example of the 
state of Franklin’s Indian diplomacy in application. First, the Dumplin 
Creek treaty served two purposes, to force the tribe to formally recognize 
illegal land claims previously made by white squatters and to secure further 
territorial concessions. One Franklinite paternalistically stated that the 
treaty negotiations aimed “to incorporate them [Cherokee], and make them 
useful citizens.”57 Governor Sevier argued that previous white “settlements, 
even if unjustly made, were nevertheless made and could not be unmade.” 
Sevier pressured the Cherokee delegation to accept the inevitability of relin-
quishing land already settled by whites in the Tennessee Valley. Sevier also 
attempted to shift the blame for white encroachment away from the state of 
Franklin by stating, “I am takeing [sic] every measure in my power to pre-
vent Encroachments on the Indians’ Land. This, however, is a difficult 
Task, because North Carolina actually sold the Land up To these [Chero-
kee] Towns.”58 The Franklinites also hoped to further extend their state’s 
land holdings in an effort to boost the state treasury and free up land for 
speculators within the Franklin government. The treaty eventually agreed 
to by the Cherokee delegation provided the tribe with clothing and trade 
goods for “all lands lying and being on the South side of the Holeson [sic] 
and French Broad Rivers, as far South as the ridge that divide the Waters of 
the Little River from the Waters of the Tenesee.” Not surprisingly, the land 
deal proved to be extremely lucrative for the Franklinites. For an amount of 
“reasonable and liberal compensation,” the state of Franklin secured thou-
sands of acres of valuable Tennessee Valley bottomland. A word in the final 
sentence of the treaty reveals the true nature of the Dumplin Creek land 
deal: “bargain.”59
The second characteristic of the Franklin Indian strategy demonstrated 
by the Treaty of Dumplin Creek is the selective assemblage of Cherokee 
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leaders by the Franklinites. By excluding Cherokee leaders possibly hesitant 
to sign away huge swaths of land for very little compensation, the Franklin-
ites assured their negotiators highly agreeable treaty delegations and lucra-
tive diplomatic arrangements. This strategy did not go unnoticed by the 
Cherokee chiefs excluded from Dumplin Creek. In a “talk” delivered by 
Old Tassel, the Cherokee chief recounted his version of the Dumplin Creek 
Treaty. Old Tassel and the principal leaders of the Cherokee Nation did not 
attend the gathering “on the French Broad [Dumplin Creek]” organized by 
the Franklinites, but instead waited to parlay with representatives of the 
“great men of the thirteen states” at Hopewell, South Carolina, scheduled 
for later that same year. Despite the absence of the Cherokee “head men” 
and the fact that the “young men” representing the Cherokee tribe informed 
the attendees that “they had no authority to treat about lands,” the Franklin 
negotiators made a series of territorial demands. The Franklinites “wanted 
[the Cherokee to cede] the land on the Little [Tennessee] River” and to al-
low the white families already settled there to “remain . . . till the head men 
of their nation were consulted on it.” The “young” Cherokee negotiators 
agreed to allow the Tennessee Valley squatters to remain “living on the 
lands,” but the Franklin government took the temporary concession to be 
permanent. Old Tassel described the events that followed the treaty negotia-
tions: “Since then we are told that they claim all lands on the waters of Little 
River, and have appointed men among themselves to settle the disputes on 
our lands [establishment of Franklin land office], and call it their ground.”60 
Old Tassel’s letter also reveals a third element of the Franklin Indian policy, 
the misrepresentation or manipulation of the terms of treaties. Despite the 
verbal commitment to delay officially sanctioning land claims until the 
principal Cherokee chiefs could be consulted, the Franklinites proceeded to 
validate squatter claims and initiate the legal mechanisms for the sale of the 
Cherokee territory. The ruthless focus on securing land, strategically select-
ing Native American leaders for treaty negotiations, and the prevaricating of 
the agreed-upon diplomatic terms characterized the Treaty of Dumplin 
Creek and all future Franklin-Amerindian negotiations.61
Nationalist historians argued that America’s native peoples failed to 
grasp the nature of Euroamerican diplomacy, the concept of property own-
ership, and the dynamics of frontier capitalism. To these scholars, this funda-
mental misunderstanding of the European socioeconomic mind-set led to 
the tragic consequences that cost the American Indians their homeland, 
culture, and lives. The diplomatic strategy utilized by the Overhill Chero-
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kee during the Franklin movement refutes these misconceptions. The Ten-
nessee Valley’s “people of the sacred fire” engaged in a series of treaty 
negotiations with the federal government, the state of  North Carolina, and 
the state of Franklin. The tribe sought to curtail the loss of their lands 
through formal diplomatic channels and resorted to violence only out of 
desperation.
The first effort to halt the advance of Franklin settlers occurred prior 
to the dubious treaty negotiations at Dumplin Creek. During the Cession 
Act controversy, the Overhill Cherokee petitioned both the state of North 
Carolina and the Continental Congress to intervene in the situation un-
folding in the Tennessee Valley. North Carolina agreed to meet with an 
Indian delegation at the end of 1784 to discuss the details of a new treaty, 
but the territorial cession prevented the meeting from occurring. With the 
repeal of the Cession Act, North Carolina once again agreed to meet with 
the native leaders of the tribe. Because of the absence of a public domain in 
the Tennessee Valley, the federal government initially held little interest in 
intervening on behalf of the Cherokee and “did not do as it was doing at 
that very time in the Northwest, that is, build garrisons, supply troops, and 
remove squatters.”62 Despite the reluctance of Congress to directly intercede 
in the conflict, the federal government did agree to provide frontier diplo-
mats to aid the southern states in treaty negotiations with the southeastern 
tribes. As the situation quickly deteriorated on the Tennessee frontier, con-
gressionally appointed Indian agents and North Carolina negotiators agreed 
to meet the Cherokee leadership at Hopewell, South Carolina.63
The Cherokee and American diplomats conducted the Treaty of Hope-
well without consulting or including the Franklin government or the Chicka-
mauga Cherokee.64 From November 18–29, 1785, Benjamin Hawkins, 
Joseph Martin, Andrew Pickens, and Lachlan McIntosh, the congressio-
nally appointed Indian commissioners, engaged the Cherokee in a series of 
talks. The negotiations proved to be strikingly different from those held 
between the Franklinites and the Cherokee at Dumplin Creek.65 First, the 
Hopewell negotiations included all of the tribe’s principal chiefs and more 
than a thousand representatives from various Cherokee towns.66 Second, 
the participants in the meetings considered the diplomatic agendas of both 
parties, and negotiators held the maintenance of peace as being equally as 
important as the protection of land claims. Third, the Treaty of Hopewell 
also included a provision that provided the Cherokee Nation the authority 
to “punish” any white settler who settled illegally on tribal lands. Finally, 
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the results of the Treaty of Hopewell proved to be mutually beneficial for 
both parties. As one historian stated, “The treaty held at Hopewell . . . is 
an admirable example of how generous a government can be with Indians 
when lands in question do not belong to that government.” The extension 
of Cherokee justice into the lives of Americans created a backlash against 
the Treaty of Hopewell among many North Carolinians as well as 
Franklinites.67
Whatever the motivations behind the equity displayed by the federal 
government at Hopewell, the treaty came as a much-needed diplomatic 
success for the Cherokee Nation. In exchange for recognizing the U.S. gov-
ernment as “sovereign of all our land,” the tribe secured the restoration of 
the territory forfeited after the signing of the Great Island Treaty in June 
1777.68 The American representatives also agreed to disavow Franklin’s 
Treaty of Dumplin Creek. As important as the reclamation of their Tennes-
see Valley lands, the Treaty of Hopewell convinced the Cherokee that the 
members of the U.S. Continental Congress might be sympathetic to their 
cause. This perceived alliance instilled the tribe’s leadership with the confi-
dence to continue to resist both the advance of the Franklin squatters and 
the use of political and military pressure by the new state for further land 
cessions. The Franklinites reacted quite differently to the news of the South 
Carolina negotiations. Congress’s willingness to make concessions to the 
Cherokee and to exclude the rebellious state’s leadership from the treaty 
negotiations strengthened the resolve of the Franklinites to defend their 
statehood effort. The land returned to the tribe by the Treaty of Hopewell 
also meant that several of the state of Franklin’s most significant towns and 
communities, including the new capital of Greeneville, now rested in 
Cherokee territory. The treaty signed at Hopewell proved to be a watershed 
moment for the Tennessee frontier that simultaneously rekindled the Over-
hill Cherokee’s hope that the American government intended to remove the 
white squatters from their lands and strengthened the Franklinites’ resolve 
to expand their state’s geographical boundaries and defend the land claims 
of their citizens.69
The negotiations at Hopewell signaled the beginning of an unusual 
political dynamic on the Tennessee frontier: the existence of two competing 
Indian policies. The state of North Carolina completely ignored the land 
cessions contained in the Treaty of Dumplin Creek, and the Franklinites 
responded by refusing to recognize the terms of the Treaty of Hopewell. 
The Cherokee Nation faced the uncertainty of two state political systems 
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conducting discrete Native American diplomacy. The confusion caused by 
the divergent diplomatic efforts quickly spread among the valley residents, 
as both states continued to maintain separate judicial, political, and mili-
tary infrastructures. For the Cherokee, the escalation of political tensions 
between North Carolina’s Tennessee Valley loyalists and rebellious Frank-
linites and the persistence of white encroachment on their hunting grounds 
forecasted the resumption of frontier violence.70
The year 1786 opened with a renewed determination by both the 
Franklinites and the Overhill Cherokee to defend their homes. Franklin’s 
chief judge, David Campbell, clarified his state’s position in a November 
30, 1786, letter to North Carolina governor Richard Caswell. Judge Camp-
bell apprised Caswell of the “many families settled within nine Miles of the 
Cherokee Nation,” and warned him of the “consequence of those emigra-
tions.” Campbell implored the governor to extend “Our laws & Govern-
ment” to the Indians “or they will become dangerous.” The Franklinite 
reminded Governor Caswell that “all [of ] America [has] extended their back 
Settlements in opposition to Laws & proclamations” of their states and that 
“It is in vain to say they must be restrained” from further encroachments. 
He closed by predicting that the “Indians are now become more pusilani-
mous [sic], and consequently will be more & more incroached [sic] upon,” 
and demanding that “They must, they will be circumscribed.”71 Cherokee 
chief Old Tassel echoed the determination expressed by Judge Campbell in 
a talk delivered to Joseph Martin on April 10, 1786. Old Tassel warned 
Martin, “Some of my young men have lately come from the Western Tribes 
of Indians and they tell me they are preparing for War and they will most 
certainly strike on your Frontiers this Spring and Summer.” In a remarkable 
display of compassion, the aging chief expressed sorrow “that your people 
are suffered to Come in our Country making disputes,” and assured Martin 
that the Cherokee “want to live in peace with our friends, the White people, 
and will never Quarrel with them if we can help it.” He pleaded with him 
to “take pity on us and do us Justice and keep your people from us, only 
such as you point out to trade with us, which we shall take great care of.” 
Old Tassel expressed his concern that his supporters will “be blamed if” 
more militant factions of the Cherokee who “have gone out do any Mischeif 
[sic].” He assured Martin that “we did everything we could to stop them,” 
but “We have been waiting a long time to see the people moved off our 
lands on the South side of the French Broad river, but they still come 
nearer.”72 Despite the previous territorial cessions and diplomatic conces-
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sions agreed to by the Overhill Cherokee, the unwillingness of the state of 
Franklin to halt the advance of its citizens ensured the rekindling of hos-
tilities in the Tennessee Valley.73
The resurgence of backcountry bloodshed commenced in the spring of 
1786 with a series of Cherokee raids against white western settlements. Led 
by mixed-blood chief John Watts, Chickamauga Cherokee forces, roughly 
one thousand strong, attacked settlements near present-day Knoxville. The 
tribe specifically targeted the Beaver Creek home of Mr. Briam due to its 
location only a few miles from the Cherokee town of Chota. The attack 
served as a warning against future encroachment on the north side of the 
Holston River.74 The Indian attacks terrorized the Tennessee Valley settlers 
and forced frontier whites to hastily organize a volunteer militia force to re-
taliate against the Overhill Cherokee. Led by Governor Sevier, 150 mounted 
Franklinites amassed at Houston’s Station to conduct their invasion of the 
Cherokee towns. After crossing the Tennessee River, the Franklin militia 
forces attacked the Hiawassee Overhill towns, burning three villages and 
killing fifteen Cherokee.75 The destruction of the Overhill Cherokee towns 
resulted in a brief pause in combat, and both parties used the lull in fighting 
to prepare for future confrontations. Joseph Martin described the uneasiness 
gripping the Tennessee Valley during the late spring of 1786, warning Gov-
ernor Caswell that “the accounts from the Cherokee Country are somewhat 
alarming.” He recounted the violence of the previous months and cautioned 
the governor that the Cherokee recently warned the Franklinites that “they 
did not wish for war but if the white people wanted war it was what they 
would get.”76
As spring gave way to summer, Dragging Canoe’s Chickamauga Chero-
kee continued their attacks on the region’s white settlements, killing “two 
[white] traders . . . on their way to the Chickasaws from Cumberland.” Jo-
seph Martin warned Governor Caswell that he feared that “Draggon [sic] 
Canoe’s” Chickamauga followers might “join the Creeks” in an “open war” 
against white settlers. Ellis Haslin, considered “one of the principal Traders 
in the Cherokee Country,” described to Martin a foreboding encounter 
with “a party of Creeks & Chickamawgahs [sic] on their way to [attack the] 
Cumberland” settlements. Haslin made an attempt to “turn them back . . . 
but they would not go back.”77 The leaders of Franklin did not distinguish 
the Overhill Cherokee from the Chickamauga Cherokee and therefore of-
ten unfairly retaliated against towns that “all seemed very Friendly.”78 The 
threat posed by the Chickamauga Cherokee convinced the Franklinites to 
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conduct a preemptive strike against the Cherokee Upper towns. On May 
12, 1786, Franklin militia colonel Anthony Bledsoe informed Governor 
Caswell of the deteriorating situation in the Tennessee backcountry. Upon 
his “return from [the North Carolina state capital] New Bern,” Bledsoe 
found the Tennessee Valley’s “peaceable situation . . . disturbed by the In-
dians stealing Horses” and “murdering and wounding” white settlers. Bled-
soe responded to these attacks by ordering “look outs in different parts of 
the Country” and expanding the ranks of the militia. Bledsoe warned Cas-
well that “Our Country being a frontier alround [sic] and in all appear-
ances likely to be invaded on every quarter, and driven to stations and 
fortifications leaving their property exposed to the savage, to the destruc-
tion of this Infant Country.” The exasperated Franklinite admitted to the 
governor that “we seem to be at a loss to know with Certainty by what hand 
we suffer in particular.”79 Colonel Bledsoe concluded his correspondence by 
“loudly calling [North Carolina] for assistance” and looking to Governor 
Caswell “to revenge her Blood.” Bledsoe then requested “permission” to 
lead a raid “against some small Town[s] of the Chickamawgahs [sic].”80
Governor Caswell reluctantly approved Colonel Bledsoe’s request for a 
raid on the Cherokee communities, and in August 1786 a group of two 
hundred Franklin militiamen, led by William Cocke and Alexander Out-
law, marched into the Overhill Cherokee territory. After destroying an 
Overhill town, the Franklinites forced the tribe into treaty negotiations.81 
Amid the threat posed by the invading Franklinites against their homes 
and families, the Overhill Cherokee leaders, led by Old Tassel and Hanging 
Maw, met with Outlaw and Cocke at Chota Ford from July 31 to August 
3. During the talks, the Franklin negotiators accused the Overhill Chero-
kee of murdering “our young men,” stealing horses, robbing, and most 
importantly, abandoning the land agreements contained in the Treaty of 
Dumplin Creek. Old Tassel defended his tribesmen by stating, “The men 
that did the Murder is bad men and no warriors is gone, and I can’t tell you 
where they are gone. They live in Coytoy at the Mouth of the Holston. This 
is all I have to say; they have done the murder.” The Franklinites argued 
that the Cherokee must relinquish all of the land “on the North side of the 
Tennessee and Holston [rivers]” because North Carolina “has sold us all the 
Country.”82 In reality, North Carolina never sold the Franklinites any land, 
and many of the state’s political leaders actively sought to destroy the em-
bryonic state. The savvy Overhill chief Old Tassel called the Franklinites’ 
bluff, stating, “I will tell you about the land. What you say concerning the 
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land I will talk to Congress about and the man that Sold it. I shall look to 
them for it. You say North Carolina sold you the land Over the River. We 
will talk to all head men about it.” The Franklinites eventually pressured 
the Cherokee into signing the Treaty of Coyatee. Perhaps in the entire his-
tory of Euroamerican Indian diplomacy, no single treaty contained the 
level of intimidation as that conducted on the outskirts of Chota. The 
treaty warned the Cherokee that “if you kill any more of our people we will 
come down and destroy the town that does the Mischief unless you bring 
the rogues to us.” The Franklin negotiators informed the Cherokee diplo-
mats that “our great councilors have sold us the lands on the north side of 
the Tennessee [River] to the Cumberland Mountains. And we intend to 
Settle and live on it.” The Franklinites cautioned the Overhill Cherokee not 
to resist their territorial expansion or “kill any of our people,” for the con-
sequences of such actions would lead to the destruction of “the town that 
does the Mischief.” The Franklinites concluded the treaty with a final ad-
monishment, stating, “as your people broke the peace you made with Con-
gress and us, and killed our men, it was your Faults that we come out to 
War. We have a right to all the ground we marched over.”83
At Dumplin Creek and Chota, the Franklinites combined their clan-
destine exploitation of the Cherokee Nation’s tribal structure with physical 
threats, verbal trickery, and post-accord manipulation of treaty terms to 
systematically plunder the Tennessee Valley land from the Overhill Chero-
kee. From the first land sales to the Wataugans to the Treaty of Coyatee 
with the Franklinites, the march of white settlements eventually extended 
across the entire Great Valley of the Tennessee.
As with the previous treaties agreed to by the Cherokee, white encroach-
ment and Indian resistance persisted after the signing of the Coyatee agree-
ment. Over the next two years, both the Franklinites and various elements 
of the Overhill and Chickamauga Cherokee sporadically clashed on the 
Tennessee frontier. Most of these isolated events involved small backcoun-
try skirmishes and resulted in relatively small losses of life. In the winter of 
1787, a detachment of 130 militiamen from Virginia’s Kentucky territory, 
led by Colonel John Logan, attacked an innocent group of Chickamauga 
Cherokee mistakenly believed to be responsible for “depredations on the 
Kentucky-Path.”84 The Kentuckians killed seven Cherokee, including a 
Chota chief, and wounded several others.85 The Cherokee also engaged in 
their share of frontier violence. Most Native American incidents involved 
the theft of horses and cattle or attacks on small groups of white hunters 
Where the Fire of Peace Is Always Kept Burning 111
and traders. In reality, the isolated incidents occurring in the Tennessee 
Valley after the Treaty of Coyatee simply continued the hostile relationship 
between the region’s Native American and white residents.
Despite the continued failure of backcountry negotiations to secure the 
removal of white squatters from their hunting grounds, the Cherokee main-
tained their commitment to diplomacy. The year 1787 not only witnessed 
the drafting of a new U.S. Constitution, but also the reengagement of the 
federal government and the state of North Carolina in southeastern Indian 
affairs. In July, newly elected North Carolina governor Samuel Johnston 
issued a “Proclamation forbidding any of the Citizens of the State [Frank-
lin/North Carolina] from entering on the Indian Territory without the 
Order of the Commanding Officer of that Quarter.” Johnston also in-
structed Joseph Martin “to use his utmost efforts, to restrain the people in 
his [southern] District from further outrages & by every means in his 
power to conciliate the minds of the Indians and to act altogether on the 
defensive.”86 Notwithstanding the federal government’s inability to enforce 
the territorial agreements spelled out in the Treaty of Hopewell, the Chero-
kee still held onto their belief that further frontier bloodshed could be 
avoided by using diplomatic channels and direct pleas to prominent Amer-
ican political figures. Cherokee chiefs continued to correspond with state 
and federal leaders and meet with various Indian agents to secure their 
territorial boundaries. At a March 24, 1787, meeting at the Overhill Chero-
kee town of Chota, Hanging Maw described the tribe’s frustration with the 
U.S. government to Indian agent Joseph Martin. Hanging Maw expressed 
his disappointment with the U.S. Congress’s inability to enforce the provi-
sions of the Treaty of Hopewell. He lamented, “We have several Treaties 
with the Americans, when Bounds was always fixt [sic] and fair promises 
always made that the white People should not come over. But we always 
find that after a treaty they settle much faster than before.” Hanging Maw 
continued, “when we Treated with Congress [at Hopewell] we made no 
doubt that we should have Justice.” The Cherokee chief described the advice 
his followers received from “People a great way off” that implored the 
Cherokee Nation not to “set still till all our Lands is Settled” or to allow 
“the Americans . . . to deceive us.” Hanging Maw concluded his talk by 
imploring Joseph Martin to use his influence and “take pity on us and have 
their people moved off our Lands.”87
Hanging Maw’s argument that treaties intensified white settlement 
proved to be prophetic. Following the signing of the Treaty of Coyatee, the 
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state of Franklin and her citizens intensified the settlement and sale of ter-
ritory in the Tennessee Valley. At the September 1787 meeting of the Frank-
lin legislature held in Greeneville, the Franklinites opened a land office for 
the purpose of selling the territory claimed from the Overhill Cherokee at 
Dumplin Creek and Coyatee. The Franklin legislature provided for land 
purchases to be transacted using both scarce specie and abundant animal 
pelts. The land office quickly began to sell land in the Tennessee Valley 
both within and outside the two treaty boundaries.88 Joseph Martin de-
scribed the chaotic situation to recently retired North Carolina governor 
Richard Caswell. After arriving at the town of Chota, Martin “found the 
Indians in greater confustion [sic] than I had ever seen them before.” 
“Colonel John Logan’s Expedition” and the “daily Incroachments [sic] of 
the Franklinists on their Lands” created an air of desperation among the 
Overhill Cherokee. Martin expressed horror upon discovering that the 
Franklinites “opened a land office for Every Acre of Land that the Legisla-
ture of North Carolina Ceded to them [Franklinites] North of the Tennes-
see [River], which includes Several of their [Cherokee] Principal cornfields 
and part of the beloved Town, Chota and the whole Town of Niol, and 
Now Settling on the Banks of the River.”89 Colonel Evan Shelby, a staunch 
opponent of the state of Franklin, joined Martin in condemning the actions 
of the Franklin government. Shelby also recounted that the Franklin gov-
ernment “Opened an Office for the Lands from French Broad River to 
Tinnise [sic] River, being the Lands Reserved to the Indians By the Gen-
eral Assembly of No. Carolina to them and their heirs for Ever.” According 
to Shelby’s intelligence, the Franklinites “are Forceably [sic] Takeing posses-
sion of the Same, and Setling [sic] in View of their Towns.” He warned that 
these actions “Cannot faile [sic] bringing On the Resentment of the Indi-
ans, and Involve us in A War with them, which Your Frontiers must share 
in its dreadful Consequences.”90 The state of Franklin’s land policies also 
drew the criticism of one of America’s most respected statesmen, Benjamin 
Franklin. Franklin condemned the Franklinites’ “encroachments” in a let-
ter to William Cocke, calling them “unjustifiable” and unnecessary. He 
believed that the Cherokee “usually give very good [land] bargains; and in 
one year’s war with them you may suffer a loss of property and be put to an 
expense vastly exceeding in value what would have contented them per-
fectly in fairly buying the lands they can spare.” Franklin expressed sympa-
thy for the Cherokee Nation as the “No. Carolinians on one side, and the 
people of your State [Franklin] on the other, encroach upon them daily.” 
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He also warned that the Franklinites’ continued breach “of a solemn treaty 
[Hopewell]” could one day “bring upon themselves an Indian war [in 
which] they will not be supported by” the U.S. government.91 Even the state 
of Franklin’s political leadership realized the anger created among the 
Cherokee by the opening of the Franklin land office. Franklin militia colo-
nel Anthony Bledsoe acknowledged to Governor Caswell that the “opening 
[of ] a land office from the French Broad to the Tennessee River . . . gives a 
general disgust to the Indians, and I judge gives them cause to harass the 
Cumberland settlements [in Middle Tennessee].”92 The opening of the 
Franklin land office and the hostile stance taken toward the Overhill 
Cherokee by the government and citizens of Franklin all but ensured an-
other full-scale Cherokee war. As one concerned Virginia resident stated, 
“Should these ill advised people [Franklin residents] force them [Indians] 
into a War, we shall have all the Southern Indians against us.”93
Amid the diplomatic maneuvering with members of Congress and the 
state governments of Virginia, Georgia, and North Carolina, the Cherokee 
Nation prepared for the impending frontier clash. One historian described 
the military buildup as “a Cherokee movement that in 1788 was to bring 
into the field a great conquering Cherokee army organized to sweep every 
settler from south of the French Broad.”94 In the spring of 1788, the Chero-
kee commenced hostilities and began incursions into the Franklin com-
munities. Surry County, North Carolina, resident Mark Armstrong wrote 
to North Carolina governor Samuel Johnston that the Cherokee “have 
killed several persons and taken some prisoners. Whilst I staid in Hawkins 
County [in the state of Franklin], four men were killed & scalped.”95 Joseph 
Martin also grimly apprised Virginia governor Edmund Randolph of the 
situation on the Tennessee frontier. In his correspondence, Martin enclosed 
“copies of letters showing the alarmed state of the frontiers of Washington, 
Russel [sic] and Hawkins Counties, and indeed throughout the whole 
Western N. Carolina and what had been known as Franklin, on account of 
the incursions of the Savages.” Across the Tennessee Valley, Martin found 
that “the inhabitants are ready to leave the country.”96
The situation in the Tennessee Valley continued to spiral out of control, 
and the struggling Franklin government proved incapable of either offering 
protection to their citizens or pacifying the enraged Cherokee. The failure 
of the Franklinites to secure formal recognition from the U.S. Congress, 
the loss of national and regional support for the statehood movement, and 
North Carolina’s strategy of conducting its affairs within Franklin’s ever-
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expanding borders continued to steadily derail the state of Franklin. In a 
letter dated April 12, 1788, North Carolina’s Governor Johnston warned 
that “Should the people in that part of the Country wantonly involve them-
selves in an Indian War without real necessity, but with a view to harass [sic] 
and drive them from their settlements I cannot promise them any assistance 
from this side of the Mountain.” By the opening of the 1788 Cherokee 
hostilities, America’s would-be fourteenth state stood on the verge of col-
lapse and faced the likelihood of a unilateral Indian engagement.97
As the mounting turmoil engulfed the state of Franklin, in May 1788 
a Cherokee named Slim Tom murdered eleven members of a Tennessee 
Valley family residing nine miles from Chota on the Little Tennessee River.98 
The Kirk family massacre proved to be the spark that once again triggered 
open warfare between the Franklinites and the Cherokee. The Kirk family 
incident and subsequent Franklinite response illustrated the barbarity per-
petrated by both sides during the struggle for control of the Tennessee Val-
ley. The sole surviving member of the Kirk family, John Kirk, described the 
massacre to Chickamauga Cherokee chief John Watts in a letter dated Oc-
tober 17, 1788. Kirk wrote, “For days and months the Cherokee Indians, 
big and little, women and children, have been fed and treated kindly by my 
mother.” According to Kirk, during a period “When all was at peace with 
the Tennessee towns,” a Cherokee named Slim Tom, “with a party of Sat-
tigo [Citico] and other Cherokee Indians,” fell upon the Kirk family and 
“murdered my mother, brothers and sisters in cold blood.” As the Kirk 
children played “about them as friends,” “the bloody tomahawk” mutilated 
their “smiling faces.” Kirk signed his correspondence “John Kirk, Jun. Cap-
tain of the Bloody Rangers.”99 The Franklinites predictably responded to 
the Kirk murders by sending out the Franklin militia, under the command 
of John Sevier, to retaliate against the Overhill and Chickamauga Chero-
kee. Sevier and approximately 150 soldiers departed from the appropriately 
named Hunter’s Station, on a small tributary of the Holston River, on June 
1, 1788, with “outrage rankling in their heart.”100 Despite the lack of evi-
dence proving Overhill Cherokee involvement in the Kirk family massacre, 
the Franklin militia force once again targeted the Cherokee’s Hiawassee 
Overhill towns. Sullivan County Tiptonite Thomas Hutchings claimed 
that “Colonel Sevier, contrary to the Council of Officers in June [2], fell on 
Kiewkah on Hiawassa, and, is said, killed about 20 Indians.”101 Sevier then 
burned the Cherokee town and marched his forces deeper into the Overhill 
Cherokee Nation. Sevier’s campaign against the Overhill Cherokee led to 
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the destruction of several important Cherokee towns and a tremendous loss 
of life for the embattled tribe.102
After destroying many of the Cherokee valley settlements, John Sevier 
turned his attention to the destruction of the largely peaceful Overhill town 
of Chilhowe, unfortunately the hometown of Slim Tom. At Chilhowe, Se-
vier’s forces surrounded the Cherokee community and the home of the 
town’s beloved chief Old Abraham. At the time of the occupation, Old 
Abraham happened to be in council with chief Old Tassel. The two Chero-
kee chiefs most dedicated to mutual peace received an invitation from the 
Franklinites to meet them at their encampment across the Little Tennessee 
River. Under a white flag of truce, Old Abraham and Old Tassel, men de-
scribed as “remarkable for their good Offices & Fidelity,” gathered in Se-
vier’s tent.103 According to Thomas Hutchings, “Abram’s [Abraham] son 
ferried them [the Cherokee party] over, and swam their horses—this done, 
they [John Kirk and James Hubbard] fell on the Indians, killed the Tassel, 
Hanging Man [sic], Old Abram, his son, Tassell’s [sic] brother, and 
Hanging-Man’s [sic] brother, and took in Abram’s wife and daughter—
brought in 14 Scalps—altogether a scene of cruelty.”104 According to first-
hand accounts of the tragic events of that summer day, John Sevier was 
“nearly a Quarter of a Mile from the Place” during the “braining” of the 
unarmed Cherokee, but the militia commander’s absence did not shield 
him from criticism.105 The Continental Congress offered several resolutions 
condemning the act, and many of Sevier’s contemporaries blamed him for 
the actions of the troops in his command. According to one Franklin histo-
rian, “the [Kirk] incident devalued Sevier’s reputation with President Wash-
ington, who wanted to keep peace with the frontier Indians,” and “the 
president called Sevier an Indian murderer.”106 Thomas Hutchings warned 
that Sevier’s conduct would “leave an evil tendency, in so much as it may 
involve us in a war.”107 Charles Thomson, secretary of the Continental 
Congress, suggested to North Carolina’s Governor Johnston that “Hostili-
ties alleged to have been committed by John Sevier & others into which you 
are earnestly requested to cause enquiry to be made & if found true to take 
measures to have the perpetrators thereof apprehended & punished.”108 
Governor Johnston responded to the Continental Congress’s demand for 
justice by “issuing a warrant for apprehending them [Sevier and party].”109 
The Washington County District Court ultimately found Sevier innocent 
of the charges brought against him relating to the murders, but the damage 
to the Overhill Cherokee could not be undone.110
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The tragic consequences of the barbarous acts of that June day ex-
tended far beyond the cold-blooded execution of two beloved Cherokee 
chiefs and their families. The reverberations from the deaths of Old Tassel 
and Old Abraham sparked a wave of terror and fear that swept across the 
Cherokee and white communities in the Tennessee Valley. Governor John-
ston hoped that the arrest of John Sevier and several Franklin militiamen 
might “conciliate the Indians & restrain the Whites from Committing 
Outrages.” In an open letter to the Cherokee Nation, Johnston promised 
that if “any of them [Franklinites] have injured you without sufficient cause 
to take them up and send them to us that they may receive Correction & 
punishment.”111 Colonel George Maxwell of Sullivan County believed that 
“Sevier’s conduct, so exasperated the Indians that the whole body of them 
is now at war with us.”112 Hugh Williamson, North Carolina delegate to the 
Continental Congress, described the far-reaching ramifications of the mur-
ders in a September 6, 1788, letter to Governor Johnston. Williamson be-
lieved that “the conduct of Mr. Sevier was . . . fatal” to the ongoing efforts 
of South Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia to conclude a “Treaty [that] is now 
pending with the Southern Indians [Creeks].” He expressed his concern 
that the murders of Old Tassel and Old Abraham might ignite “a general 
Indian War,” and entreated that the “delegates from these States earnestly 
request that preventative measures may be taken.”113 Despite the efforts by 
the Continental Congress and several southern state governments to con-
ciliate the Cherokee Nation, the actions of Sevier and his fellow Franklinites 
ensured the continuation of backcountry warfare.
By murdering the two Cherokee chiefs most dedicated to maintaining 
a harmonious coexistence between the Indian and white Tennessee Valley 
residents, the Franklinites destroyed any hope for peaceful relations with 
the Overhill Cherokee and inadvertently united the Cherokee behind a 
larger war effort. Richard Winn informed Governor Johnston that “the said 
Cherokee Chiefs have given Notice, they mean to spill Blood.”114 No longer 
could the frontier whites rely on the peaceful intervention of Cherokee 
chiefs like Old Tassel and Old Abraham on their behalf. Now the efforts of 
Cherokee resistance groups, such as Dragging Canoe’s Chickamauga Che-
rokee, became the accepted course of action for all Cherokee tribesmen.115 
The state of Franklin leadership’s uncompromising pursuit of land at any 
and all costs, use of corrupt diplomatic practices, and campaign to under-
mine the treaty efforts of North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, South Caro-
lina, and the U.S. government caused the bloodiest Indian war ever fought 
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in the Tennessee Valley. John Sevier’s son, James Sevier, described this pe-
riod as “the hottest Indian war I ever witnessed.”116 After the state of Frank-
lin’s demise, North Carolina’s Governor Johnston inherited the Cherokee 
war, which he characterized as “horrid Murders & Massacres.”117 This con-
flict raged for several years until the Overhill Cherokee and their many 
tribal allies finally agreed to sign a treaty ending the bitter hostilities. Long 
after the collapse of Sevier’s state of Franklin, on July 2, 1791, the Cherokee 
signed the Treaty of Holston (in present-day Knoxville), effectively ending 
the three-year Cherokee war initiated by the Franklinites.118
At their motivational core, the leaders and supporters of Franklin be-
lieved that their statehood movement would remove the political obstacles 
impeding the development of their backcountry communities and economy. 
An independent state bureaucracy offered the Tennessee Valley’s ruling 
class the opportunity to control state and local political and judicial posi-
tions, expand and command the rapidly developing trans-Appalachian 
economy, and implement their own Native American policy. The impact of 
the blending of the ideologies of backcountry separatism and Indian racism 
was most acutely experienced by the Overhill Cherokee. As the Franklin 
government replaced conciliatory diplomacy with their relentless policy of 
forced land cessions and violence, the Native American communities of the 
Tennessee Valley found themselves threatened as never before.
After nearly two years of political lobbying, the leaders of the state of 
Franklin had failed to garner approval from the U.S. Congress, the North 
Carolina legislature, or a single influential national political figure for their 
statehood movement. Throughout 1787, the residents of the Tennessee Val-
ley continued to suffer against the backdrop of the heightening Cherokee 
and Creek resistance movements, the disruption to their communities 
caused by two competing state bureaucracies, and the increasingly treacher-
ous local factionalism threatening their homes, families, and businesses. 
The state of North Carolina maintained its conciliatory strategy aimed at 
nonviolently defeating the Franklin separatist movement by driving a po-
litical wedge between the residents of the Great Valley of the Tennessee. 
Considerable risks accompanied North Carolina’s divisive political maneu-
verings, and as early as May 1787, Governor Caswell warned the embittered 
residents of “the Counties of Sullivan, Greene, Washington, and Hawkins” 
that if they failed to “evince the necessity of Mutual Friendship and the 
Ties of Brotherly love” between themselves, “the Blood of some of your 
dearest and worthiest Citizens may have been spilt and your Country laid 
to waste in an unnatural and Cruel Civil War.”1 Caswell’s prophetic ad-
monishment captured the social and political chaos rending the Tennessee 
Valley communities. The Caswell administration’s growing alarm over the 
potential outbreak of civil war mounted as a result of the further escalation 
of partisan political strife within the region.
In an effort to avoid the outbreak of a partisan civil war within the 
Tennessee Valley, the state of North Carolina initiated a series of backcoun-
try negotiations throughout the first half of 1787, between herself and the 
leadership of Franklin. Initially these high-level meetings held out the pos-
sibility of a peaceful compromise, but the eventual failure of the negotiators 
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to secure a substantive and lasting agreement between the two states and 
their Tennessee Valley proponents resulted in further hostilities. Tensions 
between the Franklinites and Tiptonites intensified as the leaders and sup-
porters of Franklin scrambled to preserve their statehood movement. The 
contentious 1787 state elections held in the Tennessee Valley and the ongo-
ing struggle to control local political and judicial offices resulted in violent 
clashes between partisans. As news reached the Tennessee Valley of the 
existence of a new U.S. Constitution containing language unfavorable to 
the future of the state of Franklin, many rank and file supporters of state-
hood abandoned the movement and returned their political loyalties to 
North Carolina. The dwindling local support for Franklin and the federal 
government’s rebuke placed the remaining Franklinites in an increasingly 
desperate position. Despite the inevitable fall of the state of Franklin, Ten-
nessee Valley partisans remained determined to assert their local hegemony 
and to defeat their political adversaries. During the final months of the 
state of Franklin, the communities of the Tennessee Valley erupted into a 
violent partisan clash that left several Tennessee Valley residents dead, the 
region in complete bedlam, and the state of Franklin in smoldering ruins.2
At the opening of 1787, Governor Caswell chose to expand his effort to 
bring about a harmonious conclusion to the Franklin separatist movement 
by dispatching several strategic correspondences with his son Winston into 
the Tennessee Valley. In late February 1787, the first of these letters arrived 
in the hands of the still recovering Franklin judge David Campbell. Caswell 
assured Campbell that Franklin’s independence may eventually be secured 
“if those can be brought to agree among themselves and make a General 
application to the Legislature hereafter, returning to the former Govern-
ment and agreeing to certain reasonable stipulations.”3 Winston Caswell 
also carried a letter from his father to Governor Sevier in which the North 
Carolina leader recounted his assembly’s fateful decision during the previ-
ous November session. Caswell regrettably reported that “the Assembly, 
from representation of persons among yourselves [specifically Senator John 
Tipton], was induced to believe that it was proper for the people to return 
to subjection to the laws and Government of North Carolina.” Caswell 
clearly understood the perilous situation unfolding on the Tennessee fron-
tier and included a plea for calmer heads to prevail among the region’s 
partisan leaders. Caswell appealed, “In the mean Time, the most Friendly 
intercourse between the Citizens on the Eastern & Western Waters is 
strongly Recommended.” The North Carolina governor concluded his com-
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muniqué with parting words of affection for his longtime friend and busi-
ness partner. Caswell predicted that “a new Government may be shortly 
established if the people would unite, submit to the former Government and 
Petition for Separation, this I think the only Constitutional Mode & I 
firmly believe if Pursued will be a means of effecting a separation on Friend-
ly Terms.” He confided to Sevier that he “expect[ed], if [his] Life & Death 
and strength last to lay my bones on the Western Waters. Twelve Months 
will bring about a Release to me from public employment & it is my inten-
tion then to establish it as the place of my residence.”4 Caswell’s efforts to 
waylay the further escalation of violence in the Tennessee Valley undoubt-
edly served his political and financial interests, but despite his adjurations, 
tensions between the Franklinites and Tiptonites continued to mount.
Under increasing pressure from North Carolina to return their political 
allegiance to their parent state, the Franklinites convened a spring session of 
the Franklin Assembly. In one of the last meetings of the full deliberative 
body, representatives assembled in their capital at Greeneville to attempt to 
govern their state amid the region’s swirling political instability. In addition 
to opening a land office to settle land warrants for the Muscle Shoals dis-
trict and expanding the state’s rudimentary tax code, the Franklinites uti-
lized the early March session to attempt to reverse the political factionalism 
exacerbated by North Carolina’s divide-and-conquer tactics.5 Tiptonite 
Thomas Hutchings described the coercive measures in an April 1, 1787, 
letter to Governor Caswell. Hutchings recounted the Franklinites’ effort 
“to frighten Others into Compliance with Them” by passing “an Act to 
Fine and Imprison Any person Who Shall dare to Act under the Authority 
of North Carolina.” A “First Offense [brought a fine of ] five pounds” and 
a “Second Offense ten pounds and A Year’s imprisonment.”6 Hutchings 
also informed Governor Caswell that the Franklinites “have also Impow-
ered [sic] the Governor to Raise the Militia to Oppose the Operation of the 
Laws of North Carolina Who are Now enlisting, and Giving 400 Acres of 
Land Bounty. This is under A Color of Guarding the Frontiers.” Hutchings 
ominously warned, “Should they Offer any Insults To the Civil Authority, 
I Expect it will be difficult to prevent an Effusion of Blood.”7 The Frank-
linites closed their legislative session by hanging in effigy John Tipton, 
whom they considered “the instigator of [their] unhappiness.” The Franklin 
supporters placed an “extraordinary will” symbolically inside Tipton’s mouth 
that “bequeathed his ignorance, his perjury, his folly, and his ambition to 
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be divided among his friends, and a wooden sword to the most deserving of 
them.”8
By the start of spring, a number of partisan leaders on both sides of the 
Franklin issue had grown increasingly eager to resolve the statehood affair 
through diplomacy and to avoid the resulting “Effusion of Blood.”9 On 
March 20, two delegations, led by Franklin governor John Sevier and his 
aging friend and Anti-Franklinite General Evan Shelby, rendezvoused at 
the home of Samuel Smith in Sullivan County in a bid to forestall the im-
pending warfare between the region’s two opposing factions.10 General 
Shelby described the situation to Governor Caswell in a report written the 
day after the parlay. He detailed the intensifying “Animosity arising from 
difference of opinions in Government among” the residents of the Tennes-
see Valley and related to the governor that “Many people are firmly attached 
to North Carolina, Others are as Obstinate against it.” Shelby “hoped that 
time and reflection will restore them friendly to North Carolina” and that 
the March meeting with Sevier would “quiet the minds of the People and 
Preserve the Peace and tranquility till something better could be done.”11
The conference proved to be one of the few examples of backcountry 
diplomacy that, at least briefly, offered the possibility of a peaceful resolu-
tion to the Franklin conflict. The two principal articles agreed upon ad-
dressed the violence and confusion destroying the region’s judicial system 
and emptying their states’ treasuries. In an effort to end the months of 
courtroom violence, the negotiators agreed to limit the types of cases and 
decisions adjudicated in the competing “Courts of Justice.” Both sides agreed 
to avoid trying partisans on either side of the conflict for criminal offenses. 
By limiting the kinds of court cases being seen in the Tennessee Valley to 
“the trial of Criminals, the proving of Wills, deeds, bills of sales, and such 
like Conveyances,” negotiators hoped to avoid further judicial hostilities. 
The second article acceded to by the two diplomatic contingents allowed 
“the Inhabitants residing within the said disputed Territory . . . to pay their 
Public Taxes to either the State of North Carolina or the State of Franklin.” 
This unusual decision allowed the competing state bureaucracies to function 
independently without fear of having their constituencies’ tax contributions 
diverted to the opposing government. The agreement concluded with one 
final concession to the Franklinites, in which the delegations recommended 
that Franklin’s case for separation be considered for a third time “at the Next 
Annual Meeting of the [North Carolina] General Assembly.”12
122 Th e Lost State of Franklin
The Shelby-Sevier negotiations provided few cogent solutions to ebb 
the partisan rancor imperiling the Tennessee Valley communities, and the 
articles agreed upon during the March meeting may have actually exacer-
bated regional hostilities. According to one Franklin historian, Governor 
Sevier’s willingness to sign a “truce” with the North Carolina government 
divided Franklin’s leadership and led to “the decline of the morale of nu-
merous followers.”13 Less than two months after signing the truce, General 
Evan Shelby informed Governor Caswell that “the People of Franklin have 
not assented to the agreement which was entered into with their Governor 
for the preservation of peace and good order in this Country.” The futile 
effort to bridge partisan grievances further dissevered the region’s inhabit-
ants and rendered lame the brief accord signed in Sullivan County.14
During the months following the conference held between Shelby and 
Sevier, the Tennessee Valley continued to be savagely torn apart by political 
infighting. Colonel Anthony Bledsoe described the circumstances to Gov-
ernor Caswell. “Politics in this part of the country run high, you hear in 
almost every collection of people frequent declarations for North Carolina, 
and others in the manner for the State of Franklin; I have seen it in much 
warmth.” In response to Governor Caswell’s request to “know how the 
Laws and a Return to the Old Government Set on the minds of the people” 
of the Tennessee Valley, Colonel Thomas Hutchings offered this optimistic 
analysis, “I find in the County of Green [sic] the People are much Divided, 
in the other three Counties [Washington, Sullivan, and Hawkins] about 
two thirds much pleased with the Laws and a Return to the Old Govern-
ment.”15 Just a week earlier, Franklin judge David Campbell recorded this 
conflicting assessment of the political leanings of his fellow Tennessee Valley 
residents: “You must not conclude that we are altogether unanimous but I do 
assure you [Caswell] a very Great Majority, perhaps Nineteen twentieths, 
seem determined to Preserve [Franklin] at all hazards.” Although impossible 
to verify, these statements regarding the distribution of political loyalties in 
the Tennessee Valley reflected the escalating political dissension within the 
state of Franklin.16
In the face of increasing internal opposition and the damaging impact 
of North Carolina’s divide-and-conquer political tactics, the leaders of 
Franklin remained unflinching in their effort to secure their political sov-
ereignty. In a fiery letter addressed to Governor Caswell, David Campbell 
offered a sharp criticism of the effects of North Carolina’s conciliatory strat-
egy. Judge Campbell stated, “I also blame the Law which passed in your 
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Assembly to enable the People here to hold partial Elections [to the North 
Carolina Assembly]; if it was intended to divide us and set us to measure 
one another, it was well concerted; but an ill planned Scheme, if intended 
for the good of all.” The vocal Franklinite also included his own judgment 
regarding the treacherous political landscape of the Tennessee Valley, in-
forming the North Carolina governor that “The People here . . . dread the 
Idea of Reversion” back to North Carolina. He derided North Carolina’s 
ongoing policies toward the Franklin government, asking, “if No. Carolina 
is in earnest about granting them a Separation why not permit them to go 
on as they have begun and not involve them in inextricable difficulties by 
undoing the work of two or three years Past?” Judge Campbell also mocked 
Caswell’s efforts to restore the loyalties of the Tennessee Valley separatists, 
informing the governor that “many who were formerly lukewarm are now 
flaming patriots for Franklin; those who were real Franklinites are now 
Burning with enthusiastic zeal.” The increasingly rabid Franklinites pub-
licly denounced their former government, accusing North Carolina of treat-
ing the Tennessee Valley like “a step Dame” and abandoning them as a 
“sacrifice . . . to the Indian Savages.”17 Campbell warned the North Caro-
lina government that “The Sword of Justice and vengeance will I believe, be 
shortly drawn against those of this country who attempt to overturn and 
violate the Laws and Government of Franklin, and God only knows what 
will be the event.”18
In an April 6, 1787, exchange with Governor Caswell, John Sevier also 
conveyed his belief in the Franklinites’ indomitability. Sevier expressed his 
disillusionment over the North Carolina Assembly’s continued refusal to 
agree “to the separation on Honourable Principles & Stipulations.” He la-
mented recently missed opportunities to reunite “us upon such terms as 
might have been lasting & friendly,” and confidently informed Caswell that 
“We shall continue to Act as Independent and would rather Suffer death in 
all its Various and frightful shapes than Conform to any thing that is dis-
graceful.”19 Caswell’s response to Sevier’s letter reiterated his support for 
Franklin’s political sovereignty, stating, “You may rely upon it that my sen-
timents are clearly in favor of a separation.” Caswell’s correspondence 
warned against “the violences of the passions of some men among you,” and 
repeated his call for “unanimity among the Tennessee Valley residents.” 
The forewarnings offered to Governor Caswell by two of the most influen-
tial Franklinites reflected the heightening animus developing between the 
Tennessee Valley factions.20
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During the spring of 1787, the leading opponents of the state of Frank-
lin intensified their efforts to topple the Sevier government. On April 27, 
General Evan Shelby met with several Anti-Franklin leaders, including 
Thomas Hutchings, George Maxwell, and John Tipton, at his home in 
Sullivan County. The Tiptonites convinced General Shelby to appeal to the 
government of North Carolina for a surge in their support for the Franklin 
opposition. Responding to the Tiptonite request, General Shelby penned a 
letter to the North Carolina Assembly requesting “immediate assistance” in 
their escalating struggle with the Franklin government. Shelby described 
the political climate in the Tennessee Valley as “truly alarming,” and warned 
that “it is beyond a doubt with me that Hostilities will in a short time 
Commence” between the two partisan factions. He warned that North 
Carolina must abandon its “lenient and Conciliatory Measures” toward the 
Franklinites in order to avoid “an effusion of Blood.” Shelby appealed for 
North Carolina to dispatch “one thousand troops” to confront the Franklin 
militia and predicted that a large show of force “might have a good effect” 
and induce the separatist government to “immediately give Way.” He 
warned that the “consequences” of failing to oppose the Franklinites or to 
offer only “a faint and feeble resistance” “might be very fatal and would 
tend to devastation, ruin, and distress.”21 In addition to what was ostensibly 
a plea for military intervention by the North Carolina militia, Evan Shelby 
included a request for “a quantity of Ammunition” and an alliance with the 
state of Virginia to crush the Franklin movement. In response to the cre-
ation of a Franklinite army to “Oppose the Operation of the Laws of North 
Carolina” just weeks earlier, the Tiptonites hoped to raise their own militia 
force to “put an end to the present unhappy Disturbance.”22 Throughout 
the spring of 1787, the Tennessee Valley communities increasingly resem-
bled armed camps, as both sides prepared for the predicted outbreak of 
civil war.23
In May 1787, the Franklinites held a constitutional convention in 
Greeneville to formally ratify the Franklin Constitution drafted in Novem-
ber 1785. The delegates voted to accept the Franklin Constitution, and the 
once controversial document became the frame of government for the em-
battled state. William Cocke used the constitutional convention as a plat-
form upon which to convince the Franklinites to organize another round of 
state elections parallel to the North Carolina Assembly. Governor Caswell 
and the North Carolina Assembly’s willingness to consider an independent 
state at a later date convinced Cocke “that some individuals of the said As-
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sembly now warmly express themselves in favor of separation.” Cocke be-
lieved that if the Franklinites elected new representatives to the North 
Carolina Assembly, it “would enable us [Franklinites] to send members to 
negotiate a separation, and thus we could easily obtain our wish without 
trouble or hazard.” Even Governor Caswell assumed that the North Carolina 
Assembly might be willing to concede Franklin’s independence at the No-
vember 1787 legislative session.24
Cocke’s seemingly benign electoral motion set off a furious debate 
among the Franklin leaders. A vocal group of militant Franklinites, largely 
drawn from the newly formed southern Franklin counties of Caswell, Se-
vier, and Blount, openly opposed Cocke’s motion to hold North Carolina 
elections. Opponents of the elections offered varying arguments against 
Cocke’s political assertions. Colonel Samuel Wear (Weir) claimed that the 
uncertainty of the plan “required the greatest deliberation and more time 
for consideration,” so “he would therefore vote against” opening the polls. 
Although one of the newest Franklinites, Colonel George Elholm force-
fully asserted his disdain for the parallel elections. In a stinging soliloquy, 
Elholm denounced the proposed elections, stating that “to take seats merely 
as pretended friends of North Carolina, was inconsistent with the character 
of a people whose bravery in the field [of battle during the American Revo-
lution] had changed the gloomiest aspects to that of the most pleasing.” 
Elholm implored the delegates to “not sit like old women in council when 
their rights and privileges were in question.” The former Georgian also re-
minded those supporting the elections that North Carolina refused to rec-
ognize the 1786 representatives elected by the Franklinites and that the 
parent state’s assembly might choose to do so again. General Daniel Ken-
nedy introduced another compelling argument against holding the contro-
versial elections. Kennedy contended that by holding the elections, the 
Franklinites de facto denied the political sovereignty of their own state. 
George Elholm concurred, stating that “if we suffered any of our friends to 
represent us in the Assembly of North Carolina, by choice of our citizens 
under any pretence whatever, we had in fact made void the cession act 
[1784] on our part, and of course reverted insensibly [back] to [the] North 
Carolina government.”25
Although Governor Sevier failed to directly address the issue of holding 
a new round of elections, he did offer a rare public oratory defending 
Franklin’s independence. Sevier denounced the repeal of the Cession Act of 
1784 by North Carolina and declared “the independency of Franklin” to 
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exist “in full force undeniably.” The Franklin governor reminded the dele-
gates of their March passage of a bill directing the Franklin Assembly to 
“make use of hostility” if necessary to “prevent elections within the limits 
of the State of Franklin [being held] under the authority of North Carolina.” 
Sevier warned that holding the elections “would bring the friends of inde-
pendency under the rigors of that act.” Colonel George Doherty, Major 
Samuel Newell, and Colonel Samuel Barton added their voices to the grow-
ing chorus of opposition to the Cocke measure. Despite the efforts of Colo-
nel William Cage, Colonel Thomas Amis, and others, General Cocke 
regretfully withdrew his motion to hold elections to the North Carolina 
Assembly in the state of Franklin for a second time. In its place, the Frank-
lin delegates agreed to appoint another delegation to attend the upcoming 
November session of the North Carolina Assembly in order “to negotiate 
peace with the State of North Carolina consistent with the honor of, and 
with justice to, those two States as independent of each other.” The heated 
debate surrounding the 1787 elections confirmed the effectiveness of North 
Carolina’s divisive political tactics, and the growing rupture continued to 
widen within the Franklinite ranks.26
Shortly after the conclusion of the May constitutional convention, an 
“open letter” from Governor Caswell circulated through the Franklin com-
munities exhorting the inhabitants to consider “the dreadful consequences 
which must ensue in case of the shedding of blood among yourselves.” 
Caswell’s letter implored the Franklinites to desist in opposing “the due 
operation and execution of the laws of the State [of North Carolina], men-
acing and threatening [North Carolina loyalists] . . . with violence,” and 
committing “outrages . . . on the good citizens of the said counties.” Cas-
well’s petition “entreat[ed]” the Tennessee Valley partisans to “lay aside 
your party disputes” because they are a “very great disadvantage to your 
public as well as private concerns.” Caswell’s plea to end the caustic political 
factionalism, in order to prevent “private interests from suffering,” appealed 
directly to the financial motivations of both Tennessee Valley rival groups. 
In Caswell’s last public address as governor, the “friendly and pacific” 
leader made one final effort to avoid “the dreadful calamities and conse-
quences of civil war.” His efforts again proved fruitless, as the two cabals 
continued to move closer toward an explosive showdown.27
At the end of June, John Sevier and North Carolina’s political leader-
ship tried for a second time to fashion an accord to deflect the outbreak of 
civil war in the Tennessee Valley. In a July 6, 1787, letter to General Daniel 
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Kennedy, Sevier recounted his second meeting with the North Carolina 
delegation. During the Franklin governor’s June 27 meeting with represen-
tatives of the “Old State party,” Sevier “found them much more compliable 
than I could have expected.” The attendees agreed to convene for a third 
time in Jonesboro on the last day of July, and Sevier remained optimistic 
about the future meeting, writing, “I flatter myself something for the good 
of the public may be effected.”28 Although it is unclear whether the meeting 
planned for July 31 actually took place, the June 27 conference served as 
one of the final efforts by the leadership of both states to craft an agree-
ment. By the end of summer, the opening bands of the forecasted partisan 
tempest swept across the Tennessee Valley communities.29
During the months leading up to the ensanguined fall of the Franklin 
government, the fragile coalition of Tennessee Valley Franklinites began to 
disintegrate. Despite the failure to prevent the outbreak of frontier violence, 
North Carolina’s divisive political tactics did manage to fracture the Ten-
nessee separatist movement and to lure key regional figures back into the 
folds of the North Carolina government. This coercive process dated back 
to 1785, when several Tennessee Valley political leaders once open to the 
idea of forming a new state out of North Carolina’s 1784 territorial cession, 
including John Tipton, James Stuart, and Richard White, reversed their 
political loyalties and emerged as outspoken opponents of the state of 
Franklin.30
Over the next two years, additional Franklinites reverted their politi-
cal allegiances back to their former state. The commissioning of Franklin 
loyalists to influential posts within the North Carolina state government 
proved to be one of the most effective reversionary tactics utilized by the 
Caswell administration. From the election of senators to the appointment 
of county sheriffs, prominent Franklinites continued to accept lucrative 
and prominent civil, judicial, and military commissions from the North 
Carolina government. In February 1787, Governor Caswell offered Frank-
lin’s chief judge, David Campbell, an appointment as “Judge of the Wash-
ington district.”31 The ultimate insult to the Franklin government came in 
the fall of 1787, when, at the behest of Evan Shelby, North Carolina of-
fered John Sevier a commission as brigadier general of the Washington 
District. The allure of a guaranteed state salary and regional prestige un-
doubtedly influenced some Franklinite decisions, and the continued aban-
donment of the fated Franklin government aggravated the festering 
regional hostilities.32
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The “failure of the [diplomatic] conferences” between Sevier and the 
North Carolina commissioners and the “discord and strife” accompanying 
the August North Carolina Assembly elections forced the Franklinites to 
“hurriedly [fall] back on [William] Cocke’s [election] strategy which had 
been discussed and discarded in May.”33 For a second time, Franklin candi-
dates competed with North Carolina candidates in state elections, but the 
1787 elections witnessed both state’s candidates appearing on the same bal-
lot. According to one Franklin historian, the Franklinites “put up their own 
candidates to oppose ‘old state’ men in their elections!” The 1786 legislative 
balloting occurred in a relatively peaceful and organized manner, but the 
results of the August 1787 elections nearly incited the valley residents to 
war. The 1787 polling results and the violence surrounding the elections 
illustrated the irreconcilable divisions within the Tennessee Valley. The 
southern Franklin counties of Blount, Sevier, and Caswell reaffirmed their 
allegiance to the Franklin government by overwhelmingly electing Frank-
linites to represent their interests at the upcoming North Carolina legisla-
tive session.34
The elections held in the northern Franklin counties of Washington, 
Sullivan, Greene, and Hawkins proved far more contentious. Although no 
hard polling numbers survive, the political factionalism in these hotly con-
tested counties unquestionably led to the election of two sets of representa-
tives. The threat of polling station violence in Hawkins County (called 
Spencer County by the Franklinites) led North Carolina county sheriff 
John Hunt to declare that only Tennessee Valley inhabitants making tax 
contributions to North Carolina could cast their votes.35 This decision drew 
the ire of William Cocke and a group of Greene County Franklinites. Ac-
cording to the only available account of what transpired that summer day, 
“when about three votes were taken, Col. [William] Cocke appeared with 
a number of men, some of whom were from Greene County.” Sheriff Hunt 
“had [received] undoubted information that these men had come part of 
the way armed, in consequence of which he [John Hunt] was apprehensive 
a riot would ensue.”36 One determined Hawkins County voter declared 
“that if the people were all ot [sic] his mind he would have his vote or a blow 
and he did not care which he gave first.”37 The threat of violence forced 
Sheriff Hunt to shut down the polling station, and a few days later the 
Franklinites declared their own candidate, Stockley Donelson, the victor.38 
Despite the Franklinites’ triumphant declaration, three Hawkins County 
“inspectors of the polls” “jointly granted to Mr. [Thomas] Amis [the North 
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Carolina candidate] a Certificate specifying that he was duly elected on 
said third Friday & Saturday in August.” The confusion surrounding the 
Hawkins County elections forced the North Carolina Assembly to an-
nounce “that neither of the parties is entitled to a seat” at the state legislative 
session.39 As the North Carolina government contemplated the bewildering 
election results, the acrimony surrounding the 1787 legislative elections 
further pushed the Tennessee Valley toward civil strife.40
The 1787 legislative elections proved to be the spark igniting the parti-
san fumes of civil discord. In July 1787, an altercation between two Wash-
ington County sheriffs nearly led to a pitched battle between the Tiptonites 
and Franklinites. Jonathan Pugh, the North Carolina sheriff, described the 
incident in a sworn deposition delivered to James Stuart on September 20, 
1787. Pugh recounted that “on [the] thirty-first day of July last he” arrested 
James Sevier in the town of Jonesboro for failure to pay taxes. Sheriff Pugh 
demanded that Sevier provide financial “security for his appearance at [the] 
next court” session, “which he refused to do.” James Sevier then informed 
Pugh that “he despised the deponent’s authority, and that he would not pay 
obedience to the laws of North Carolina.”41 The fracas escalated after An-
drew Caldwell, the Franklin sheriff of Washington County, confronted 
Pugh and “violently struck and abused the deponent.” Sheriff Caldwell’s 
threat to arrest Pugh forced the North Carolina loyalist to flee Jonesboro. 
Caldwell pursued Pugh and eventually “put him in prison and shut the 
door.”42
The commotion in Jonesboro quickly drew the attention of Governor 
Sevier, who confronted Pugh about having the audacity to serve a North 
Carolina writ in the state of Franklin to his son. Sevier declared that he 
“paid no obedience to the laws of North Carolina” and that he “despised 
her authority.” A few weeks later, John Tipton and a group of armed men 
traveled to Jonesboro to “redress” the “quarrel” between the two Washing-
ton County sheriffs.43 The Tiptonites succeeded in confiscating county re-
cords from the Jonesboro courthouse, but never found Sheriff Caldwell. 
The unexpected Tiptonite foray inexplicably “produced a rapid [but faulty] 
report” among the Franklin supporters “that they had made a prisoner of 
his Excellency” John Sevier. The erroneous report “caused two hundred 
men to repair immediately to the house of Col. Tipton, before they became 
sensible of the mistake.”44 Governor Sevier narrowly prevented the Tip-
tonites from becoming a “sacrifice to [the] Franks,” but the incident further 
fanned the flames of partisanship.45
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During the final months of 1787, the Franklin independence move-
ment suffered several devastating political blows. Concurrent with the 
conclusion of the September U.S. Constitutional Convention, meeting in 
Philadelphia, the Franklin government gathered for the last time to discuss 
the logistics of their military alliance with the state of Georgia against the 
Upper Creeks and to select another set of diplomats to attend the upcoming 
session of the North Carolina Assembly. To make matters worse, several 
prominent members of the Franklin government “had accepted office un-
der North Carolina” and others “had failed to meet their colleagues” at the 
most recent session of the “Legislature of Franklin.” According to one 
Franklin historian, the Franklin government “manifested a strong tendency 
to dismemberment.”46
Amid the political dissension plaguing the meeting, Governor Sevier 
managed to secure financing for the proposed joint expedition with Geor-
gia. The delegates appointed Landon Carter and David Campbell to serve 
as commissioners to lobby the November session of the North Carolina 
Assembly to reconsider Franklin’s independence. The remaining Franklin-
ite leadership predictably passed another act to open a land office to issue 
grants for territory previously secured from the Cherokee by the treaties of 
Dumplin Creek and Coyatee.47
As the Franklin government continued to crumble, the Franklinites 
received word that the delegates to the U.S. Constitutional Convention had 
finally completed their difficult task of crafting a new frame of government 
for the young American Republic. On Monday, September 17, the president 
of the convention, George Washington, transmitted a copy of the newly 
drafted U.S. Constitution to all thirteen state governments for “assent and 
ratification.” Washington attached a personal correspondence to the docu-
ments, describing the importance of the redrawn frame of government, the 
inevitability of resistance from some states, and the necessity of at least nine 
states quickly ratifying the constitution. Washington closed his letter to the 
state assemblies by assuring America’s political leadership that the new 
constitution will “promote the lasting welfare of that Country so dear to us 
all, and secure her freedom and happiness.”48 As copies of Washington’s 
letter and the new constitution spread among the Tennessee Valley com-
munities, the reeling Franklin supporters anticipated a decision on the ad-
mittance of new states into the federal union. In a constitution designed to 
defend America’s sovereignty, Article IV, section 3, effectively destroyed the 
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Franklin independence movement by codifying that “new States may be 
admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed 
or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed 
by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Con-
sent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”49 
As one Tennessee historian stated, “Any hope that had remained for Fed-
eral intervention was now gone.”50 After years of unsuccessfully lobbying 
the federal government to support their independence movement, the only 
prospect for the state of Franklin’s improbable survival now lay with the 
North Carolina Assembly.51
In November, the North Carolina Assembly convened for their fall ses-
sion. Rabid Anti-Franklinites overwhelmingly represented the Tennessee 
Valley inhabitants at the convention, including Robert Allison, George 
Maxwell, and James Stuart in the House of Commons, and John Tipton 
and Joseph Martin in the senate. Only David Campbell, whose political 
loyalty wavered, appeared on the membership rosters for the Franklinites.52 
During the lengthy sessions, the representatives made several critical deci-
sions regarding the Franklin counties, including passing an act to reconsider 
the ceding of her “Western lands” to the federal government, commissioning 
regional military officers, and reexamining a bill “declaring what crimes and 
practices shall be deemed Treason . . . for quieting the tumults and disorders 
in the Western parts of this State.”53
Late in the legislative session, the North Carolina Senate also consid-
ered a “Petition of the inhabitants of the Western Country,” circulated by 
Franklin supporters after the adjournment of the final Franklin Assembly.54 
In a desperate final plea for North Carolina to “graciously . . . consent to a 
Separation,” the commissioners carried with them a petition signed by 
roughly 450 Tennessee Valley residents. The frontier document reiterated 
many of the same arguments for separation, including the passage and sub-
sequent controversial repeal of the Cession Act of 1784, the guarantee of 
statehood contained in the North Carolina Constitution, the geographical 
“remoteness” of the region from the seat of state government, and the inad-
equate distribution of funds for the promotion of internal improvements 
and the defense of their communities against the regional Indian tribes.55 
The senate chose not to take any action regarding the petition or any sub-
sequent appeals by the Franklin attendees. As the North Carolina govern-
ment continued its conciliatory policy toward the Franklinites by again 
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extending pardons for “the offences and misconduct of certain persons in 
the Counties of Washington, Sullivan, Greene, and Hawkins,” the likeli-
hood of Franklin’s independence evaporated all together.56
By the end of 1787, the repeated failure of diplomatic appeals to both 
the federal and North Carolina governments, the fragmentation of Frank-
lin’s political leadership, and the collapse of regional support among the 
rank and file dismantled the statehood movement, but deep-seated partisan 
hatred persisted in the burned-out hull of America’s aborted fourteenth 
state. Franklinite descendent J. G. M. Ramsey described the scene. “Vestige 
after vestige of Franklin was obliterated; its judiciary gone; its legislature 
reduced to a skeleton; its council effete, defunct, powerless; its military dis-
organized, if not discordant, and its masses confused and distracted, with 
no concert, and unanimity among themselves.”57 In the northern Franklin 
counties of Hawkins and Sullivan, former Franklinites grudgingly accepted 
the defeat of the Franklin movement. Surry County resident Mark Arm-
strong informed newly elected North Carolina governor Samuel Johnston 
that “the unhappy division which has for some time past subsisted between 
the people of the Old State & New State of Franklin . . . [seemed] to be 
done away and [a] reconciliation [had] taken place.”58 In neighboring 
Washington and Sullivan counties, the resumption of peaceful relations 
failed to materialize, as partisan tensions continued to flare.59 John Sevier 
never wavered in his belief in the salvation of his government through its 
doomed alliance with the state of Georgia and support from powerful 
Americans. Governor Sevier optimistically informed General Daniel Ken-
nedy in January 1788 that “I find our friends very warm and steady—much 
more than heretofore.” Over the coming months, partisans in Washington 
County pushed the Tennessee Valley to the brink of civil war.60
It came as little surprise that a dispute involving state jurisdiction and 
private property initiated the outbreak of bloodshed between the Tennessee 
Valley partisans. The “fieri facias” commenced after Colonel John Tipton, 
serving as colonel and clerk of court for Washington County, ordered Sher-
iff Jonathan Pugh to execute a seizure of John Sevier’s property to satisfy 
unpaid taxes to the state of North Carolina.61 Revenge served as Tipton’s 
true motivation for ordering the raid on Sevier’s Washington County plan-
tation, and the collection of back taxes simply offered him the justification 
to order the search and seizure.62 Sheriff Pugh traveled to the Sevier farm at 
Plum Grove and confiscated several of Sevier’s slaves and livestock as pay-
ment for the delinquent tax contributions. In a fateful decision, John Tipton 
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ordered Pugh to deliver Sevier’s property to his home on Sinking Creek “for 
safe-keeping.”63
Governor Sevier received word of the loss of his slaves while drilling the 
militia forces of the southern Franklin counties, whose rabid support for 
Franklin remained unwavering, for a spring assault on Dragging Canoe’s 
Chickamauga Cherokee. Sevier ordered the Franklin troops to march to 
Tipton’s farm to reclaim their governor’s property and defend their state’s 
sovereignty. In a sworn deposition taken August 20, 1788, several Tiptonites 
recounted the events of that winter morning. “On the 27th of February last 
John Sevier Marched within sight of the house of the said John Tipton, 
Esqr. With a party of men to the amount of One Hundred or upwards with 
a drum beating colours flying In Military Parade and in a Hostile man-
ner.”64 By the early afternoon of February 27, Franklin governor John Se-
vier and a force of roughly 150 Franklin troops surrounded the Tipton home 
and made preparations to arrest John Tipton.65
As the Tipton family and approximately forty-five loyalists found them-
selves surrounded by Franklin troops, the ominous predictions of bloodshed 
appeared to be at hand. Within hours of the beginning of the siege, John 
Sevier dispatched Colonel Henry Conway with a flag of truce and a letter 
demanding immediate capitulation from the Tiptonites.66 General Sevier’s 
dispatch “requested” that John Tipton “and the party in his house surrender 
themselves to the discretion of the people of Franklin within thirty minutes 
from the arrival of the flag of truce.”67 The Tiptonites stubbornly refused to 
surrender, and Colonel Conway returned to the Franklinites’ military en-
campment with only a “verbal answer” to Sevier’s “daring insult.”68 Tipton 
retorted that “he begged no favours, and if Sevier would surrender himself 
and leaders, they should have the benefit of North Carolina Laws.” Over 
the next several hours, Conway tauntingly paraded his detachment of 
Franklin troops across John Tipton’s snow-covered fields before taking their 
positions “near to the [Tipton] spring and still house.”69 The Tiptonites 
managed to get word to their supporters of the ongoing encirclement, and 
a small detachment of Washington County troops, under the command of 
Captain Peter Parkinson, quickly rushed to the aid of the Tiptonites. As the 
sun dipped below Sinking Creek canyon, both factions prepared for the 
ensuing assault.70
The hostilities, which historians later dubbed the Battle of Franklin, 
“commenced” early that evening with “the firing on Captain Parkinson’s 
company.” As Parkinson’s small detachment of troops approached the Tip-
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ton farm, the “Governor’s whole body [of troops] opened fire.”71 The Frank-
linites managed to take five of Captain Parkinson’s troops prisoner, shoot 
three horses from under their riders, and force the Washington County 
rescuers to retreat. The exchange of fire caused panic among the Tiptonites, 
and under cover of darkness, two women fled the Tipton home attempting 
to escape with their lives. As the two women emerged from the besieged 
farmhouse, Henry Conway’s troops opened fire on the unsuspecting escap-
ees. One of the women, Rachel Devinsly, “received a ball through her 
shoulder,” but apparently lived to recount her tale. Despite withering gun-
fire from both sides, the first day of the Battle of Franklin ended without a 
single human fatality.72
As the sun rose on the second day of the standoff (February 28), two 
Tiptonites succeeded in eluding Franklinite sentries and securing addi-
tional Sullivan County reinforcements for the beleaguered old state loyal-
ists. Apprized of the Sullivan County troop mobilization by Franklin 
supporter William Cox, Governor Sevier attempted to block their passage 
by guarding every available route to the Tipton farm.73 As approximately 
forty Franklin militiamen, under the command of Captain Joseph Hardin 
and John Sevier Jr., “started for the [Dungan’s Mill] ford to dispute the 
passage of the Sullivan men,” the Franklinites sent another flag of truce to 
John Tipton and his supporters.74 Although Tipton described this offer as 
“more mild in nature,” he recounted in a deposition taken several months 
after the incident that he again refused to surrender and informed the 
Franklinites that “all I wanted was a submission to the laws of North Caro-
lina, and if they would acquiesce with this proposal I would disband my 
troops here and countermand the march of the troops from Sullivan.”75 
The Franklinite troops rejected Tipton’s ultimatum and his offer to recall 
the Sullivan County force being raised by George Maxwell and John Pem-
berton. Governor Sevier’s inexplicable absence from the Franklinites’ mili-
tary command post forced his soldiers to reply without their commander. 
The Franklin men informed John Tipton that Captain Parkinson’s troops 
“were easy about” defeated, and “as for the troops on their march to join 
[him], they could countermand their march themselves.”76 As reports of 
Sullivan County troop movements continued to filter into the Franklinites, 
both factions drew closer to the precipice of war.77
While a thick blanket of snow fell across the Tennessee Valley, the 
Sullivan County troops continued “to move undiscovered and unmolested” 
toward the Tipton farm. “On the morning of the 29th, before daylight, 
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[John Tipton] received information that Colonel Maxwell, with the ap-
proximately [180] troops from Sullivan County, and a number from 
[Washington] county, had collected in a body at Mr. Dungan’s, about six 
miles from” the Tipton homestead.78 From the opposite direction (from the 
east side of the Tipton house), Governor Sevier’s two sons, John and James, 
led a second reconnaissance expedition comprising thirty men toward 
Dungan’s Mill Ford to intercept the Sullivan County troops. After travel-
ing only three hundred yards, the Franklin men came under fire from the 
Sullivan County militiamen. As minié balls “rattled the fences” surround-
ing the Tipton farm, the Sevier brothers, “at full gallop,” led their scouting 
party in a desperate retreat.79 As the small unit of Franklin scouts fled 
blindly through the driving snowstorm, they undoubtedly heard the open-
ing volleys fired by their troops against the Tipton home ring out across the 
Tennessee Valley. The Battle of Franklin was finally at hand.80
The sudden reverberations from the Sullivan County troops’ guns 
caught the Franklinites by surprise. Despite the continued warnings of ad-
vancing Tiptonite troops, “Sevier thought himself very secure, and was very 
sure he should take Tipton and his men.” Governor Sevier’s overconfidence 
proved his undoing. A witness to the events of February 29 described what 
transpired: “a great body of Sullivan men attacked him [Sevier] with heavy 
firing, and rushed among them, took a number of prisoners, arms, saddles, 
and dispersed the whole of the Franklinites.” As the Sullivan County forces 
engaged the Franklinites, John Tipton and the remainder of the barricaded 
Tiptonites “sailed out [of the farmhouse] and drove them [Franklinites] 
from their ground without much resistance.”81 The two-pronged attack 
overwhelmed the Franklinites, and “forced the Governor to retreat without 
his boots.”82 As the partisans continued to exchange volleys, both sides suf-
fered casualties. Franklinite John Smith sustained a fatal shot to the thigh, 
and Henry Polley and Gasper Fant each received a devastating wound, to a 
leg and arm, respectively. As Sevier’s forces hastily retreated from the battle-
field, the Franklinites’ delaying fire led to the deaths of Washington 
County sheriff Jonathan Pugh and John Webb of Sullivan County, as well 
as the wounding of Captain William Delancy and John Allison.83 As Sevier’s 
troops suffered “total defeat” at the hands of the old state men, their gover-
nor deserted them and absconded himself “15 miles from [Tipton’s] home,” 
beaten and “barefooted.”84
As John Sevier and his Franklinite forces retreated from Sinking Creek, 
the scouting party led by John and James Sevier finally penetrated the cur-
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tain of snow to belatedly enter the fight. In their confusion, the Franklinites 
apparently fired upon their own troops, but fortunately missed their in-
tended targets. Following the friendly fire incident, the scouting party 
continued toward the firefight. As the Franklinite forces rode “up to the 
camp [with] Col. Sevier’s flag still flying, they did not suspect the sudden 
& complete change in affairs that had taken place during their brief ab-
sence.” As they approached the Tipton home, “A volley of guns arrested 
them and some few, amazed & wondering were pulled from their horses & 
called in to surrender, among them, James & John Sevier [Jr.] & their 
cousin John Sevier.”85 In a stunning reversal of fortune, the Tiptonites 
routed the Franklinites and captured the sons and nephew of Franklin 
governor John Sevier. As word of the crushing defeat of his forces and the 
apprehension of his family members reached the Franklin governor, John 
Sevier reluctantly sent a verbal communiqué to John Tipton “asking [for] 
his life [and that] of his parties,” and agreeing to “Submit to the Laws of the 
State” of North Carolina. The Tiptonites accepted the Franklinites’ terms 
of surrender and “Colonel [George] Maxwell sent him [Sevier] a flag giving 
him and his party to the 11th [of March] to submit to the laws of North 
Carolina.”86 In the meantime, John Tipton “determined to hang both” of 
Sevier’s sons, but “Apprised of the rash step which he intended to take, the 
young [Sevier] men sent for Mr. Thomas Love and others of Tipton’s party” 
to intervene on their behalf. After Love and others “urged their arguments 
so effectively,” John Tipton agreed to “restore [the Sevier brothers] to their 
liberty.”87 The release of the Sevier brothers and the capitulation of Gover-
nor Sevier ended the Battle of Franklin, but the legal and political fallout 
from the three bloody days of fighting remained.88
The Franklinites’ humiliating defeat on the snow-cloaked fields of the 
Tipton farm destroyed lingering support for their statehood movement in 
Washington and Sullivan counties, but the southern Franklin counties 
continued to defend Sevier and the importance of statehood. The dimin-
ishing support in the upper Tennessee Valley counties became painfully 
apparent to the Franklinites during a failed bid to retaliate against John 
Tipton in early March. Thomas Hutchings described the events in a letter 
to Brigadier General Joseph Martin. “Captain [William] Cocke issued his 
general orders to Thomas Henderson to raise a militia of their party to 
march against Colonel Tipton. They had so little success that I presume 
they are much dispirited. Every one of their captains, I believe, refused. 
They cannot make a party of any consequence.”89 On March 1, 1788, John 
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Sevier’s term as governor of the state of Franklin expired, but he continued 
to attract the loyalty and admiration of the majority of the Tennessee Valley’s 
southernmost inhabitants.90 In early March, Sevier finally sent his response 
to John Tipton and George Maxwell’s “flag of truce dated 29th February 
1788.” Sevier maintained that he “did not fully comprehend” the terms of 
surrender, and assured his opponents that the Franklin “council, equally 
now as heretofore, to be amendable to the laws of the Union for our con-
duct.” He also expressed his desire that the Tiptonites “will be answerable 
to the same laws for your proceedings, and actuated by principles of hu-
manity and discretion of the people, and honor of both parties.” Sevier’s 
letter surprisingly did not reveal any hint of defeat, and the former Franklin 
leader even included a defiant request for the “return of property that fell 
into [Tiptonite] hands.”91 A day after the March 11 deadline for Sevier and 
his fellow Franklinites to submit to the laws of North Carolina, John Tip-
ton and George Maxwell informed Arthur Campbell that the Franklinites 
“never Came in to Comply with the Terms” and “that he [Sevier] is trying 
to Raise another party.” The Tiptonites requested “a few volunteers to quell 
the Insurrection” and “save [the region] from future bloodshed.”92 In an-
other exchange with General Martin, Tipton reiterated his concern over the 
likelihood of future “private injuries if not murders,” but also insisted that 
the “violators of the [North Carolina] law should be brought to justice, es-
pecially those who have so flagrantly transgressed.”93 The political and ju-
dicial uncertainties surrounding the Franklinites forced John Sevier to hide 
among his southern supporters.94
Before any of the leaders of the separatist movement could be “brought 
to justice,” John Sevier fell back upon his highly effective diversionary tactic 
of launching Indian warfare to deflect any civil or criminal retribution and 
to bolster his regional support. Joseph Martin clearly understood Sevier’s 
potent blending of racial identity and patriotism to resuscitate the Franklin 
movement. In a March 24 exchange with North Carolina governor Samuel 
Johnston, Martin warned that “Sevier had gone towards the French Broad 
River since the 10th instant; that Colonel Canaday [sic], with several 
others, had gone the same way to carry on an expedition against the Chero-
kee Indians, which I am well assured wishes to be at peace.” Martin ex-
pressed his disbelief that “Sevier and his party are embodying under the 
color of an Indian expedition to amuse us,” believing instead that the 
Franklinites’ “object is to make another attack on the citizens of this State 
[Tiptonites].”95 Governor Johnston suspected the Franklinites of “wantonly 
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involving themselves in an Indian War without any real necessity,” and 
charged Joseph Martin with the daunting task of “cultivating a good un-
derstanding with the [Cherokee] Indians & preventing by all means any 
Hostilities or Insults committed on them by Citizens of this State.”96 As 
John Tipton and Samuel Johnston prepared to indict John Sevier for trea-
son, the former Franklin governor launched his spring campaign against 
the Chickamauga Cherokee.97
The months surrounding his defeat at the Battle of Franklin proved 
disastrous for “Nolachucky Jack” and the Franklin statehood movement. 
The recent resignation of Franklin sympathizer and Sevier compatriot 
Richard Caswell from the governorship and his replacement by the unsym-
pathetic Samuel Johnston threatened any hope for an amicable reunifica-
tion of the two states. Despite Sevier’s overtures of peace, Governor Johnston 
refused to negotiate with the Franklinites and openly called for the prosecu-
tion of the state of Franklin’s political leadership. In an April exchange with 
Beaufort County, North Carolina, congressman John Gray Blount, Gover-
nor Johnston described his frustration over what he saw as the continued 
failure of North Carolina’s conciliatory policies toward the Franklinites. He 
described the “dangerous Riots in which some blood has been spilt and two 
men killed by Rioters under the Command of Sevier.” Johnston also ex-
pressed his “hope the [North Carolina] Assembly at their next meeting [in 
November] will either use means effectually to enforce the Execution of the 
laws in the Country or leave them to Govern themselves.” He warned that 
a continuance of North Carolina’s current strategy “may in time be at-
tended with very bad influence on the Conduct of the Citizens in other 
parts of the State.”98 Johnston branded the Franklinites “outlaws and va-
grants,” and promised to “exert the whole power of [the North Carolina] 
Government to bring to Condign punishment all such [persons] as shall 
presume to violate the laws and disturb the peace of the State.”
John Sevier continued to defend his actions during the Franklin move-
ment, blaming North Carolina for causing “all of these disturbances,” and 
reiterating that he was involuntarily “drafted into the Franklin measures by 
the people of this country.”99 In addition to the installation of a dogged 
Franklin opponent in the North Carolina governor’s seat, John Sevier also 
became embroiled in the controversy surrounding John Kirk’s retaliatory 
execution of the peaceful Cherokee delegation led by Old Abraham and 
Old Tassel. Governor Johnston and many of North Carolina’s political 
leaders blamed John Sevier for the slaughter of the two peace chiefs and 
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their families by bloodthirsty Franklinite soldiers.100 In a July 1788 address 
to the Cherokee Nation, Johnston expressed regret for the murders and 
promised the tribe that “if any of them [Franklinites] have injured you 
without sufficient cause to take them up and send them to us that they may 
receive Correction & punishment.” The secretary of the U.S. Congress, 
Charles Thomson, expressed Congress’s support for punishing the “perpe-
trators” of the murders. He informed Johnston that if the charges against 
“John Sevier & others” are “found true,” then the state of North Carolina 
should “take measures to have the perpetrators thereof apprehended & 
punished.” As the Chickamauga campaign raged in the Tennessee back-
country and southern Franklinites refused to bow to the authority of the 
North Carolina government, Governor Johnston finally issued his long-
awaited warrant for the arrest of John Sevier for treason.101
In July 1788, North Carolina governor Samuel Johnston wrote to the 
former chief judge of the state of Franklin, David Campbell, regarding 
John Sevier’s prosecution. Johnston believed that “John Sevier, who styles 
himself Captain General of the State of Franklin, has been guilty of High 
Treason in levying troops to oppose the Laws and Government of this State, 
and has with an armed force put to death several good Citizens.” Governor 
Johnston gave his consent for Judge Campbell to “issue a warrant to ap-
prehend the said John Sevier, and in case he cannot be sufficiently secured 
for Tryal [sic] in the District of Washington, order him to be committed to 
the Public Gaol [sic] for the District of Hillsborough.” Johnston also or-
dered “the Commanding Officer of Washington District [Joseph Martin] to 
furnish sufficient Guard to assist the Sheriff in the Execution of his duty” 
and if necessary, to carry out the arrest and prosecution “in secrecy and 
dispatch in order that it may succeed in such manner as to restore peace & 
tranquility to that part of the State.”102 After months of pressure applied by 
John Tipton and Sevier’s determined political enemies, the leader of the state 
of Franklin finally faced the stark reality of being executed for treason.103
Despite Governor Johnston’s issuance of an arrest warrant and his 
guarantee of a militia force sufficient to capture the wildly popular former 
Franklin governor, Judge Campbell refused to carry out the apprehension 
of John Sevier. Although Campbell remained silent regarding his reasons 
for letting Sevier remain free, several Franklin historians assert that Camp-
bell’s friendship with the fugitive prevented him from executing the ar-
rest.104 Campbell’s decision and Sevier’s prolonged absence from the region 
delayed the inevitable legal showdown between John Tipton, Samuel John-
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ston, and John Sevier. Sevier remained in the Tennessee backcountry 
throughout much of the spring and summer of 1788, before eventually re-
turning to his home in early October. According to several sources, Sevier 
“openly” visited public places in Jonesboro, and defiantly continued to 
conduct business with the region’s economic elite. Astoundingly, Sevier, 
who undoubtedly knew of the warrant for his arrest, initiated clashes with 
his political and economic opponents.105 The day before his arrest, the for-
mer Franklin governor instigated an altercation outside of a Jonesboro store. 
According to court depositions taken by Justice of the Peace William Cox 
at the end of October 1788, David Deaderick testified that he and former 
Washington County sheriff Andrew Caldwell “were peacefully sitting in 
his shed adjoining his store house . . . when [his] boy informed him that 
[John] Sevier was at his door.” Upon opening the door, Deaderick “was 
surprised to see a number of men [ten or twelve] on horseback . . . [with] 
John Sevier, Senr., at their head.” Sevier commanded that Deaderick stop 
“whistling” and demanded “Whiskey or Rum.” Deaderick replied, “as to 
whistling, he hoped he might do as he pleased, but whiskey or Rum he had 
none.” Sevier then became belligerent and stated that he “was informed 
[that] he had [liquor] & they wanted it & would pay money for it.” Upon 
being told that “he was informed wrong,” Sevier asked Deaderick if “[An-
drew] Caldwell was with him.” Caldwell “came to the door & Sevier asked 
him nearly the same respecting Liquor, who also informed him he had 
none.” Sevier then flew into a rage and “began to abuse this place, then its 
inhabitants without distinction.” Deaderick and Caldwell confronted Se-
vier, asking him “if he aimed that discourse or abuse at” them. Sevier an-
swered, “Yes, at you or anybody else,” and then called Deaderick “a son of 
a Bitch.” Deaderick replied, “[that Sevier] was a dead son of a Bitch, and 
stepped close to Sevier, who immediately drew out his pistol, or pistols.”106
As Sevier and Deaderick prepared to square off, Andrew Caldwell 
stepped between the two men to prevent the escalation of the altercation. 
Caldwell’s efforts at diplomacy proved futile, as Deaderick, armed with his 
own pistol, charged into the street after Sevier. As the dispute intensified, 
“Caldwell and Sevier began to quarrel; in the Course of which the former 
desired Sevier to pay what he owed him. He replied he owed him nothing. 
Caldwell said he was damned eternal liar. Sevier swore by God he would 
shoot him & rais’d [sic] his pistol. It went off, and wounded a certain Rich-
ard Collier.”107 After accidentally wounding an innocent bystander, John 
Sevier and his party quickly fled the scene of the crime. Sevier’s betrayal of 
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former Franklin sheriff Andrew Caldwell and involvement in the Jonesboro 
shooting provided his opponents with a fortuitous opportunity to exact 
their revenge.108
After the altercation in Jonesboro, John Sevier attempted to avoid cap-
ture by hiding at the home of Jacob Brown’s widow. Caldwell immediately 
informed John Tipton of Sevier’s involvement in the shooting. At approxi-
mately “2 o’clock, after midnight [on October 10], Colo. Tipton, Adw. 
Caldwell & several others [eight to ten men] came to the deponents store 
[Deaderick] when he joined them and persued [sic] Sevier whom they over-
took & Apprehended about day light [the] next morning.”109 After appre-
hending his hated rival, John Tipton madly waved his pistol in the prisoner’s 
face and threatened to hang him before he could stand trial. The Sevier 
family’s friendship with influential Washington County resident Colonel 
Robert Love saved John Sevier from execution, but the former Franklinite’s 
connections to powerful North Carolinians could not prevent his transfer 
to the Morganton jail. Despite his appeal to be incarcerated in Jonesboro in 
order to stay near his family and friends, John Tipton insisted that Sevier be 
held at the Burke County jail in order to avoid potential rescue attempts by 
Franklin loyalists. As Sevier began his long march of shame over the south-
ern mountains, John Tipton triumphantly paraded the Franklin leader in 
shackles in front of the home of the widow of Jonathan Pugh. After several 
days of difficult winter travel, Sevier’s armed escort delivered the former 
Franklin governor to the Morganton jail to await trial.110
The arrival of one of North Carolina’s most celebrated and infamous 
sons drew the immediate attention of Sevier’s Burke County supporters. 
Fortunately for the former Franklin governor, the sheriff of Burke County, 
William Morrison, served with Sevier at the Battle of King’s Mountain, and 
upon his compatriot’s arrival at the jail “he knocked the irons from his 
hands & told him to go where he pleased.”111 As Sevier awaited arraignment 
in Morganton, Charles and Joseph McDowell, two brothers who also fought 
alongside Sevier during the American Revolution, posted his bail.112 Short-
ly after being freed, Sevier rendezvoused with a small group of friends and 
family who traveled to Burke County to secure his release. The group of 
rescuers found Sevier in a local tavern enjoying a drink with Major Joseph 
McDowell. Sevier’s would-be liberators “told him frankly [that] they had 
come for him & he must go.”113 Sevier confidently remained in Morganton 
several more hours before preparing to depart. Contrary to several fanciful 
accounts describing his gallant escape from the custody of his Morganton 
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jailers, “Sevier [simply] ordered his horse & [they] all started off [toward 
Washington County] before noon, in the most public & open manner.”114
The ease by which John Sevier “escaped” from Burke County demon-
strated his steadfast support among the inhabitants of western and central 
North Carolina, but the former Franklin separatist still faced ferocious op-
position within the North Carolina government. A few days after returning 
to his Tennessee Valley home, Sevier began the daunting process of restor-
ing his political influence within his former government and defending his 
actions during the Franklin affair. On October 30, 1788, Sevier sent an 
address to the North Carolina General Assembly describing his reasons for 
jumping bail in Burke County and, more importantly, justifying his deci-
sions as the governor of the state of Franklin. As to his flight from justice, 
Sevier argued that he could not receive a fair trial “borne off, out of District, 
at a distance from his friends & neighbors who can only be the best Judges 
of his innocence or Guilt.” He informed the delegates that his arrest, extra-
dition, and incarceration “not only deprive[d] a man of His liberty, but 
treated him with wanton cruelty and savage insults before Trial, or any evi-
dence of the breach of the Laws adduced.” As to his scheduled trial, Sevier 
asked the legislators, “Is it not obvious to you, that the rigid prosecutions 
now carried on is more to gratify the ambition and malice of an obscure 
and worthless individual [referring to John Tipton], than to appease the 
Justice of the State?”115
Sevier defended his participation in the Franklin independence move-
ment, and reminded the North Carolina Assembly that he and his fellow 
Franklinites “were all [recently] employed and deeply engaged” in throwing 
“off the British yoke of slavery and tyranny . . . at the expense of their blood 
and loss of their dearest relations.” Sevier deflected personal responsibility 
for the chaos and tragedy surrounding the Franklin movement by reiterat-
ing his initial reluctance to join the statehood effort, and insisting that “the 
people [of the Tennessee Valley] wish[ed] for separation.” Despite his recent 
prosecution by the state of North Carolina and public rebuke by Governor 
Samuel Johnston, Sevier contended that he always maintained his loyalty to 
his former government and wished only that North Carolina “flourish and 
become great.” As the North Carolina Assembly opened their November 
session, John Sevier nervously awaited his legal and political fate.116
As the November meeting got under way, delegates again debated par-
doning former Franklinites for “the offenses and misconduct” carried out 
during the separatist movement. As the act of pardon easily passed in the 
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senate and the House of Commons, a group of John Sevier’s political rivals 
introduced a “Bill to repeal part” of the act of clemency in order to exclude 
him from the general pardon. The delegates formed a special committee to 
consider the proposal, and on November 30, “on examining sundry papers 
and hearing oral Testimony,” the committee offered their final decision.117 
The committee’s chairmen, John Rhea, declared that, “John Sevier, Es-
quire, together with sundry other persons in the said Counties [of Wash-
ington, Sullivan, Greene, and Hawkins], did in the years 1785, 1786 and 
1787, . . . subvert the peace & good order of Government of the State of 
North Carolina.” Despite the fact the committee found that Sevier’s “con-
duct was in many particulars highly reprehensible,” they believed that he 
“ought to be placed in the same situation” as “all the citizens” who “have 
been pardoned and consigned to oblivion.”118 Despite the protests of John 
Tipton and several other Franklin opponents, the state of North Carolina 
pardoned John Sevier.119
John Sevier’s congressional exoneration ended his legal difficulties, and 
the vindicated former rebel quickly joined many of his fellow Franklinite 
leaders in reestablishing his political standing in the Tennessee Valley. After 
publicly swearing his loyalty to the laws of North Carolina in February 
1789, the residents of Greene County elected John Sevier to the North 
Carolina Senate. The North Carolina Senate appointed the former rebel 
leader to the state committee that eventually ratified the U.S. Constitution, 
as well as electing Sevier to be the brigadier general of the District of Wash-
ington.120 Miraculously, the former governor of the state of Franklin rose 
from the ashes of his still smoldering state and perched himself high atop 
North Carolina’s political mountaintop.
The violence surrounding the 1787 Tennessee Valley elections, the 
bloodshed that occurred on John Tipton’s Washington County farm, and 
the Jonesboro shooting became the tragic consequences of the intensifica-
tion of partisanship surrounding the state of Franklin. The deadly conclu-
sion of the Franklin statehood movement resulted from the prolonged 
fervent struggle between two rival factions of the region’s ruling class to 
determine the political and economic destiny of the trans-Appalachian 
frontier. North Carolina’s remarkably effective divide-and-conquer diplo-
matic strategy, combined with the repeated repudiation of the principles of 
backcountry separatism from both outside and inside the Tennessee Val-
ley, led to the loss of local support for statehood and ultimately the tumul-
tuous collapse of Franklin. As former Franklinites attempted to forget the 
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final bloody months of the state of Franklin, the sordid details of a trans-
Appalachian conspiracy remained obscured behind the lingering partisan-
ship and raging Indian warfare that continued to plague the Tennessee 
Valley communities.121
During the chaotic months separating John Sevier’s defeat at the Battle of 
Franklin and his arrest for treason by John Tipton, former North Carolina 
congressman Dr. James White secretly visited the former Franklin governor 
at his Washington County plantation at Plum Grove.1 During their clan-
destine meeting, Dr. White revealed a “shadowy scheme” that tantalizingly 
held out the possibilities of simultaneously resurrecting backcountry sepa-
ratism and reviving the elusive Muscle Shoals land deal.2 The events that 
unfolded between July 1788 and April 1789 involved the government of 
Spain, a small group of powerful land speculators, prominent Franklinites, 
and the communities of “Lesser Franklin.”3 To the leaders and remaining 
supporters of the Franklin statehood movement, the Spanish conspiracy 
stood as their last opportunity to preserve their political and economic he-
gemony, to pressure North Carolina and the U.S. government into acceding 
to Franklin’s admittance into the union, to eliminate the ongoing Native 
American threat, and to advance their collective fiscal and political inter-
ests. The sordid details of the “Spanish Intrigue” reveal a conspiracy that 
threatened to fracture the southwestern frontier in order to reconstruct the 
shattered remains of Franklin and advance the political and financial for-
tunes of a cabal of influential Tennessee Valley leading men.4
The genesis of the Spanish Intrigue in the Tennessee Valley originated 
with the 1783 speculative efforts of William Blount’s Muscle Shoals Com-
pany and the postrevolutionary alliance forged between the southeastern 
Indian tribes and the nation of Spain.5 The southern aboriginal tribes, the 
Spanish government, and America’s eastern political leadership desperately 
sought to halt America’s westward expansion at the southern Appalachian 
Mountains.6 As America’s frontier communities extended beyond the 
southern mountains, many of the once divided southeastern tribes united 
against the white squatters and their state governments. The vast majority 
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of the postrevolutionary Indian wars fought in the Appalachian backcoun-
try resulted from white encroachment on Indian lands.7
On the Tennessee frontier, two Native American resistance leaders, 
Dragging Canoe, leader of the Chickamauga Cherokee, and Alexander 
McGillivray, leader of the Upper Creeks, engaged in guerilla warfare in a 
futile effort to end the western advance of Anglo-America.8 Spain also 
hoped to halt the United States’ territorial growth to protect their dimin-
ished North American colonies in Florida and the Mississippi River Valley.9 
In a strategic plan to preserve their colonial possessions, the Spanish gov-
ernment provided material aid and logistical support to the Chickamauga 
Cherokee and the Upper Creeks. In 1784, Alexander McGillivray negoti-
ated the Treaty of Pensacola with Spanish emissaries in Florida. Through 
their surrogate, the Pensacola, Florida, trade firm Panton, Leslie, and Com-
pany, Spain agreed to secretly provide weapons and ammunition to the 
Creeks to finance their continued struggle against white expansion.10 Dur-
ing the state of Franklin’s infancy, the growing cost of prolonged Indian 
warfare, mounting casualties, and Spanish interference prevented the states 
of Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Franklin each from lay-
ing claim to the Muscle Shoals land. Despite these hurdles, the Franklin 
leadership refused to surrender their dream of securing and developing the 
increasingly profitable bend of the Tennessee River.11
In the summer of 1786, James White met privately with Spanish Min-
ister (Charge d’Affairs) Don Diego de Gardoqui at his home in New York 
City.12 Dr. White was born into a prominent Philadelphia Catholic family 
and received his education at Jesuit College in French Flanders. Upon earn-
ing his medical degree from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland, 
White returned to the American colonies, practiced medicine outside of 
Philadelphia, and eventually served as a “Doctor Physick” to the Continen-
tal Army during the American Revolution. In 1783, he purchased a sizeable 
tract of land in eastern North Carolina and moved to Chatham County 
(near the current city of Fayetteville). White was elected to serve as Chat-
ham County’s representative to the 1784 North Carolina House of Com-
mons and as one of North Carolina’s six representatives to the 1785–1787 
U.S. Congress. At the time of his meeting with Gardoqui, he also held the 
influential post of U.S. Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Southern 
District and owned substantial tracts of trans-Appalachian land in both 
Greene County in the state of Franklin and Davidson County in North 
Carolina’s rapidly expanding Cumberland District.13 White’s close personal 
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and business connections to numerous Tennessee Valley leaders and his 
familiarity with the challenges confronting potential backcountry land 
speculation led him to Gardoqui’s home at the Kennedy House at #1 
Broadway. During the August 26 meeting, White described the escalating 
tensions between Spain and the United States over the commercial use of 
the Mississippi River. White informed Gardoqui that he “realized that you 
are going to win what the United States never expected to cede to Spain, 
which is the Navigation of the Mississippi,” and that the “Southern States 
. . . will never agree” to the concession. White predicted that “as soon as 
they [southern political leaders] learn of the Cession, they will consider 
themselves abandoned by the Confederation and will act independently.”14 
The North Carolinian believed that “This situation offer[ed] Spain the 
most favorable opportunity to win them forever.” White asserted that if the 
Spanish government kept the Mississippi River open to the southern states 
and eased trade restrictions, then “His Catholic Majesty [Carlos III] will 
acquire their eternal goodwill and they, as an Independent State, will draw 
closer to His Majesty.” White told Gardoqui that he planned to return to 
his home along the Cumberland River (Middle Tennessee) to “sound out 
the minds of [regional] leaders,” and promised to report back by February 
of the following year. The stunned Gardoqui “replied with very polite words 
[but] without committing himself” to such a dangerous scheme.15
White’s eagerness to ink a deal between the political leadership of the 
southwestern frontier and the Spanish government drove him to expedite 
his political reconnaissance mission. White returned to Gardoqui’s New 
York home four months early and related to the Spanish official that “the 
fears of the [southern] States had increased greatly” over the Mississippi 
River deal.16 In reality, White’s characterization of southern sentiment ap-
plied primarily to the western frontier communities of Virginia and North 
Carolina, and he probably exaggerated the scope of his knowledge regard-
ing the regional reaction to the commercial controversy to convince Gardo-
qui to risk opening backcountry talks. During the October 4 meeting, 
White failed to name any specific frontier communities or willing partici-
pants, but he did assure Gardoqui that “the new [western] settlements are 
much inclined to separate from the United States upon the least apparent 
pretext and the matter of the surrender of the navigation of the Mississippi 
was so important that it would cause them to give themselves up, or at least 
ally with the English or the Spaniards.” White warned Gardoqui not to 
forgo the opportunity to unite the “two Nations,” “because a contrary ac-
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tion would cause the loss of a Bulwark the power and strength of which the 
world in general has no conception.” White’s arguments proved extremely 
persuasive, and he offered to visit Spain’s Mississippi Valley plantations fol-
lowing his return trip to his Nashville home. Gardoqui approvingly pro-
vided him with four letters requesting that White “be treated as one of my 
friends, and as a person of honor and esteem, and that he should be granted 
every assistance” by Spanish officials.17 After two months of lobbying, Dr. 
White had succeeded in securing the Spanish government’s consent to initi-
ate the backcountry coup.18
Amid the ongoing negotiations between Gardoqui and U.S. Secretary 
of State John Jay over the future navigation of the Mississippi River and the 
Franklinites’ struggle to secure independence, the secret channels of com-
munication remained open between Spain and the Tennessee Valley. How-
ever, over the next eighteen months, correspondence between Spain and the 
southwestern frontier slowed. Spain’s continued support of the aboriginal 
resistance movements strained relations with the East Tennessee separatists. 
Reports from the Tennessee frontier emerged accusing Spain of aiding and 
abetting the southeastern Indian tribes in their struggles against the white 
encroachers.19 In January 1788, James Robertson and Anthony Bledsoe, 
two Cumberland leaders, informed North Carolina governor Samuel John-
ston that “Indians have killed Seven of the Inhabitants [of Davidson and 
Sumner counties].” Robertson and Bledsoe accurately believed the “Invad-
ers to be the Creek Nation who are at this time Allies to the King of Spain.” 
They pleaded with Governor Johnston to intervene on their behalf in order 
to “prevent the further effusions of Blood.” The men suggested that John-
ston appeal to Gardoqui to prevent “their [the Creeks’] further Acts of 
Savage Barbarity,” and if the “Minister of Spain . . . [does] not think proper 
so to do,” then U.S. Superintendent of Indian Affairs James White would 
“be of Service.”20
Governor Johnston quickly responded to Robertson and Bledsoe’s re-
quest and agreed to present their concerns “before the Council of State at 
their first meeting.” Johnston also sent copies of their January 4 letter to the 
“Delegates in [the United States] Congress to make sure use of them as may 
be proper.” He assured the two men that “Congress will no doubt apply to 
the Resident from the Court of Spain [Gardoqui] for an Explanation of the 
Conduct of Col. McGilvery [sic].” On April 18, Gardoqui dispatched a 
formal denial of his nation’s involvement in the “Cruelty of the Savages” on 
the “Frontiers of North Carolina.” The Spanish minister protested, “Your 
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Excellency [King Carlos III] may give full assurances to the contrary that 
the Spanish Government entertain such sentiments of good will and Amity 
to the United States, that it would rather sedulously prevent than encourage 
any outrages upon their Citizens.”21 Shortly after receiving the King of 
Spain’s denial, Governor Johnston received a letter from Dr. James White 
reassuring him that the “the Catholic King is relaxing in its policy” toward 
territorial disputes on the southern frontier. In an amazing effort at decep-
tion, James White, a former U.S. congressman representing the state of 
North Carolina, effectively misled his governor regarding Spanish designs 
on the United States’ southeastern frontier. In addition to his own ongoing 
efforts to promote Spain’s acquisition of North Carolina’s transmontane 
territory, White was also aware of Spain’s support for McGillivray’s Creek 
insurgency.22
Despite contradictory reports emanating from the western frontier, on 
May 8, 1788, Governor Johnston accepted Gardoqui’s protest of innocence. 
He informed the Spanish minister that he “had confidently entertained 
that the Citizens of our Western Frontiers were not well informed when 
they attributed the Cruelties experienced by the savages to the interference 
or connivance of the subjects of his Catholic Majesty.” Amazingly, Johnston 
agreed “to inform the citizens on the Western Frontiers” of the King of 
Spain’s growing concern over the “abhorrent” attacks by the Spanish-aligned 
Creeks, and to “promote & conciliate sentiments of Good will and amity in 
the minds of the Citizens . . . towards their neighbors the Subjects of his 
Catholic Majesty.” Governor Johnston also sent a letter to James White 
expressing his willingness to publicly accept Spain’s denial and assuring 
him that “it has been my wish to Cede that Country [North Carolina’s 
western frontier] to Congress yet as that measure [1784 Cession Act] was 
afterwards done away I shall do everything in my power to save the Interest 
of that people.” Johnston and the political leadership of North Carolina 
remained dangerously unaware of the treachery being devised by Dr. James 
White.23
The first appearance of the state of Franklin in Spanish communica-
tions occurred on September 25, 1787, in a confidential communiqué be-
tween New Orleans governor Estevan Miro and Minister of the Indies Don 
Antonio Valdes. Miro included a map of the settlements “West of the Ap-
palachian Mountains” with his letter to Valdes. The map’s key listed “a 
Republic with the Name State of Franklin,” and also included brief ac-
counts of the state’s failed bid for admittance into the union and continuing 
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struggle to “preserve their independence.” The inclusion of Franklin in the 
Spanish survey of western settlements demonstrates the Spanish govern-
ment’s growing interest in the embattled state. A few weeks later, Gardoqui 
described the ongoing “revolt” in “the new County of Franklin” to the 
governor of Cuba, Don Josef (Joseph) de Ezpeleta. The Spanish ambassador 
believed that the Franklinites might be persuaded to join Spain if a com-
mercial route could be established connecting the Tennessee Valley to the 
Mississippi River. Although optimistic regarding a future alliance between 
Spain and Franklin, efforts to construct a viable trade route faced consider-
able geographical challenges from the “rugged mountains” and five hundred 
miles of “swampy lands” separating Franklin’s farmers from Spain’s Missis-
sippi Valley settlements.24
The first direct communication between Franklin and Spain appeared 
in the spring of 1788. The Franklinites’ repeated failure to win approval for 
their independence and waning regional support for the statehood move-
ment created the perfect political atmosphere for the efforts to lure the 
Tennessee Valley communities into Spain’s sphere of influence. Apprised of 
John Sevier’s debilitating defeat by opponents of the statehood movement at 
the Battle of Franklin in February, Spain and James White both hoped to 
capitalize on the dimming fortunes of the Franklinites. In April 1788, 
White returned to Gardoqui’s Manhattan home “encouraged” by recent 
reports out of Franklin and “enthusiastic” about the future success of their 
scheme. After toasting each other’s health, White and Gardoqui mapped 
out the details of a secret compact between Franklin’s political leadership 
and the government of Spain. White offered to “go to the state of Franklin” 
and attempt to gauge the level of support for a Franklin-Spanish alliance. If 
the Franklinites embraced his overtures, White planned to travel from the 
Tennessee Valley to either Natchez or New Orleans to put the plan into 
motion. Gardoqui described the plot to Spain’s secretary of state, Conde de 
Floridablanca. The Spanish diplomat disclosed to Floridablanca the exis-
tence of “secret reports from some of those settlements [Franklin, Cumber-
land, and Kentucky] whose principal inhabitants have received favorably 
the idea (‘of turning to us’).” He believed that “it would be impossible to 
oblige this people by force, but . . . would be easy to win them by Tact and 
generosity, leaving them their customs, religion, and laws, on the supposi-
tion that in time they will be imperceptibly drawn to ours.” Gardoqui also 
claimed to be in possession of additional “secret information” confirming 
that “the District of Frankland” was “ripe” for an alliance, and he proposed 
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“sending Don Jaime [James White] there to promote it.” Gardoqui expressed 
his concerns over “trusting [his nation’s] affairs to foreigners [meaning James 
White],” and he remained cognizant of the diplomatic “consequences” if the 
United States discovered Spain’s “consideration” of the “complicated and 
dangerous business.”25 Gardoqui included a group of petitions from un-
named Franklinites expressing their support for the Spanish alliance, and 
the minister proposed rewarding these future allies with “large tracts of land, 
powerful interests, and other brilliant advantages.”26 Following their meet-
ing, James White embarked for the crumbling state of Franklin with a Span-
ish passport and three hundred pesos in hand.27
White arrived in the Tennessee backcountry during the darkest days of 
the state of Franklin. During White’s brief visit to the Tennessee Valley, 
North Carolina’s Governor Johnston issued an arrest warrant for John Se-
vier, and Franklin’s southern communities confronted the daily horrors of 
Chickamauga Cherokee and Upper Creek attacks. The state’s economy suf-
fered a terrible blow with the recent abandonment of a joint military cam-
paign with the state of Georgia and the resulting derailment of the most 
recent plans to acquire the elusive Muscle Shoals territory. As one Franklin 
historian commented, “In these circumstances Sevier proved responsive to 
White’s overtures.”28 Neither participant recorded what transpired during 
their summer discussions, but clearly the two frontier leaders recognized 
their shared interests. On September 12, 1788, John Sevier drafted two 
letters to Gardoqui and entrusted their delivery to his son James.29 Sevier’s 
two correspondences disclosed specific details regarding the Franklin-
Spanish alliance. In the first communiqué, Sevier expressed his desire to 
extend Franklin’s settlements to “the Tenesee [sic] River or near the Mussell 
[sic] Shoals.” The former Franklin governor “solicited” Gardoqui’s “inter-
position” with Spain’s Indian allies in order “to keep the peace” during 
Franklin’s territorial expansion. After more than four years of failure, Se-
vier hoped to utilize Spain’s influence to finally conclude the Muscle Shoals 
land deal and to bolster Franklin’s contentious Indian policy.30
In the second of the two letters, Sevier reported to Gardoqui that “the 
people of this country with respect to the future of an alliance, and com-
mercial connection with you are very sanguine and that we are unani-
mously determined on the event.” The secrecy of the frontier plot makes it 
impossible to verify the true level of support among the Franklinites for the 
Spanish alliance, but Sevier did offer the Spanish minister several compel-
ling reasons motivating his fellow Franklinites. Sevier lashed out at the state 
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of North Carolina, decrying “the embarrassment we labour under in respect 
to the parent state, who make use of every stratagem, to obstruct the growth, 
and welfare of this country.” Sevier warned Gardoqui that “there will not 
be a more favorable time than the present to carry in to effect the plan on 
foot,” and implored Spain’s highest-ranking American diplomat “to make 
every speedy and necessary preparation for defense; should any rupture take 
place.” Sevier asked Gardoqui to consider “the advantages” of a Spanish- 
Franklin “connection,” and then made several requests of the Spanish gov-
ernment, including “a few thousand pounds” to alleviate the “great scarcity 
of specie in this country,” “military supplies,” and Spanish passports.31 In 
exchange for their sworn allegiance to the Spanish king, the political and 
economic leadership of Franklin hoped to advance their personal economic 
fortunes and defend their political autonomy.32
As James Sevier departed the Tennessee Valley to deliver his father’s 
communications to Don Diego de Gardoqui, Franklin supporters in the 
southern Tennessee Valley communities struggled to keep alive their hopes 
for independence. Sevier arrived at Gardoqui’s New York residence on the 
same day John Tipton, leader of the Anti-Franklinites, apprehended his 
father for high treason.33 Unaware of the arrest, James Sevier presented his 
father’s two letters to Gardoqui. Just a week before this meeting, Gardoqui 
informed Governor Miro of the escalating danger surrounding the ongoing 
Franklin conspiracy. The Spanish diplomat warned that even James White 
“no longer consider[ed] it safe nor proper to remain in this country.” White’s 
mounting fear that his role in the scheme might be discovered forced him 
to assume several aliases (Don Jaime and Jacques Dubois), and Gardoqui’s 
concerns over being implicated in the plot led him to distance himself from 
the conspiracy. Gardoqui instructed James Sevier to travel to New Orleans 
and contact Governor Miro for future “aid and protection.”34 Gardoqui 
also dispatched James White to the Spanish territory to mediate the clan-
destine negotiations. After receiving several Spanish passports and travel 
money, Sevier left for New Orleans unaware of the ever-increasing impor-
tance of his mission.35
Over the final two months of 1788, the governments of Georgia, Vir-
ginia, and South Carolina renewed efforts to establish peaceful relations 
with the southeastern Indian tribes. At Governor Johnston’s behest, North 
Carolina joined the other southern states in their ongoing negotiations with 
the Creeks and Chickamauga Cherokee. Despite publicly criticizing the 
1785 Treaty of Hopewell upholding Cherokee land claims, the Johnston 
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administration continued North Carolina’s Indian policy of pursuing a 
diplomatic and cost-effective solution to the wave of frontier violence. John-
ston offered his support for the Tennessee Valley communities south of the 
French Broad River (“Lesser Franklin”) and to the Cumberland settlements 
of Middle Tennessee. And he defended his decision to support the last re-
maining Franklin holdouts to Dr. Hugh Williamson, arguing that the 
“People Inhabiting the Lands on the Fork of French Broad and Holstein 
Rivers . . . [deserved to be] under the protection of the State [of North 
Carolina just] as any other of her Citizens.”36 Both Williamson and John-
ston believed John Sevier’s 1788 campaigns against the southeastern tribes 
to be “fatal to the hopes” of concluding a lasting peace with either the 
Cherokee or Creeks. Dr. Williamson warned Johnston that John Sevier’s 
actions could cause the outbreak of a “general Indian War.”37 Johnston’s 
shared opposition to the Treaty of Hopewell and public expression of sup-
port for the Tennessee Valley and Cumberland communities eased western 
hostility toward the state of North Carolina. For the increasingly marginal-
ized southern Franklinites, Johnston’s conciliatory policies and the North 
Carolina Assembly’s willingness to pardon former Franklinites further de-
flated their support for the southern separatist movement.38
By November 1788, supporters of the “Lesser Franklin” movement in 
the southeastern Tennessee Valley found themselves reduced to pleading 
with their parent state of North Carolina for assistance against the growing 
Indian resistance movement. The Franklinites’ unrelenting Indian cam-
paigns that escalated Creek and Cherokee hostilities, dwindling munitions 
and frontier defenses, and refusal to abandon their illegal settlements cre-
ated an increasingly alarming situation in the Tennessee backcountry. Un-
aware of Sevier’s ongoing negotiations with the Spanish government and 
incapable of defending themselves, a group of Greene County residents 
petitioned the North Carolina General Assembly to aid them in their fron-
tier defense. The petitioners informed the representatives of their dire situ-
ation, writing, “We your Petitioners Are now Sufferers by a most Cruel and 
unjust war with the Cherokee Indians We have been Closely Confined in 
forts these six months past, and many of our people Barbarously Massacred, 
our farms not attended our Horses and Cattle drove from our Stations. And 
often We [are] not Able to do more than defend ourselves from our walls.” 
The petitioners also revealed that the previous years of political “Divisions 
and Controversies Among the people” in the upper Tennessee Valley left 
them “without Assistance from the more Secure parts of the District” and 
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“out of the power of the Militia Officers to Assist us.” The petition also 
con-veyed their mounting apprehension over the impact ongoing diplo-
matic negotiations with the regional Indian tribes would have on their 
homes. In an effort to legitimize their land claims, the Greene County citi-
zens requested that the North Carolina Assembly carve a new county out of 
the southern communities of Greene County, establish a local courthouse 
and “Administration of Justice,” and most critically, erect a land office to 
legally register their land claims. The petition revealed a grudging aban-
donment of independence by Franklin’s remaining supporters, and placed 
even greater importance on John Sevier’s negotiations with Spain.39
Despite the enterprising efforts of James White, Don Diego de Gardo-
qui, and the Sevier family, the Spanish conspiracy began to collapse toward 
the end of 1788. Rising Spanish suspicions, glaring cultural incongruities, 
and a rapidly shifting political climate made the relationship between Spain 
and Franklin untenable. The Spanish Intrigue never progressed far enough 
for the two parties to work out the complex logistics of a Franklin-Spanish 
alliance, but Spain’s designs for the incorporation of Virginia’s Kentucky 
frontier offers a glimpse into the possible inner workings of such a plan. In 
addition to courting the political leadership of Franklin and Cumberland, 
Spain also conspired with Brigadier General James Wilkinson to consoli-
date Virginia’s rapidly developing Kentucky settlements into their North 
American colonies. The Spanish Intrigue in Kentucky advanced much 
further than either the Franklin or Cumberland schemes.40 In August 1787, 
Wilkinson traveled to New Orleans, where he presented a memorial to 
Governor Miro laying out a proposal for the union of the Kentucky com-
munities and Spain. Wilkinson’s exasperation over the U.S. government’s 
inability to acquire navigation rights to the Mississippi River from Spain 
primarily motivated his seeking an alliance. Tobacco had become the prin-
cipal cash crop in Kentucky’s frontier economy, and the navigation of the 
Mississippi River offered the most viable commercial route to regional 
markets. In order to compete with Virginia’s powerful eastern planters, 
Wilkinson needed access to the Mississippi River and to new markets in 
Spain’s Louisiana Territory. Wilkinson offered “two propositions” as to 
how Spain might acquire the Kentucky territory. The first involved the 
King of Spain’s “receiving the inhabitants of the Kentucky region as sub-
jects” and then “taking them under his protection.” Wilkinson’s second 
proposal attempted to draw Kentucky and Spain together culturally 
through emigration and intermixing.41 The Spanish government viewed 
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the Kentucky intrigue as an opportunity to expand Spain’s North Ameri-
can land holdings and to further distance the Spanish colonies from the 
land-hungry American government.42
Planning for the Spanish conspiracy in Franklin and Kentucky would 
have been very similar. In a letter dated September 25, 1787, Governor Miro 
and Intendant-General of Florida Martin Navarro described the details of 
the Kentucky plot to Spanish Minister Don Antonio Valdes. Miro and 
Navarro’s “instructions” on what to do if Wilkinson’s “predictions” came 
“true” offered an extensive list of legal, political, economic, and cultural 
directives. They first considered the potential religious conflicts that could 
emerge when joining Catholic Spain with the overwhelmingly Protestant 
Kentuckians.43 During Gardoqui’s initial contact with future Franklin 
conspirator James White, the Spanish minister reassured Spain’s secretary 
of state of White’s trustworthiness by describing him as “a Catholic” who 
“has never used [his Catholicism] to serve his ends, nor for anything else.”44 
In the initial negotiations with Wilkinson, Spain insisted that the Kentuck-
ians “permit Churches served by Irish catholic priests, without the exercise 
of any other Religion being permitted.” The Spanish government attached 
a conversionary mission to what ostensibly stood as a territorial annexation. 
Spanish officials agreed to allow the Kentuckians to privately “exercise their 
present religion,” but ultimately hoped that the frontier Protestants could 
be “converted by [the] persuasion and good example” of frontier Catholics. 
The chance of a mass Catholic conversion of the overwhelmingly Protestant 
communities scattered across the southeastern frontier seems extremely 
unlikely.45
Despite concerns over religious pluralism, the Wilkinson plot remained 
fundamentally a scheme born out of mutual economic and political neces-
sity. In their consultation with Valdes, Miro and Navarro addressed the 
fiscal aspects of a Spanish-Kentucky compact. These considerations in-
cluded: the sale of Kentucky tobacco, trade tariffs and duties, and future 
trade relations with the United States and Britain. If Kentucky became part 
of Spain, then the region’s commercial farmers faced the prospect of a “six 
percent” export tax, an “import duty,” and a potential trade embargo from 
the United States and Britain. For Kentucky’s commercial tobacco farmers, 
access to the Mississippi River and Spain’s global agricultural markets 
eclipsed these meager economic concessions. The Spanish officials weighed 
the financial rewards of the Kentucky conspiracy against the potential po-
litical and military repercussions they faced from the United States. Miro 
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and Navarro determined that “it would be obligatory and necessary to place 
detachments [of Spanish troops] at the principal points of these new domin-
ions . . . in order to watch out for any attempt the United States might begin, 
to impede the introduction of commerce, and to settle difference among the 
inhabitants.”46 In addition to stationing soldiers in Kentucky’s backcountry 
communities, the Spanish officials concluded that there needed to be “Jus-
tices of the Peace” to enforce Spanish law. In essence, Miro and Navarro 
believed that Spanish Kentucky must be governed by Spanish appointees 
and defended by Spanish troops.47
The circumstances surrounding the proposed Franklin-Spanish alli-
ance differed slightly from Wilkinson’s Kentucky scheme, but Spain’s 
diplomatic “blueprint” for governing Franklin presumably would have con-
tained many of the same elements. Perhaps the most revealing description 
of the proposed inner workings of the Spanish conspiracy in Franklin is 
contained in an exchange between Josef de Ezpeleta and Don Antonio 
Valdes. After meeting with James White in Havana in the winter of 1788, 
Cuba’s Governor Ezpeleta recounted recent developments occurring on 
“the Western side of the Allegheny Mountains and the Appalachians.” Ez-
peleta informed Valdes that “more than two hundred thousand inhabitants 
settled in the Territories of Kentucky, Cumberland, and Franklin . . . [are] 
awaiting whatever fortune they might expect from [the United States] Con-
gress.” He believed the westerners felt “cramped now by this dependency” 
upon congressional support and this led them to their decision “to live under 
a separate Government” and to consider making “alliances of another kind.”48 
Ezpeleta then described intimate details about the potential Franklin-
Spanish pact. Briefed by White, Ezpeleta explained the political and eco-
nomic benefits offered by the backcountry compact for both Franklin and 
Spain. The Franklinites stood to profit financially from their partnership 
with the Spanish government. A Franklin-Spanish commercial relation-
ship offered the Franklinites unfettered access to Spain’s ports, markets, 
shipping, and most importantly the Mississippi River. Franklin’s land 
speculators also potentially gained “an increase in their territory” after 
Spain halted Native American resistance to the expansion of white settle-
ments across the Tennessee backcountry. Spanish interests also potentially 
benefited from a proposed merger with the Franklinites. The Tennessee 
Valley settlers’ military experience would make them ideal Spanish sol-
diers, and if an agreement could be concluded between their government 
and Spain, King Carlos III expected the Franklinites “to defend the King’s 
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territory against any attack by another Power.” Ezpeleta elaborated on the 
other possible Spanish advantages, which included: developing “commerce 
that will greatly increase the Merchant Marine,” providing manpower for 
Spain’s “Royal Navy,” and creating “a secure barrier against the unjust at-
tempts of the United States” to annex Spanish territory. Ezpeleta envisioned 
the Franklinite “Vassals” pledging “an oath of fidelity” to Spain and being 
“employed in the service of the King like real Spaniards.”49 Ezpeleta reiter-
ated James White’s assertion that the Spanish government needed to 
“promptly” move forward with the necessary arrangements for the secret 
alliance.50
Even as Ezpeleta, Gardoqui, Sevier, and White encouraged the Spanish 
government to “place [the Franklinites] under the protection of the King,” 
rumblings of discontent could be heard from both sides.51 In an October 
30, 1788, address to North Carolina’s General Assembly, John Sevier at-
tempted to curry favor and remove treasonous suspicion by warning the 
representatives of the “formidable and inveterate enemies watching to take 
advantage of our divisions.”52 Sevier’s reference to foreign threats is remark-
able in light of his ongoing negotiations with Spain and probably reflected 
his growing doubts about the wisdom of a deal with the Spanish king. The 
increased urgency of James White’s appeals to Spanish officials also con-
firmed the cooling of support for a Franklin-Spanish alliance within the 
Tennessee Valley. From the start, Spain’s political leadership worried about 
a possible deal with the Franklinites. As early as September 1787, Estevan 
Miro cautioned his government that the Tennessee Valley settlement’s ex-
panding population and military power posed a threat to Spain’s Louisiana 
Territory. Miro also warned that denying these frontiersmen access to the 
Mississippi River could provoke a war that might ultimately cost Spain all 
of the North American territories and Mexico. Miro strongly advised ally-
ing with the western settlers before they are “driven back into the arms” of 
the U.S. government.53
By the end of 1788, the growing chorus of suspicious Spanish voices 
threatened to derail the conspiracy in Franklin. James White attempted to 
calm the Spanish government’s growing hesitancy over continuing the on-
going Franklin negotiations. On December 24, 1788, White argued that 
“the policy of the Spanish Government” should be aimed at “attracting” the 
Franklinites “as friends [rather] than taking precautions against them as 
enemies.” White promoted the trade benefits of the alliance, as well as the 
strategic advantages of “using these people as a barrier” against American 
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aggression and territorial encroachment. He also reminded Governor Ez-
peleta that Spain’s diplomatic delays allowed the Tennessee Valley settle-
ments to “take on more formidable proportions,” and pose an even greater 
threat to Spain’s North American colonies. White offered Spain’s political 
leaders his optimistic vision of an alliance with the Franklinites. He be-
lieved that “Spain now has in her hands the power to assure herself of this 
Country [Franklin] by peaceful and humane methods. Then its inhabit-
ants will be a Source of advantage instead of dangerous and turbulent 
neighbors.” If the Franklinites remained “United to the American Repub-
lics, they may be especially suspicious,” but if they could be “Separated” 
from the United States, their alliance offered the Spanish Empire numer-
ous advantages. Dr. White echoed Governor Ezpeleta’s contention that a 
Franklin-Spanish alliance would “keep them [Tennessee Valley residents] 
from Mercantile rivalries [with Spain], stimulate . . . an increase of Sailors 
for the Royal Navy,” and expand maritime trade of “Tobacco, Hemp, iron, 
Food, and other bulky articles” from Spain’s “Ports on the Mississippi 
[River].”54 White concluded his defense of the Franklin plan by recom-
mending that the Spanish government move slowly with the efforts to 
convert and acculturate the Tennessee Valley residents. White queried, “As 
to internal policy, Will it not be best to indulge them by granting them the 
continuance of their manners, Customs, and Prejudices that habit makes 
the Love?” White understood the disastrous consequences of forcing cul-
tural uniformity on the Franklinites, and he argued that, “With time, if 
other customs are considered necessary, they can be substituted for these.” 
White’s attempts to prevent future cultural and religious disharmony re-
vealed one of the fundamental obstacles preventing a Franklin-Spanish 
union: cultural intolerance.55
Back on the Tennessee frontier, the rupture between the remaining 
southern separatists and the state of North Carolina gradually began to 
close. Most of Franklin’s former political leaders accepted the inevitability 
of reunion and returned their political allegiance to North Carolina.56 Only 
in Greene County did significant support for statehood remain. On Janu-
ary 12, 1789, sixteen Greene County residents met at the courthouse to 
once again address the Indian attacks and ongoing treaty negotiations en-
dangering their settlements. The group never mentioned the state of Frank-
lin nor Spain during the conference, but the attendees overwhelmingly 
supported the creation of a new state west of the Appalachian Mountains. 
The frontier leaders castigated the state of North Carolina for failing to 
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bolster western defenses and for appointing the much maligned Indian 
agent Joseph Martin as a member of the North Carolina delegation negoti-
ating with the southeastern tribes.57 The Greene County men adopted fif-
teen articles primarily aimed at strengthening their frontier defenses and 
defending their land claims. The representatives also reaffirmed their alle-
giance to John Sevier, electing him to “keep the command of the inhabit-
ants on the frontiers” and conduct all future “talks with the Indians.” The 
frontier leaders concluded their meeting by calling on Washington and Sul-
livan counties to join their “Voluntary plan of Safety.”58 Clearly John Sevier’s 
overtures to the Spanish government failed to stop Spain’s Indian allies 
from attacking white settlements south of the French Broad River, and just 
two days prior to the Greene County conference, Sevier and “the arms of 
Franklin” confronted a “combined force of Creeks and Cherokees” at Flint 
Creek. In the shockingly bloody Battle of Flint Creek, the frontier militia-
men slaughtered the Native Americans, leaving 145 dead and countless oth-
ers mortally wounded. In what historians have dubbed “The Last Battle of 
Franklin,” Sevier struck a crippling blow to the Indian resistance move-
ment.59 Despite their defeat at Flint Creek, determined members of the 
Cherokee and Creek tribes continued their attacks on western settlements. 
The persistence of Indian violence and a growing awareness of cultural dis-
parities further diminished the likelihood of a Franklin-Spanish alliance.
In February 1789, John Sevier became the last in a long line of former 
Franklin leaders to pledge his fealty to the laws of North Carolina. Despite 
the rapidly changing political dynamics of the Tennessee Valley and the 
recent death of Spain’s King Carlos III, James White remained convinced 
that a backcountry compact could still be concluded. During the spring of 
1789, White delivered several letters to unnamed Tennessee Valley “leading 
men,” stipulating that they must swear an “oath of allegiance to the [new] 
King . . . if it was their wish to come under the protection of Spain.” White’s 
April 18 correspondence to Governor Miro expressed his growing impa-
tience over Spain’s measured approach to frontier negotiations. White again 
urged Miro to offer the Franklinites “refuge under the King’s protection” 
before it was too late.60 In response to White’s appeals, Miro issued a state-
ment to the Tennessee Valley “Westerners” that expressed Spain’s desire to 
“favor and protect” them. The April 20 memorandum promoted James 
Wilkinson’s recently proposed strategy for uniting Kentucky and Spain 
through emigration and cultural intermixing. Miro extended an invitation 
to the Tennessee Valley residents to settle in the Louisiana Territory on land 
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granted by the Spanish government. The New Orleans governor also of-
fered to open Spanish markets and trade routes to the would-be emigrants 
and even to waive duties on any property imported or sold in Spanish North 
America. Following Miro’s address, the Spanish government abruptly aban-
doned James White’s dangerous scheme for securing a Franklin-Spanish 
alliance and adopted James Wilkinson’s more cautious emigration approach. 
Miro explained that, despite the “proposal of the afore mentioned Gentle-
man [White]” and “the wishes of those Districts . . . to make a connexion 
[sic] with the Court of Spain, after disseviring [sic] themselves from the 
United States,” he did not feel it in his “power to stipulate any thing, nor to 
promote the scheme; because the good understanding subsistent between 
the most catholic Majesty & the United States prevents it.” Miro’s pronounce-
ments undoubtedly came as a devastating blow to James White’s grandiose 
vision of a Spanish Tennessee Valley.61
After the Miro memorandum, the Spanish conspiracy in the Tennessee 
Valley quickly imploded. On April 30, 1789, Miro informed Valdez that he 
considered “it of little use for us [Spain] to intermeddle in” Franklin, and 
Spain turned its attention to winning support in North Carolina’s newly 
named Mero District [Cumberland] and Wilkinson’s Kentucky territory.62 
James White briefly continued to press for a Cumberland-Spanish alliance, 
but eventually abandoned all hope of uniting Middle Tennessee with Spain’s 
North American territories. After traveling once more to Franklin to de-
liver Miro’s spring memorandum, White terminated his correspondence 
with the nation of Spain. James White remained in Nashville, where he 
practiced law in the newly created Southwest Territory and served as one of 
Tennessee’s first state representatives from Davidson County. His wife’s 
death in 1796 led him to sell his Tennessee property and relocate to Nat-
chez, Mississippi. White finally settled permanently in the Louisiana Terri-
tory, where he died on December 10, 1809. Less than three years after 
conceiving of a Spanish-controlled Tennessee Valley, James White’s 
Franklin-Spanish conspiracy faded into the past.63
John Sevier and his fellow Franklinites’ motivation for parlaying with 
Dr. James White and Spanish officials remains a source of historical con-
tention. Franklin apologists argue that Sevier intended to use the negotia-
tions with the Spanish government to force the U.S. government to take a 
harder line with Spain regarding the ongoing diplomatic struggle over the 
navigation of the Mississippi River or to pressure North Carolina or the 
U.S. Congress into granting Franklin its independence.64 Critics of Sevier 
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and company’s Spanish collusion contend that the backcountry affair 
stemmed from the insatiable desire of influential land speculators, such as 
William Blount, Richard Caswell, and John Sevier, to secure control of the 
valuable Muscle Shoals bottomland for personal financial gain.65 In truth, 
Sevier and the leadership of Franklin hoped to benefit both politically and 
financially from the Spanish collusion. The Franklin statehood movement 
grew out of the eagerness of the Tennessee Valley’s ruling class to cement 
their control over the region’s political and economic future. They truly 
believed that the backcountry conspiracy stood as their last opportunity to 
preserve their statehood movement and their regional hegemony. Regard-
less of the rationale, the Spanish Intrigue remains the final arresting chapter 
in the tumultuous history of North Carolina’s rogue state of Franklin.
In September 1804, Ingram Weirs sued former Franklin diplomat William 
Cocke over disputed land grants issued by the Spencer County Court 
[Hawkins County under North Carolina and Tennessee] in the defunct 
state of Franklin. During the course of the proceedings, attorneys for both 
litigants debated the circumstances surrounding the creation and gover-
nance of Franklin. The legality of Cocke’s land claims rested on the legiti-
macy of the state of Franklin and her court system. The case Weirs v. Cocke 
is emblematic of the divergent historical and popular interpretations of the 
Tennessee Valley separatist movement. Rhea and Williams, lawyers for the 
plaintiff, argued, “Surely it will not be contended that the sale by the Sher-
iff, under the pretended authority of the Franklin Government, can give 
any legal right to the defendant.” They characterized the Franklin state-
hood movement as “an insurrection, as much so as the opposition to the 
excise [Whiskey Rebellion], which took place a few years ago in the back 
parts of Pennsylvania.” Rhea and Williams maintained that “None of the 
acts of such a government can be good, or founded on such principles, as to 
obtain a moment’s consideration in a court of competent authority,” there-
fore, the “proceedings of the [Franklin] court of Spencer cannot be records; 
if they are, a writ of error would lie in this court, but no lawyer entertains 
an idea of such a thing.”1 The attorneys for Cocke, G. W. Campbell, and 
Jenkings Whitesides challenged the plaintiff ’s comparison of the Franklin 
movement to the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion, retorting that “The Franklin 
Government is not to every purpose, to be considered as an usurped one. It 
is not similar to the insurrection in the western part of Pennsylvania; that 
was an absolute opposition to a law of the United States essential to its ex-
istence; one for raising a revenue.”2 According to the Campbell and White-
sides account, “Franklin arose from necessity; from the situation in which 
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the people of North Carolina, west of the Mountains were placed; detached 
from anterior settlements in the eastern part of the State, exposed to the 
incursions and merciless barbarities of the neighboring savages.” They be-
lieved that the state of North Carolina’s unwillingness to “afford the people 
of this country . . . [the] prompt assistance which was indispensable to their 
happiness . . . [and] existence” compelled the Franklinites to form “a gov-
ernment of their own.” Ignoring the actual historical events surrounding 
the state of Franklin, Campbell and Whitesides asserted that the Tennessee 
Valley separatist leaders launched their movement “in a peaceable manner” 
and that the actions of the Franklin government “were not attended with 
violence, civil war, or bloodshed.”3 Newly appointed judge to Tennessee’s 
Superior Court of Law and Equity and Middle Tennessee land speculator 
John Overton apparently agreed with the defense’s argument that the state 
of Franklin served as a legitimate “de facto government,” and thereby vali-
dated Cocke’s land claims. The trial transcripts from Weirs v. Cocke reveal 
the dynamic historical evolution of the state of Franklin and the continued 
importance of the statehood movement in the political and economic com-
petition for the Tennessee Valley.4
Following the collapse of the state of Franklin and the Spanish Intrigue, 
the residents of the Tennessee Valley continued to struggle with the politi-
cal uncertainty surrounding their rapidly developing communities. Amid 
the formation of the state of Tennessee, the socioeconomic development of 
East Tennessee, and the antebellum turmoil surrounding the divisive po-
litical issues of slavery and secession, the descendents of the Franklinites 
and Tiptonites continued to grapple over the region’s political and eco-
nomic future. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the his-
torical legacy and meaning of the Franklin separatist movement became 
intertwined with this transmontane hegemonic contest. Through the 
blending of patriotic rhetoric, nationalistic language, and revolutionary 
symbolism, contemporary Franklinites forged a history of their separatist 
movement that inspired local and regional pride, historical interest, and 
most importantly political loyalty. Building upon these efforts, the descen-
dents of the Franklinites and Tiptonites redefined the movement in an ef-
fort to reshape the past, defend the actions of their kinfolk, and advance 
their families’ political and financial fortunes. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the continued evolution of the meaning of Franklin 
allowed several prominent American figures to recast the movement for 
their own political purposes. Tracing the contemporary invention of Frank-
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lin through its political manipulation by abolitionist Ezekiel Birdseye and 
North Carolina senator Andrew Johnson reveals the state of Franklin’s 
continued influence on the Tennessee Valley’s political and economic 
maturation.
From the beginning, Tennessee Valley Franklinites doggedly promoted 
the connections between their separatist movement and the American Revo-
lution. By associating Franklin with America’s struggle for independence, 
the Franklinites hoped to win widespread political and public support for 
statehood. If America’s political leaders could be convinced that Franklin’s 
independence flowed from the same patriotic river giving birth to America’s 
separation from Britain, then the state of Franklin’s chances of survival 
dramatically improved. Public support for Franklin, both inside and out-
side of the Tennessee Valley, depended heavily upon the region’s historical 
ties to the Battle of King’s Mountain and the famed revolutionary sacrifices 
of the region’s Overmountain Men. Through the efforts of skilled orators 
and savvy diplomats, the Franklinites cemented the link between Tennes-
see Valley separatism and America’s glorious rebellion.5
Virginia’s Colonel Arthur Campbell made the first connections be-
tween backcountry separatism and the American Revolution.6 In the sum-
mer of 1785, Campbell defended his earlier efforts to ignite a Washington 
County, Virginia, independence movement. In a letter to a Washington 
County neighbor, Colonel John Edmiston, Campbell responded to his crit-
ics, lamenting, “It is extremely unfortunate that many well-meaning and 
valuable men in America, who remained unshaken during the severest tri-
als, at the end of the [Revolutionary] war, lost sight of the object they were 
contending for or perhaps they had no object in view at all.”7 Campbell 
argued that Americans “were provoked and justly angry with England” for 
attempting to deny America’s sons “a republican or free government.” He 
then outlined “three kinds of government,” of which Campbell held “De-
mocracy or [a] republican government” to be the ideal. Campbell’s analysis 
supported his Anti-Federalist argument that successful republics only 
flourished in “small societies or States.”8 Campbell’s assertion that back-
country separatism emanated from the same political vein as revolutionary 
republicanism became one of the earliest rhetorical arguments for Franklin’s 
independence. During the convening of the first Franklin Assembly in 
March 1785, a member of the convention “arose and made some remarks 
on the variety of opinions offered, for and against a separation.” Drawing 
upon the revolutionary precedent established by the Declaration of Inde-
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pendence, the unnamed Franklinite compared “the reasons which induced 
their separation from England, on account of their local situation, etc., and 
attempted to show that a number of the reasons they had for declaring in-
dependence, applied to the counties here represented by their deputies.”9
The connections between the political and economic leadership of the 
Tennessee Valley and the American Revolution are well established. West-
ern soldiers like John Sevier, Landon Carter, and John Tipton led hundreds 
of Tennessee Valley settlers in bloody backcountry battles against British 
forces and their Indian and southern loyalists. The political leadership of 
Franklin never allowed either North Carolina or the United States’ govern-
ment to forget their sacrifice during the Revolutionary War and often drew 
upon this legacy to defend their independence movement and gain the po-
litical loyalty of their Tennessee Valley neighbors. In one of John Sevier’s 
few direct addresses to the North Carolina Assembly, he reminded the rep-
resentatives that “we were all employed and deeply engaged [recently] to 
keep off the British yoke of slavery and tyranny, and in the days of your 
greatest extremity, the people who are now suffering for differing in politi-
cal sentiments, were those who gave you the first relief, at the expense of 
their blood and the loss of their dearest relations.”10 Sevier challenged the 
assembled delegates, asking, “Has North Carolina forgot that for such acts 
America took up arms against the British nation? Has she also forgot that 
the man and party that now suffers, was her zealous defenders in the days 
of her greatest extremity?” In a letter read before the Georgia Assembly in 
the summer of 1787, Sevier accused North Carolinians of forgetting that 
many Franklinites “fought, bled, and toiled” alongside their citizens for 
“the common cause of American Independence.” To Sevier and his fellow 
Franklinites, their devotion to America’s sovereignty justified their effort to 
establish their own independent state and obligated the U.S. government 
and North Carolina to support their independence movement.11
Supporters of Franklin pointed out perceived similarities between 
America’s separatist movement and their own on the Tennessee frontier. 
Through the use of painstakingly chosen language and symbolism, Frank-
lin became an extension of the revolution and the Franklinites stood as its 
“rear-guard.”12 The blurring of the lines between revolution and separatism 
became one of the primary strategies used by Franklin’s propagandists to 
defend their state’s political sovereignty. The most obvious manifestation of 
this tactic was the naming of their new state after Benjamin Franklin. 
Originally, the political leadership of the Tennessee Valley intended upon 
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designating their new state Frankland (meaning “Freeland”), but the Frank-
linites eventually abandoned the esoteric reference to the European Franks 
who dominated the Province of Gaul after the disintegration of the West-
ern Roman Empire.13 It is unclear as to why they replaced Frankland with 
Franklin, but amid the postrevolutionary wave of nationalism celebrating 
the political, ideological, and military leaders of the American Revolution, 
the name change served to highlight the region’s devotion, loyalty, and 
necessity to the fragile new republic. The Franklinites undoubtedly under-
stood the political and diplomatic benefits of identifying their state with 
one of America’s most celebrated patriot leaders, and as opposition to their 
statehood movement mounted, the Franklinites increasingly wrapped 
themselves in the blanket of American nationalism and the rhetoric of 
revolution.14
The Franklinites persistently evoked the language used by America’s 
revolutionaries in their effort to secure support for their own statehood 
movement. A letter composed by an anonymous Washington County, 
Virginia, resident on June 1, 1785, reflected the melding of the rhetoric of 
America’s rebellion with the Franklin separatist movement. The recent 
Franklin visitor proclaimed that “The New Society or state called Franklin, 
has already put off its infant habit, and seems to step forward with a florid, 
healthy constitution” and the Franklinites need “only the paternal guard-
ianship of Congress for a short period, to entitle it to be admitted with [il-
legible], as a member of the Federal Government.” The author thundered, 
“Here the genuine Republican! Here the real Whig will find a safe asylum, 
a comfortable retreat among the Modern Franks, the hardy mountain 
men!”15 The Franklinites interlaced their correspondence and legislation 
with the powerful prose and mythology of the American Revolution, and 
words like republican, liberty, independence, and patriot grounded the 
principles of Franklin separatism in the ideological foundations of America’s 
independence. The Franklinites argued that their efforts to defend their 
political “independence” and “pursue their own happiness” developed from 
the identical reasons, rights, and dreams that fostered the political radical-
ism of the American Revolution. The Tennessee Franklinites asserted that 
their separation from North Carolina occurred only out of necessity and 
that unreasonable taxes, political neglect, and eastern tyranny forced them 
into their fateful decision.16 To the Franklinites, their statehood movement 
truly stood as Tennessee senator Andrew Johnson described seventy years 
later, “The War of Rebellion in Epitome.”17
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In conjunction with the Franklinites’ efforts to craft a positive image of 
their state, opponents of Franklin created a vastly different account of the 
Tennessee Valley separatist movement. From the first machinations of in-
dependence, North Carolina’s political leadership conspired to undermine 
Franklin’s sovereignty and dissociate the movement from the sacred revolu-
tion. As the Franklinites cast themselves as defenders of the principles of the 
revolution, North Carolina governor Alexander Martin openly condemned 
their “revolt” and decried the economic motivations behind Franklin. Mar-
tin understood the potential effectiveness of drawing upon the victory of 
the Overmountain Men, and he warned the Franklinites not to “tarnish . . . 
the laurels you have so gloriously won at King’s Mountain and elsewhere, in 
supporting the freedom and independence of the United States.” To Gover-
nor Martin, the “black and traitorous [Franklin] revolt” threatened the 
stability of the new American government, and during the final months of 
his governorship, he made every effort to destroy the state.18
Governor Martin’s attack on the Franklinite propaganda effort fueled 
the growing Anti-Franklin movement within the region. The Tiptonites 
emerged victorious at the Battle of Franklin, but ultimately lost the long war 
of popular opinion in the Tennessee Valley. The Tiptonites struggled to cast 
the southern separatist movement in a negative light and to undercut the 
Franklinites’ vainglorious efforts to anoint their movement with a sense of 
honor and patriotism. The Anti-Franklinites attacked the carefully crafted 
image of the Franklin independence movement. To the opponents of Frank-
lin, the Tennessee Franklinites did not represent a revolutionary vanguard, 
but instead were “the off scourings of the Earth,” “outlaws and vagrants,” 
and “fugitives from Justice.”19 Franklin’s independence did not emerge out 
of necessity, nor did it reflect any of the principles of the American Revolu-
tion. For the Tennessee Valley Tiptonites, the Franklin movement disrupted 
their communities, escalated Indian violence, and retarded the growth of 
their region. Neither the propaganda war characterizing the political and 
public debate over the state of Franklin nor the intensity of backcountry 
partisanship ended with the dissolution of the separatist movement.20
The decades following the abandonment of the Franklin movement 
witnessed a remarkable political and economic transformation of the Ten-
nessee Valley and the reemergence of former Franklinites into positions of 
political influence. Subsequent to their November 1789 ratification of the 
U.S. Constitution, the North Carolina legislature once again ceded the 
state’s western territory to the U.S. government. In an effort to avoid the 
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political chaos that followed the passage of the 1784 Cession Act, the U.S. 
government designated North Carolina’s ceded lands the Southwest Terri-
tory. President George Washington and Congress immediately laid out a 
plan for the administration of the new territory and its eventual admission 
into the union as an independent state. Washington selected North Caro-
lina congressman and wealthy land speculator William Blount to serve as 
territorial governor, and Congress decreed that the residents of the South-
west Territory be governed under the provisions established by the Northwest 
Ordinance. Once again, the inhabitants of the Tennessee Valley became 
embroiled in an effort to fashion a new state out of their communities and 
in the scramble among the region’s leading men to claim positions of back-
country authority within the shifting political landscape.21
With the designation of the Southwest Territory, several of the former 
partisan opponents during the Franklin affair managed to recover their 
positions of political leadership. As Governor Blount began the process of 
forming a territorial government, he turned to several prominent Franklin-
ites to fill important governmental posts. Blount traveled to the former 
Franklin counties of Greene, Hawkins, Sullivan, and Washington in Octo-
ber 1790 and began reorganizing the local governments, now under the 
auspices of the U.S. Congress. In a remarkable example of a political resur-
rection, Blount appointed former Franklin governor John Sevier, now serv-
ing as a U.S. congressman representing North Carolina, brigadier general 
of the Washington District’s militia (one of three districts created out of the 
Southwest Territory, the other two being the Mero and Hamilton districts). 
Sevier’s political appointment became the first in a series of decisions made 
by Governor Blount that restored former Franklinites to positions of politi-
cal, judicial, and military influence. In November 1790, Blount selected the 
former chief judge of the state of Franklin, David Campbell, to be one of 
the Southwest Territory’s three territorial judges, and the following year, 
Franklin diplomat William Cocke became the attorney general of the Wash-
ington District. In December 1793, Southwest Territory residents voted in 
elections to determine their county representatives in the lower house of the 
newly created territorial government. When the first session of the territo-
rial government convened in February 1794, former Franklinites and Tip-
tonites filled the ranks of the territorial representatives, including John 
Tipton (Washington County), William Cocke (Hawkins County), and 
Spanish conspirator Dr. James White (Davidson County). A few months 
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later, President Washington selected John Sevier and Franklin’s surveyor 
general, Stockley Donelson, to the territorial council, which served as an 
“upper house” within the full territorial legislature. Clearly, John Sevier and 
his fellow Franklinites managed to escape the political fallout caused by the 
Franklin debacle, but their families’ continued political hegemony rested 
on defending their political past.22
In the years separating the fall of Franklin and the 1796 admission of 
the state of Tennessee into the union, the population and economy of the 
Southwest Territory continued to expand at an extraordinary pace. Initially, 
the communities of the Tennessee Valley (located primarily in the Wash-
ington District) experienced the most rapid population growth. In a July 
1791 survey of the Southwest Territory conducted at the request of Gover-
nor Blount, the census revealed approximately 36,000 inhabitants of the 
entire western territory. The Washington District’s population had swollen 
to nearly 29,000 residents, and Middle Tennessee’s Mero District contained 
nearly 7,000 inhabitants.23 In a census conducted four years later to deter-
mine if the Southwest Territory’s population satisfied the demographic re-
quirements laid out by the Northwest Ordinance for a territory’s successful 
transition to statehood, census takers identified a total territorial popula-
tion of 77,300. The population of the Washington District had more than 
doubled, reaching 65,300 inhabitants. In addition to the rapid population 
growth, the Tennessee Valley’s regional economy experienced a dramatic 
period of expansion. Tennessee Valley farmers expanded their commercial 
agricultural enterprises, purchased thousands of slaves, and became increas-
ingly connected to regional and national markets. The new wave of Tennes-
see Valley immigration and the improvement of regional transportation 
arteries also opened new markets for Tennessee Valley merchants and 
manufacturers.24
By the end of 1795, the majority of the inhabitants of the Southwest 
Territory began to openly express support for the final phase of the state-
hood process. In January 1796, fifty-five delegates convened in Knoxville 
to draft a constitution for the new state. Once again, several former Frank-
linites and Tiptonites sat among the delegates to the constitutional conven-
tion, including Landon Carter, William Cocke, and John Tipton. In less 
than a month, the delegates crafted the state of Tennessee’s first constitu-
tion. Despite John Sevier’s being absent from the proceedings, a few weeks 
later the newly elected state representatives elected him to be Tennessee’s 
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first governor. On June 1, 1796, President Washington signed the Tennes-
see statehood bill, thus concluding the two-decade effort to forge a new 
state out of North Carolina’s western frontier.25
The creation of the state of Tennessee and the conclusion of the trans-
Appalachian Indian wars removed the final barriers to the full realization 
of the economic potential of the Tennessee frontier. Over the course of the 
next three decades, East Tennessee continued to experience significant 
population and economic growth, but this expansion was eclipsed by the 
profound transformation taking place in Middle Tennessee. By 1820, 
Middle Tennessee’s population dramatically outpaced East Tennessee; the 
area now contained nearly 68 percent of the state’s population. Over the 
next thirty years, East Tennessee’s economy lagged behind the tremendous 
profits generated by slave labor and commercial agricultural in Middle Ten-
nessee, and by 1830 the Tennessee Valley communities no longer occupied 
the economic and political center of the state.26
Despite the loss of political and economic influence within the state, 
East Tennessee’s leading families continued to compete for control of their 
own communities. The descendents of the participants in the Franklin af-
fair redefined the significance of the frontier statehood movement in an 
effort to promote their own political and economic hegemony within a 
rapidly changing Tennessee Valley. Within their correspondences with 
early frontier historians like Lyman Draper and Judge John Haywood, the 
children of the Franklinites and Tiptonites reshaped the history of Franklin 
in an attempt to secure their own families’ claims to regional preeminence. 
Beginning in the early nineteenth century, American historian Lyman Co-
peland Draper began collecting materials relating to the state of Franklin 
and the Tennessee frontier. The loss of most of the official papers relating 
to the state of Franklin during the last years of its existence made Draper’s 
job exceedingly challenging. In order to enhance his understanding of the 
complex events surrounding Franklin, Draper contacted several children of 
leading Franklinites and Tiptonites. Within these exchanges, the sons of 
separatism continued the partisan struggle to control East Tennessee by 
reshaping the legacy of Franklin and their ancestors.27
On February 9, 1839, Overton County resident Colonel George Wash-
ington Sevier sent a short letter and brief biographical sketch of his father, 
John Sevier, to Lyman Draper. Draper, who originally wrote to George 
Sevier’s “relative,” Arkansas senator Ambrose Hundley Sevier, inquired 
about John Sevier and “the thrilling scenes of those [frontier] days.” George 
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Sevier used his correspondence with Draper to criticize Nashville resident 
Judge John Haywood’s Civil and Political History of Tennessee, published in 
1823. Although not present for the Franklin debacle, Haywood became 
one of Tennessee’s first Supreme Court judges and also one of the state’s 
earliest historians. Haywood’s history of Tennessee offered a remarkably 
astute analysis of the Franklin statehood movement and painted a strik-
ingly realistic and historically balanced portrait of the actions of both fac-
tions during the affair. Haywood’s revealing account of frontier Tennessee 
and the state of Franklin, and specifically the gubernatorial activities of 
John Sevier, angered George Sevier. He lashed out at Haywood, stating, 
“Haywood’s history of Tennessee is very imperfect & written altogether 
from the statements of a few old men some of whom have strong prejudices 
against my father the late Genl John Sevier.” Sevier defended his father, 
arguing, “He was not only a Genl but a Statesman & politician” who fought 
for “internal improvements” for his constituents. George Sevier’s biography 
of his father is more remarkable for what is not in the account than what he 
included. In the entire four-page account of his father’s life, George Sevier 
never mentioned the state of Franklin, only acknowledging his father’s in-
volvement in the scheme in a short sentence in the accompanying letter to 
Draper, stating, “My father was the Governor of the small State of Frank-
lin.” George Sevier’s effort to downplay his family’s role in the Franklin 
debacle through selective biographical omissions only added to Draper’s 
curiosity regarding the failed statehood effort.28
Over the next fifty years, Lyman Draper continued to delve deeper into 
the Franklin affair. He questioned North Carolina congressman and U.S. 
Indian agent Joseph Martin’s son and the grandson of Franklin militia 
captain Andrew Caruthers, but as participants “of the strong events” sur-
rounding Franklin passed away, the history of Franklin took on a life of its 
own. In 1851, lawyer, businessman, historian, and John Sevier enthusiast 
Albigence Waldo Putnam sent Lyman Draper a remarkable “sketch of the 
life of Gen. John Sevier” recently submitted to the Nashville newspaper the 
True Whig. Putnam’s thirteen-page biography romanticized the events of 
Sevier’s exceptional life, and is one of the earliest examples of the historical 
mythmaking related to the state of Franklin. To Putnam, the “personal, 
civil, legislative, judicial, executive, and military . . . contention and strife” 
accompanying Franklin was “aimed at the very man who had done, was 
doing, and continued to do more to defend the people and promote their 
peace and prosperity than any other man in all the country.” Putnam re-
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counted John Sevier’s tormented acquiescence to statehood and his noble 
rejection of North Carolina’s 1784 commission as brigadier general. He 
then compared Sevier to “Moses,” who “chose rather to suffer affliction 
with his people—than be flattered with the writing on sheep-skin!” Put-
nam portrayed Sevier as a man courted by the state of North Carolina, but 
who managed to “keep Old Rip Van Winkle at arms length.” According to 
Putnam, Sevier held the “coon skin money” of the State of Franklin “in 
more esteem than the parchment roll with the Great Seal of North Carolina 
attached.” He became the embodiment of a frontier patriot, fighting his 
“political opponents” and savage Indians “hip and thigh and from tree to 
tree.” John Sevier “feared not, faltered not, and failed not!” Regarding the 
catastrophic Indian wars largely initiated by the Franklinites, Putnam cast 
the southeastern Indian tribes as the aggressors who “disregarded the trea-
ties” carefully negotiated by Sevier and forced him to “pursue their ma-
rauding parties.” Putnam paternalistically described “Nolachucky Jack” as 
the “father, friend, and protector” of the “people living south of [the] Ten-
nessee & Holston River [Sevier, Caswell, and Blount counties],” and did 
not mention the violence, bloodshed, and suffering he brought upon these 
settlements. Regarding the end of Franklin, Putnam argued that the Frank-
linites abandoned their efforts only after forcing North Carolina to concede 
to a number of “measures proposed and adopted to satisfy the people of 
Franklin.” Putnam excluded accounts of the Battle of Franklin, Sevier’s ar-
rest, and the Franklinite’s involvement with the Spanish government. De-
spite the movement’s failure to achieve statehood, Putnam’s biography 
depicts it as John Sevier’s successful campaign to improve the lives of Ten-
nessee Valley families. A. W. Putnam eventually rewarded Sevier’s commit-
ment to the inhabitants of Tennessee by erecting the first monument to 
Sevier “on Tennessee soil.”29
Lyman Draper also contacted the descendents of the Tiptonites, who 
predictably offered him a very different version of the history of the state of 
Franklin. John Tipton, the grandson of Anti-Franklinite leader Colonel 
John Tipton, recounted the Franklin affair in a brief biographical sketch of 
his grandfather sent to Draper on January 22, 1839. Tipton portrayed his 
grandfather as a frontier warrior “frequently in command and engaged in a 
number of battles and skirmishes with the Indians.” He described “Col. 
John’s” rise to political prominence in East Tennessee and his grandfather’s 
involvement in the violence in Washington County. According to Tipton’s 
account, his grandfather “opposed” the state of Franklin, and “most of his 
Rocked to Death in the Cradle of Secession 173
neighbors [meaning Greene and Sullivan counties] sided with him.” Tipton 
attempted to downplay his grandfather’s complicity in the backcountry 
bloodshed, offhandedly commenting, “some men on each side determined 
to take up arms and in the year [left blank] the fighting men met at the 
residence of Col. Tipton.” Tipton boasted that “a skirmish took place in 
which the Sevier party was routed with the loss of 6 or 7 killed and wound-
ed.” John Tipton’s biography of Colonel Tipton defended his grandfather’s 
actions during the Franklin movement while obscuring his direct involve-
ment in the most unsavory aspects.30
Dr. Abraham Jobe, the maternal great-grandson of Colonel John Tip-
ton, offered one of the most interesting accounts of the Battle of Franklin. 
Dr. Jobe, born in Carter County, Tennessee, on October 9, 1817, briefly 
chronicled his great-grandfather’s participation in the defeat of the Franklin 
separatist movement. The Jobe-Tipton family preserved the stories of their 
forebears through oral traditions, and Jobe “gathered [his account] from 
old men and women who distinctly remembered all the facts they detailed.” 
Jobe’s sensationalized account of the Battle of Franklin predictably casts 
John Sevier as the aggressor in the backcountry skirmish. According to 
Jobe, his great-grandfather’s unwavering loyalty to the state of North Caro-
lina and refusal to submit to the authority of Franklin incited Sevier to raise 
an army and march “on Tipton to coerce him into obedience.” As Sevier’s 
forces surrounded “the brave little band in the [Tipton] house,” “the first 
gun fired was at a woman who had been sent out of the house to the spring 
after water.” In Jobe’s version of the battle, the Tiptonites’ counterattack 
came as a chivalrous response to the Franklinite assault on an innocent 
woman. Jobe concluded his tale with his great-grandfather gallantly leading 
“his men” in a successful assault on Sevier’s forces that left several Franklin-
ites wounded or dead. Jobe’s account of the history of Franklin mirrored 
the version offered by the Franklinite descendents. To Dr. Jobe, his great-
grandfather’s loyalty to North Carolina and the new American republic 
compelled him to defend the Tennessee Valley communities from political 
and social anarchy.31
It comes as little surprise that the descendents of the participants in the 
Franklin movement attempted to protect the historical reputations of their 
families. Their historical revisionism blurred the reality of the frontier sepa-
ratist movement and projected the backcountry partisanship of the eigh-
teenth century onto the political canvas of the nineteenth century. The 
complex and dichotomous legacy of Franklin proved extraordinarily mal-
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leable. Historical factualism often gave way to political expediency, as 
Franklin’s legacy became intertwined with the two dominant political is-
sues of the nineteenth century: slavery and secession. As Ezekiel Birdseye 
and Andrew Johnson resurrected backcountry separatism in an effort to 
defeat Middle Tennessee’s slaveholding political aristocracy, and Johnson 
desperately attempted to forestall Tennessee’s secession from the union, the 
state of Franklin emerged anew in America’s political consciousness.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the state of Tennessee 
experienced two parallel socioeconomic developments: the expansion and 
increasing importance of slave labor in Middle Tennessee’s thriving com-
mercial agrarian economy and the emergence of a determined antislavery 
movement in East Tennessee’s increasingly economically isolated and po-
litically marginalized communities. Since the earliest settlement of the 
Tennessee frontier, slave labor remained a fixture in the backcountry agrar-
ian economy. During the decades that followed the Franklin statehood 
movement, Tennessee’s slave population increased exponentially in response 
to western expansion and the growth of commercial agriculture in both 
eastern and central Tennessee. The 1791 Southwest Territory census re-
corded 3,400 slaves (2,300 in the Washington District and 1,100 in the 
Mero [Cumberland] District), and less than five years later, the 1795 terri-
torial census recorded 10,600 slaves across the territory (with 8,150 slaves 
residing in the Washington District). The tripling of the Southwest Terri-
tory’s slave population resulted from the dramatic expansion of the region’s 
market economy and trans-Appalachian population. By the opening of the 
nineteenth century, the enormous demographic and economic growth in 
Middle Tennessee and the availability and affordability of suitable farmland 
led to a significant increase in the state’s slave population. By 1810, Tennes-
see commercial planters expanded the slave population in their state to 
more than 35,000 slaves, with nearly 80 percent of all slaves working on the 
cotton and tobacco plantations of Middle Tennessee. East Tennessee’s slave 
population rose only slightly, to 9,300 slaves, but as new antebellum indus-
tries developed and improvements to the region’s increasingly inadequate 
transportation and trade arteries failed to materialize, the importance and 
utilization of slave labor in the region declined. By 1830, the farmers, stock-
raisers, manufacturers, merchants, and political leaders of eastern Tennessee 
stood on the periphery of their state’s dynamic economic and political trans-
formation, but unexpectedly found themselves at the epicenter of America’s 
growing antislavery movement.32
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Ezekiel Birdseye moved into the Tennessee Valley at the height of the 
resurgence of the southern mountain abolitionist movement. Decades prior 
to Birdseye’s 1838 arrival, antislavery forces thrived in East Tennessee. As 
early as 1815, Quaker leaders like prominent iron manufacturer Elihu Em-
bree, Benjamin Lundy, and Charles Osborne founded emancipation societ-
ies and published antislavery newspapers in the Tennessee Valley to “effect 
the abolition of slavery by political means.”33 Over the next twenty years, 
prominent Presbyterian ministers joined with Quakers to establish dozens of 
manumission societies across the region. According to Birdseye biographer 
Durwood Dunn, “As late as 1827, East Tennessee alone contained nearly 
one-fifth of all antislavery societies in the United States.” In one of the few 
direct links between Tennessee Valley abolitionism and the Franklin state-
hood movement, the Reverend Samuel Doak taught many of the Presbyte-
rian leaders of the early Tennessee abolitionist movement at Washington 
College. “Doak’s Log College” became the training ground for prominent 
antislavery leaders such as John Rankin and David Nelson. By 1841, every 
county comprising the former political boundary of the state of Franklin 
contained at least one abolitionist or antislavery organization.34
The Tennessee Valley manumission societies waged a highly effective 
antislavery campaign on the fringes of increasingly politically dominant and 
proslavery Middle Tennessee. Through the use of rousing political petitions 
and the publication of antislavery newspapers and pamphlets, Tennessee 
Valley abolitionists pressured local, state, and federal leaders to confront the 
moral indignities and economic consequences of the institution of slavery. In 
an amazing testament to their determination, East Tennessee abolitionists 
from sixteen counties convinced the delegates to the 1834 Tennessee consti-
tutional convention to debate amending the state’s 1796 constitution to end 
slavery.35 From 1834 to 1835, a special committee, chaired by Hawkins 
County native John A. McKinney, considered the gradual emancipation of 
all slaves in East Tennessee and five additional counties in Middle Tennessee. 
Despite ultimately being defeated by the proslavery leadership of West and 
Middle Tennessee, East Tennessee abolitionists continued to promote their 
antislavery agenda. Members of the Tennessee Valley Manumission Society 
even backed the African colonization efforts of the 1820s and 1830s, and 
formed the Tennessee Colonization Society to lend their support to the grow-
ing effort to resettle freed slaves in Liberia.36
The Tennessee Valley’s twenty-five-year history of antislavery activity 
attracted Ezekiel Birdseye to the former state of Franklin. Birdseye moved 
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from his home near Stratford, Connecticut, to Newport, Tennessee (present- 
day Cocke County), to join in the flourishing Tennessee Valley antislavery 
movement. He collaborated with prominent Tennessee abolitionists such as 
Reverend H. Lea, Robert Bogle, John Caldwell, Reverend Boswell Rogers, 
Reverend Spencer Henry, and Maryville College president Dr. Isaac Ander-
son.37 As the Tennessee Valley antislavery forces strengthened, Ezekiel 
Birdseye dreamed of establishing an independent “free state” comprising 
“the mountain areas of Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia.”38 Be-
tween 1839 and 1840, Birdseye and Newport judge Jacob Peck met to dis-
cuss the creation of a free state of  “Frankland.” In a letter to Gerrit Smith, 
a wealthy philanthropist and abolitionist from Peterboro, New York, Birds-
eye described his dream “that East Tennessee might be detached from 
other parts of the state and made a separate and free state.” Despite his ef-
fort to “convince those with whom I have been acquainted . . . that such a 
division would contribute to the well being of East Tennessee,” Birdseye 
found himself “despaired to seeing it accomplished soon if ever.”39
Ezekiel Birdseye’s public advocacy for the creation of an abolitionist 
state in the heart of the slave south threatened to alienate potential Tennes-
see Valley slaveholding supporters of East Tennessee statehood.40 The savvy 
“Connecticut Yankee” responded by masking his abolitionist motivations 
for statehood behind a persuasive argument for East Tennessee’s economic 
independence. Birdseye switched his rhetoric promoting Tennessee Valley 
separatism from controversial moral arguments against the indignities of 
the “peculiar institution” to more socially palatable appeals involving inter-
nal improvements and regional economic growth.41 Birdseye joined a swell-
ing chorus of East Tennessee’s economic and political leaders demanding 
that the state government in Nashville promote the development of the re-
gion’s transportation arteries (roads, turnpikes, canals, and railroads) and 
increasingly isolated market economy.42 Birdseye echoed regional economic 
boosters in another letter to Gerrit Smith, stating that “the natural resources 
of the country were its mineral, agriculture, and manufacturing resources.” 
If East Tennesseans could be convinced to embrace “free labor,” “directed 
industry,” “a home market for the farmer,” and “such legislation as would 
encourage improvements,” Birdseye believed that the region would experi-
ence a renaissance of “wealth and prosperity.”43 Birdseye justified his deci-
sion to submerge the abolitionist roots of his support for statehood, 
confiding to Smith, “Those who hope by this means [creating a new state] 
to exterminate slavery in East Tennessee think it will be prudent to say little 
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on that subject or publickly [sic] on it until the act of separation is deter-
mined then to make an effort to carry that measure.” Birdseye expressed 
confidence that “a very large majority of our people would vote for the ter-
mination of slavery without delay,” but feared that the “surrounding slave 
states would take the alarm and no doubt make strenuous efforts to coun-
teract a policy which they deem destructive to their interests.”44 After the 
creation of a new state of Frankland, Birdseye believed that “The friends of 
the slave would have an open field and opportunity to meet the advocates 
of slavery in debate.”45
Birdseye’s new fiscal appeals for Tennessee Valley independence drew 
the northern abolitionist into an unlikely alliance with one of the South’s 
leading political figures, Andrew Johnson. Johnson served as the Tennessee 
state senator for Greene and Hawkins counties and tenaciously promoted 
the economic development of East Tennessee.46 Since 1836, the Tennessee 
legislature had passed two separate pieces of legislation aimed at improving 
the region’s transportation system. Both efforts proved to be ineffectual, 
resulting in only “one turnpike and false starts on two railroads.”47 To an 
ambitious politician and businessman like Andrew Johnson, the develop-
ment of the Tennessee Valley’s economy became a salient political issue. In 
the winter of 1841, representatives from across the Tennessee Valley con-
vened in Knoxville to promote the construction of a transmontane railroad, 
turnpikes, and the “improvement of navigation of the Tennessee River.” 
Both Andrew Johnson and Ezekiel Birdseye attended the “internal improve-
ment conventions.” Birdseye, representing Cocke County, described the 
meetings to Gerrit Smith: “On Monday and Tuesday of this week [Novem-
ber 22–23] I attended the internal improvement convention of East Ten-
nessee at Knoxville.” Over the span of two separate conventions, the East 
Tennesseans drafted a memorial to the Tennessee legislature requesting 
that they release approximately $650,000 dollars to complete the Hiawas-
see Railroad, to construct a turnpike from Abingdon, Virginia, to Knox-
ville, and to improve navigation on the Tennessee River.48 Amid the debate 
over how to improve the region’s economy, the delegates considered a plan 
for forming an independent state out of the counties of East Tennessee. 
According to Birdseye, “This was discussed in the convention on both days” 
and “Not a single opponent appeared.”49 Both Johnson and Birdseye left the 
internal improvement conventions optimistic about the economic and moral 
future of their Tennessee Valley communities.50
At the next legislative session, representatives from Middle and West 
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Tennessee de facto rejected the Tennessee Valley memorial by agreeing to 
sue the Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad Company, owners 
of the Hiawassee Railroad, for an earlier breach of contract. The lawsuit all 
but ensured the failure of the trans-Appalachian rail line through the Ten-
nessee Valley and outraged regional politicians. In response to the defeat of 
the internal improvement memorial, Andrew Johnson introduced a resolu-
tion in the Tennessee Senate to organize an independent state of Frankland 
out of East Tennessee and the mountainous portions of Georgia, North 
Carolina, and Virginia. Johnson’s resolution called for the creation of “a joint 
select committee appointed to . . . take into consideration the expediency 
and constitutionality of ceding one of the grand divisions of the state (com-
monly called East Tennessee) to the General Government, for the purposes 
of being formed into a sovereign and independent state to be called ‘the State 
of Frankland.’”51
Throughout 1841 and 1842, the East Tennessee press enthusiastically 
promoted Birdseye and Johnson’s statehood ideas. In the Jonesboro Whig, 
newspaper editor William G. “Parson” Brownlow applauded the resolution 
and harshly criticized the political leadership of Middle Tennessee for po-
litically and economically neglecting the eastern part of their state. Ezekiel 
Birdseye informed Judge Peck, “There are three political newspapers in 
Knoxville all of which now advocate the policy of separating East from 
West Tennessee. The other papers in East Tennessee will so far as I am in-
formed give their support of the measure.”52 An anonymous congressman 
and contributor to the Knoxville Argus defended the separatist resolution, 
stating his East Tennessee constituents did “not [have] a single interest in 
common with the people west of the mountains.” E. G. Eastman, editor of 
the Knoxville Argus, described his utopian version of an independent Frank-
land. Eastman believed that once the “chains which render East Tennessee 
subservient to the more powerful division of the State shall be severed,” the 
state of Franklin “will, like a bird thrown free from its cage, rise with buoy-
ant and vigorous wing, and soar high above the clouds of adversity which 
now hang heavy upon her.”53
In January 1842, the Tennessee Senate finally voted on Andrew John-
son’s Frankland resolution. Led by the determined senators from East Ten-
nessee, the statehood proposal passed by a vote of seventeen to six. The 
senate appointed Johnson and John R. Nelson, the representative from 
Knox and Roane counties, to the Frankland statehood committee and 
passed the resolution on to the state’s House of Representatives for their 
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consideration. Samuel Milligan, the representative from Greene and Wash-
ington counties, led the effort in the Tennessee House of Representatives to 
secure passage of the Frankland resolution. The contentious debate sur-
rounding the statehood proposal revealed the bitter factionalism that con-
tinued to define East Tennessee politics. The members of the House of 
Representatives rejected the separatist resolution twenty-nine to forty-one, 
with the East Tennessee representatives splitting their votes.54 The defeat of 
the “Johnson-Milligan resolution” derailed the plan to create an independent 
state of Frankland.55 Despite continued support from within the communi-
ties of East Tennessee, the second Frankland statehood movement suc-
cumbed to entrenched internal regional divisions and vicious partisan attacks 
from the political leadership west of the Tennessee Valley.56
The similarities between Arthur Campbell and John Sevier’s state of 
Franklin and Ezekiel Birdseye and Andrew Johnson’s state of Frankland are 
striking. Both movements generated support within East Tennessee by 
capitalizing on the perception of political and economic marginalization by 
the distant centers of state government and the struggle for regional internal 
improvements. In the first manifestation of backcountry separatism, fron-
tier defense and the development of the Tennessee Valley’s land-based 
economy factored as two of the primary motivations for independence.57 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the expansion of the region’s 
trade and transportation infrastructure inspired the rebirth of East Tennes-
see separatism. The moral and religious leadership of the Tennessee Valley 
played critical roles in both statehood movements, and the efforts to inject 
the radical principles of republicanism and abolitionism met with identical 
political rebuke. Andrew Johnson and Ezekiel Birdseye never directly ac-
knowledged that their movement built upon the legacy of the first state of 
Franklin, but by the middle of the nineteenth century, the memory of Frank-
lin and the heroic defenders of frontier independence increasingly defined 
the identity of the politically marginalized and perpetually polarized East 
Tennesseans.
For nearly two decades following the defeat of the second Franklin 
statehood movement, East Tennessee separatist sentiment lay dormant, but 
the antebellum secession debates in the U.S. Congress, the Tennessee legis-
lature, and within the communities of the Tennessee Valley rekindled the 
ideological flames of eastern separatism. In the two decades preceding the 
Civil War, the Tennessee Valley economy experienced “its own small-scale 
industrial revolution.” The completion of the East Tennessee and Virginia 
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Railroad across the region and the potential financial windfalls offered by 
the extraction of the region’s coal, iron, and copper deposits threatened to 
transform the communities of East Tennessee. Rural industrialization and 
its reliance upon free labor seemed incompatible with Tennessee’s en-
trenched slave labor–based agrarian economy. Across the United States, 
antislavery industrial boosters and manufacturers attacked the institution 
as archaic and detrimental to the growth of America’s advancing industrial 
economy.58 Despite their reputation as rabid southern abolitionists, a sig-
nificant number of East Tennesseans clearly owned slaves, and the majority 
of the region’s inhabitants supported the preservation of the institution.59 
The development of early mineral extraction and manufacturing industries, 
the entrenchment of slave labor, and the growth of abolitionism created an 
explosive situation in the Tennessee Valley.60
In February 1860, Tennessee senator and Unconditional Unionist An-
drew Johnson stood before a bitterly divided U.S. Senate and harshly de-
nounced the most recent threats made by the political leadership of South 
Carolina to secede from the union. Over a two-day period, the Greeneville 
native castigated “run-mad Abolitionists” and “red-hot [southern] disun-
ionists” for being “engaged in [the] unholy and nefarious work of breaking 
up the Union.” During his fiery speech, Johnson laid the blame for the 
mounting sectional disharmony at the feet of both southerners and north-
erners. The Tennessean accused “the Abolitionists proper of the North” of 
“shaking the right hand of fellowship with the disunionists of the South in 
this work of breaking up the Union” by promoting their radical antislavery 
agenda. Johnson, who “emerged as the most visible and controversial south-
ern Unionist in Congress,” defended himself against personal attacks 
launched by pro-secessionist southern politicians branding him a “Black 
Republican” and an “ally” of abolitionism.61 Mississippi senator Jefferson 
Davis labeled Johnson a political hypocrite for opposing secession, stating 
that “Tennessee was born of secession” and “rocked in the cradle of revolu-
tion.” In a clear reference to the first Franklin statehood movement, Davis 
revealed to the senators that “Tennessee . . . matured, and claimed to be a 
State because she had violently severed her connection with North Carolina, 
and through an act of secession and revolution claimed then to be a State.” 
Davis questioned Johnson’s “position” as a “great objector against the exer-
cise of the right of secession” when the state the senator represented “was 
born of secession.”62 Jefferson Davis transformed the Franklin separatist 
movement into a patriotic precedent for southern secession, and in the pro-
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cess struck an effective blow against one of the few southern politicians open-
ly opposing the dissolution of the union.
Andrew Johnson countered Senator Davis’s misrepresentation of early 
Tennessee history by using the chaos and violence surrounding the Franklin 
separatist movement to warn of the dangers posed by secession. Johnson 
challenged Davis’s implication that his state owed its existence to secession, 
and offered his own set of political lessons to be drawn from the Franklin 
fiasco. Reading from John H. Wheeler’s 1851 Historical Sketches of North 
Carolina from 1584–1851, Johnson recounted Wheeler’s version of the rise 
and fall of the state of Franklin and its “brave and patriotic” leader John 
Sevier. After concluding his reading of Wheeler, Johnson opined that Se-
vier “had fallen into this error of secession or separation from the State of 
North Carolina,” and the “doctrine of secession could not even be sustained 
by him, with his great popularity and with the attachment the people had 
for him.” According to Johnson, “Instead of Tennessee having her origin or 
birth in secession, the precise reverse [was] true.” “The State of Franklin 
had its birth in an attempt at disunion and was rocked to death in the cradle 
of secession,” leaving its “great defender and founder [John Sevier] lodged 
in irons.” The senator from Tennessee argued that the Franklin statehood 
movement demonstrated the “nefarious” consequences of the “blighting,” 
and the “withering doctrine of secession.” Even the “great” John Sevier, who 
“even now [is] venerated” in Tennessee, could not escape the “infamous,” 
“diabolical,” “hell-born and hell-bound doctrine of secession.” Johnson as-
sured the senators that Tennessee “has many fond recollections of the Revo-
lution, but with all her revolutionary character, her people have never 
attempted secession.” In a remarkable effort at historical revisionism, An-
drew Johnson recast the Franklinites as helpless pawns controlled by the 
irresistible and maddening disease of secession.63
Andrew Johnson’s contested effort in the U.S. Congress to stall the 
disintegration of the union reflected the partisan tensions resulting from 
the secession crisis across the state of Tennessee. After the secession of seven 
southern states, Tennesseans confronted the difficult decision of whether to 
join South Carolina, Mississippi, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, 
and Texas in abandoning the union. In a February 1861 referendum, Ten-
nesseans voted “four to one” against convening a secession convention to 
decide their state’s political fate. After the April 1861 Confederate assault 
on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, residents of Tennessee considered a 
second secession referendum. The swirling uncertainties of civil war and 
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President Abraham Lincoln’s call for troops to suppress the rebellion con-
vinced Tennessee voters to reverse their state’s political course. On June 8, 
1861, Tennesseans voted overwhelmingly to “leave the Union,” and on June 
24, Tennessee governor Isham G. Harris pronounced that “all connection 
by the state of Tennessee with the Federal Union [is] dissolved.” Of the 
47,238 votes cast against secession, nearly 18,000 came from East Tennes-
see, all but ensuring that “East Tennessee would become a Unionist strong-
hold” throughout the Civil War.64 The failure of Andrew Johnson and his 
fellow East Tennesseans to stop their state from abandoning the union 
ushered in one of the most divisive and violent periods in the Tennessee 
Valley’s history.65
The secession of their state from the union bitterly divided the residents 
of East Tennessee. Despite overwhelming opposition to secession from East 
Tennesseans, there remained a vocal and determined pro-secession contin-
gent within the region. An examination of East Tennessee’s Confederate 
leadership reveals that regional supporters of secession were primarily drawn 
“from a rising commercial-professional class that was emerging as the re-
gion became even more firmly integrated into the [national] market econo-
my.” These young Tennessee Valley entrepreneurs, residing mostly in urban 
areas and towns, established close commercial ties to the lower South. As a 
result of these market connections, these new economic elites positioned 
themselves to compete with the region’s entrenched families, mostly Union-
ists, for economic and political control of the Tennessee Valley.66 Over the 
course of the Civil War, East Tennesseans witnessed vicious partisan vio-
lence within their region and a destructive “bushwhacker war” that terror-
ized their communities. East Tennessee remained a political stronghold for 
southern unionism throughout the conflict and a direct threat to the Con-
federate military effort. For much of the war, either Union or Confederate 
troops occupied the former communities of the state of Franklin.67
Amid the anarchy and violence gripping East Tennessee, several of the 
region’s leading political figures reintroduced East Tennessee separatism, 
and on June 17, 1861, East Tennesseans met in Greeneville to consider their 
next course of action.68 Over the four-day session, the delegates passed 
“resolutions expressing their desire not to be involved in civil war,” and re-
jecting their state government’s passage of the “ordinance of separation.”69 
The attendees also appointed a committee to draft legislation to be pre-
sented to the Tennessee legislature “seeking consent” to form an indepen-
dent state out of East Tennessee and the unionist counties of Middle 
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Tennessee. On June 29, 1861, the Tennessee legislature rejected the “State 
of Frankland” petition, defeating Tennessee Valley separatism for a third 
time in seventy-seven years.70
From the original statehood movement through the multiple nineteenth-
century manifestations of East Tennessee separatism, the state of Franklin 
remained inexorably linked to the fierce competition to control the political 
and economic direction of the Tennessee Valley. By utilizing rhetorical 
flourishes, patriotic symbolism, and appeals for infrastructural improve-
ment, advocates for East Tennessee independence drew upon the legacy and 
mythology of John Sevier’s state of Franklin to promote their political, 
economic, and moral agendas.71 The historical sparring between the de-
scendents of the Franklinites and Tiptonites, Ezekiel Birdseye’s free state of 
Frankland, and Andrew Johnson’s desperate efforts to defuse the secession 
crisis in the U.S. Senate fit onto a historical continuum of redefining the 
Franklin statehood movement. Franklin’s historical, political, and cultural 
transformation did not end with the Civil War. Over the next 150 years, 
East Tennessee historians, business leaders, and politicians continued to 
reshape Franklin’s historical legacy and recast the movement’s significance 
to Tennessee and America’s history.
While no man has the right to object to or to protest the facts of 
history, neither has any man the right to pervert those facts, nor 
unjustly to characterize them according to his own whim or fancy, 
and thereby detract from the good name and fame of men, who in 
their day and generation served the State and its people faithfully 
and well, with singular disinterestedness, sacrifice, and devotion.
—Mathews, “The Spanish ‘Conspiracy’ in Tennessee”
The “facts of history” are rarely unambiguous, and more often than not, 
they are highly subjective and open to an infinite number of interpreta-
tions. The events of and the participants in the Franklin separatist move-
ment present a striking reminder of this historical truism. The state of 
Franklin stood briefly as America’s unrecognized fourteenth state, and the 
defenders of statehood naturally tried to cast their movement in the most 
favorable political and historical light possible. Throughout the twentieth 
century, the historical legacy of the state of Franklin continued to be a 
source of state and local pride and an effective symbol for the promotion of 
economic improvements and political interests within East Tennessee. On 
April 19, 1931, Nashville sculptors Belle Kinney and Leopold F. Scholz un-
veiled their eight-foot-tall bronze statue of John Sevier at the Statuary Hall 
in Washington, D.C.1 The monument, donated by the state of Tennessee, 
depicts Sevier standing heroically with his arms crossed and a sword draped 
on his side. The short biographical sketch of Sevier included with the un-
veiling’s “program of exercises” only mentioned the state of Franklin in 
passing. The program read: “When because of inability of North Carolina 
to afford governmental protection to the ‘over-mountain’ people, the inde-
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pendent State of Franklin was established, Sevier became its first and only 
governor. When the government fell he was arrested for treason, but was 
never tried, and his disabilities were removed.”2 Less than ten years later, 
the Tennessee state legislature passed an act to preserve the Knox County 
home of John Sevier. The 1941 bill provided $4,500 dollars in state funds 
to purchase Sevier’s home and forty adjoining acres of farmland, and allo-
cated $3,500 dollars to restore the property “to as near its original condition 
as possible.” The legislature also set aside $600 dollars annually to maintain 
what eventually became the Marble Springs Historic Site. John Sevier’s 
prestige as a “commonwealth builder and Revolutionary hero” continued to 
ascend to new heights.3
On June 1, 1946, the Library of Congress included “a display on the 
state of Franklin” in their sesquicentennial celebration of the founding of 
the state of Tennessee. The Jefferson and Sevier county chapters of the As-
sociation for the Preservation of Tennessee Antiquities even “commemo-
rated the signing of the Treaty of Dumplin Creek.” In an “impressive 
ceremony” held on June 10, 1954, attendees were treated to a lecture by Dr. 
Robert H. White on the “historical consequences of the signing of the 
treaty,” and “a pageant . . . which reenacted the negotiations which took 
place between the Commissioners of the State of Franklin and representa-
tives of the Cherokee Indian nation on June 10, 1785.” The chairman of the 
Dumplin Creek Historical Commission, Dr. Dan M. Robison, dedicated a 
plaque “commemorating the signing of the treaty.” The plaque read, “The 
only treaty made by the State of Franklin was signed here after some nego-
tiation. Commissioners were John Sevier, Joseph Outlaw, and Daniel Ken-
nedy. Signatory Cherokee chiefs were the King of the Cherokee Ancoo of 
Chota, Abraham of Chilhowee, The Sturgeon of Tallassee, The Bard of the 
Valley Towns, and some thirty others.” The celebration is remarkable in 
light of the Dumplin Creek Treaty’s controversial territorial cessions and 
disastrous repercussions for the Overhill Cherokee.4
During the middle of the twentieth century, the state of Franklin be-
came the subject of two historical romance novels. The novelists cast the 
turmoil surrounding the state of Franklin as their literary backdrop and 
many participants in the statehood movement as characters in their love 
stories. Helen Topping Miller set her 1947 novel, The Sound of Chariots, in 
the early months of the state of Franklin, but only loosely followed the ac-
tual historical events of the statehood movement. The novel traces the 
frontier exploits of Giles Hanna, an impoverished soldier and Sevier loyal-
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ist, and Raleigh Bevan, a villainous, foulmouthed land speculator. Most of 
Miller’s story unfolds before the birth of Franklin, but she did include a 
brief allusion to the future of the doomed state. Miller described Franklin 
as a “new little state that had been born in the fierce morning of indepen-
dence, in the minds of the proudly independent men who had fathered it. 
. . . A valiant little state!” She mournfully repined, “It was to live in a tumult 
of argument and dissension. It was to fight valorously for its life for four 
brief years. And then it was no more, and the people who trod its hills and 
valleys a century after might not know even that it had lived.”5
In 1952, Chicago native Noel B. Gerson published The Cumberland 
Rifles, which he described as a “Novel about the Lost State of Franklin and 
Spain’s abortive attempt to conquer young America.” Gerson’s tale included 
numerous “historical figures,” such as John Sevier, George Elholm, John 
Tipton, Don Diego de Gardoqui, and Don Esteban Miro, as well as several 
characters that were “the products of [Gerson’s] imagination.” The novel 
revolved around the efforts of Boston schoolteacher Rosalind Walker to 
open a female seminary in the Tennessee Valley and a secretive plot carried 
out by Spanish undercover agents Janus Elholm and Harold Jordan “to over-
throw the stripling government of Franklin.” Despite being a work of his-
torical fiction, Gerson capitalized on the immense popularity of John 
Sevier by making him one of the heroes of his story. In the novel’s climactic 
ending, Sevier and Nashville-founder James Robertson lead the “army of 
Franklin” in an epic defeat of the treacherous “Castilians.” Sales of both 
novels undoubtedly benefited from the burgeoning Franklin mythology and 
the romanticization of the Tennessee Valley separatists.6
One of the most publicized expressions of the romanticization of John 
Sevier and the state of Franklin occurred with the 1956 and 1958 produc-
tions of Kermit Hunter’s outdoor drama Chucky Jack: The Story of Tennessee. 
Hunter, best known for his plays Unto These Hills and Horn in the West, 
crafted a moving account of the postrevolutionary life of John Sevier and 
the founding of the state of Tennessee. With the backing of the Great 
Smoky Mountains Historical Association, Chucky Jack played to large audi-
ences in Gatlinburg’s 2,501-seat Hunter Hills Theatre. A 1956 ticket order 
form described the drama:
Hero of King’s Mountain—one of the first settlers to push down the 
green valleys to the west—member of the Continental Congress— 
founder of the Lost State of Franklin—first governor of Tennes-
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see—one of the truly great American patriots . . . JOHN SEVIER! 
. . . called by the Indians CHUCKY JACK from his pioneer home 
on the Nolichucky River. Now this giant figure comes to life in a 
vivid and stirring outdoor drama, set in the breathtaking Hunter 
Hills Theatre at Gatlinburg in the cool shadows of the Great 
Smokies. Sixteen memorable scenes trace the career of this eminent 
statesman whose character and leadership at a crucial moment 
molded the very foundations of American democracy. Authentic 
Colonial costumes, exciting incidents, colorful dances, a magnifi-
cent musical score composed by Jack Frederick Kilpatrick
. . . CHUCKY JACK is an experience you will always remember.
For the cost of the $1.50 ticket, one could ride the trackless sightseeing train, 
called the “Chucky Jack Special,” up to the outdoor amphitheater and witness 
the story of “a man who braved the wilderness of long ago to establish a new 
social order, to give opportunity and scope to the people around him, to 
produce in the western wilderness a better way of life.” Chucky Jack stood as 
the theatrical embodiment of the mythology of John Sevier and the state of 
Franklin.7
In 1965, the staff of East Tennessee State University’s B. Carroll Reece 
Memorial Museum began preparations for a Lost State of Franklin exhibi-
tion. The yearlong exhibition sought to highlight Franklin’s role in the de-
velopment of East Tennessee. As Reece Museum curator Robert S. Moore 
and his staff began to collect documents, paintings, and memorabilia relat-
ing to the statehood movement, they unintentionally endorsed the roman-
ticized version of Franklin’s history. The organizers of the exhibit failed to 
include any meaningful reference to Franklin’s turbulent relations with the 
southeastern Indians or conspiratorial connections to the Spanish govern-
ment in their display. Despite the perpetual Indian violence and territorial 
disputes plaguing the state, the Franklin exhibitors chose only to feature a 
copy of a 1772 “Watauga Treaty with the Indians” and a child’s toy “replica 
of an Indian bark canoe.” There is not a single allusion to the Spanish In-
trigue or the clandestine relationship between Franklin governor John Se-
vier and Dr. James White in the exhibition catalog. By excluding these two 
fundamental elements, the staff of the B. Carroll Reece Memorial Museum 
purged the most bothersome aspects of the statehood movement from their 
exhibition and distorted Franklin’s checkered past.8
Buried deep within the voluminous papers of Kingsport native and Ten-
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nessee state congressman James H. Quillen, preserved in the East Tennessee 
State University archives, are several copies of a very unusual piece of legisla-
tion. Quillen’s “Franklin Bill” aimed “to establish and create the territory of 
Franklin, and to authorize said territory to petition for admittance as the 
51st sovereign State of the United States.” The largely symbolic act read:
Whereas; the great traditions and the peerless heritage of the 
former State of Franklin have been obscured and lost for future 
generations, and it is deemed beneficial and desirable to the future 
welfare of our Country that the former State of Franklin be re-
created, and that section of our present sovereign State of Tennessee 
lying to the East of the Cumberland Mountains and comprising 
the Eastern Grand Division of the State of Tennessee is composed 
of the descendents of those great men who originally carved out of 
a wilderness the State of Franklin, and which said section of the 
State is indigenous to the stalwart characteristics and qualities of 
leadership which contributed so greatly to the establishment and 
preservation of our nation.9
Amazingly, Quillen penned his State of Franklin Bill in the spring of 1961 to 
serve as a political gimmick aimed at increasing support for his Republican 
Party in East Tennessee. A few days after reading his Franklin Bill before the 
Tennessee House of Representatives, Congressman Quillen received a West-
ern Union telegram from Kentucky state senator H. Nick Johnson expressing 
his desire for “the State of Franklin to include Southeastern Kentucky.” The 
Republican Congressmen informed Senator Johnson that “I have been hav-
ing a ‘good time’ on my bill to recreate the Grand Old State of Franklin.” He 
joked to Johnson, “I really appreciate your joining with me on this to include 
Southeastern Kentucky. Perhaps we can make Republicans out of them.”10 Of 
course, the State of Franklin Bill failed to pass in the Tennessee legislature, 
but James H. Quillen’s personal crusade to “publicize” the “colorful history” 
of the state of Franklin continued for thirty more years.11
In 1962, Tennesseans elected James H. Quillen to the U.S. House of 
Representatives from the First Congressional District. Over the Sullivan 
County native’s thirty-four-year stay in Congress, he managed to procure 
significant federal funding to improve East Tennessee’s economy and trans-
portation network. In 1982, Quillen used his considerable political influ-
ence to convince Tennessee’s political leaders to build the James H. Quillen 
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College of Medicine at East Tennessee State University. In December of 
that same year, Quillen joined with other congressional Republicans to pass 
the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. The bill, eventually 
signed into law by President Ronald Reagan, provided federal funds to 
complete two important highways in East Tennessee, “Johnson City’s State 
of Franklin Road and the Great Smoky Mountains’ Foothills Parkway.”12 
The city of Johnson City and Washington County started construction of 
the State of Franklin Road at the end of the 1970s, but budget shortfalls 
and logistical problems led to delays in completing the first two sections of 
the thoroughfare. By 1982, only a small critical stretch of the road remained 
unfinished, and Congressman Quillen’s unwavering support for the “prior-
ity” project ensured its eventual completion. Johnson City residents finally 
witnessed the realization of the State of Franklin Road in 1995, and the 
roadway remains one of the central arteries in Washington County. By 
naming one of East Tennessee’s most traveled roadways after the state of 
Franklin, Congressman Quillen and the political leadership of East Ten-
nessee cemented the state’s legacy in the minds of the thousands of drivers 
daily navigating the Johnson City street and once again fused John Sevier’s 
statehood movement to internal improvement efforts within the Tennessee 
Valley.13
In 1968, East Tennessee banker W. E. Newell delivered a remarkable 
address to the business leaders of East Tennessee, entitled “The Tri-City 
Area and the State of Franklin.” Newell’s speech connected the state of 
Franklin to the “industrial development” and economic “growth” of the 
Tri-City Area (encompassing Bristol, Kingsport, and Johnson City). He 
argued, “In order to understand the present economic and industrial situa-
tion here in Bristol and the Tri-city area, we must first look at the . . . ‘Lost 
State of Franklin.’” In what assuredly must have seemed like a strange topic 
for a lecture on regional fiscal promotion, Newell related the history of 
Franklin to his audience. His familiar romanticized version of Franklin 
masked the true purpose of his lecture. Newell pointed out that “through-
out the entire history of the United States, there has been little in common 
between the North Carolina country this side of the mountains and the 
state capital in Raleigh.” Similarly, he believed that “There has been little in 
common between the Tennessee section east of the Cumberlands and the 
state capital, Nashville,” and in truth “economically, agriculturally, politi-
cally, and socially, the areas comprising the ‘Lost State of Franklin’ are 
[still] more closely bound to each other than they are to the Bluegrass sec-
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tions of Nashville and Frankfort, the aristocratic Tidewater section of Vir-
ginia, or the wealthy Piedmont section of North Carolina.”14 Newell drew 
upon the “common bond,” cemented during the trying days of Franklin, to 
implore East Tennessee’s economic leaders to “seek new industry” and 
“keep atuned [sic] to the needs of the industry that we already have.” He 
encouraged attendees to “work together toward keeping the milk stool bal-
anced and the legs growing stronger through a cooperative effort for our 
mutual benefit.” In light of the significant relationship between the Frank-
lin statehood movement and the expansion of the Tennessee Valley’s frontier 
economy, Quillen’s and Newell’s use of the statehood movement for the 
promotion of regional economic development seems exceedingly appropri-
ate. Newell concluded his speech with these final rousing words: “Yes, be-
ginning with the Lost State of Franklin in the 1700s and running to this 
day of the so-called Great Society in the 20th Century, we in this area are 
bound together by strong social, political, geographical, and industrial ties. 
We are on the march industrially.”15
The economic boosterism of James H. Quillen and W. E. Newell rep-
resented only a small part of the role the state of Franklin continued to play 
in the fiscal development of East Tennessee during the second half of the 
twentieth century. Today, a brief scan of the Tri-City Area yellow pages re-
veals numerous businesses that adopted the state of Franklin into their cor-
porate identities. In February 1996, the first office of the recently chartered 
State of Franklin Savings Bank opened its doors for business on 612 West 
Walnut Street in Johnson City. Over the next five years, the bank expanded 
to include four additional branches and became one of the most successful 
businesses in the Tennessee Valley. In addition to local banking, East Ten-
nessee entrepreneurs also incorporated Franklin’s name into several other 
businesses, including: State of Franklin Real Estate Company, State of 
Franklin Chiropractic, State of Franklin Healthcare, and State of Franklin 
Insurance Company. These business owners hope to profit from the region’s 
pride in the statehood movement that occurred in their communities more 
than two hundred years earlier.16
The history and memory of the state of Franklin continue to evolve, as 
critics and supporters of the Franklinites defend their positions in the pages 
of history books, in the words of patriotic oratories, and on the bronzed 
plaques of marbled monuments. As historian Michael Toomey points out, 
“it is perhaps fitting that the historical interpretation of the State of Frank-
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lin should be as complex as the circumstances under which the government 
functioned.” From the carefully crafted popular images of Franklin contem-
poraries to the historiographical wars waged in print, Franklin has never 
been and will never be a “lost” state.17
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